Social policy in the European Union: state of play 2015

Edited by David Natali and Bart Vanhercke
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Sixteenth annual report

Edited by David Natali and Bart Vanhercke

European Trade Union Institute (ETUI)
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Preface

Social policy in the European Union: state of play 2015 sheds light on the main challenges with which the past year has left us in the area of social policy writ large. It also looks ahead, identifying new opportunities for policymakers and social stakeholders alike. As the European Union (EU) has ceased to be the veritable ‘convergence machine’ it used to be, social and economic divergence (especially within the Eurozone) increasingly undermines the credibility of the European project. Reasoning in terms of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ – ‘the South’ versus ‘the North’ – will inevitably gain legitimacy, while the unfolding Greek tragedy is taking the legitimacy crises of the European project as a whole to an unprecedented level.

A set of political and institutional milestones has marked the most recent stage of European integration. As for EU politics, the 2014 European elections promised to be a turning point – for better or for worse – and have indeed the potential to increase the political legitimacy of EU governance. The appointment of the ‘last chance’ European Commission raises the prospect of a new institutional context that will allow fresh ideas to take hold and grow, including the announced – and much-needed – revamping of European social dialogue. In other words: for some observers, 2014 saw the first signs of a potential turning point in EU politics and the striking of a better balance between economic and social policies.

For others, the year 2014 has been another missed opportunity, confirming that the EU will not be able to overcome the formidable political and institutional hurdles, which continue to impede any kind of quasi-federal solution needed to move beyond the crisis. The ongoing process of simplification and improvement of the ‘acquis communautaire’, now known as the ‘Regulatory Fitness and Performance (REFIT) initiative, is already slowing down the legislative process, especially in the areas of social and environmental protection.
The main questions addressed by the book are: What would be the best ways for the EU to move forward from the crisis? To what extent are the post-European Parliamentary election period and the new European Commission game changers that can pave the way for a more social EU agenda? And finally, what are the limits of the increasingly important yet highly contested role of the EU in pushing national reforms in policy areas at the core of the welfare state?

This volume consists of two parts. The first sheds light on EU politics and governance after the Parliamentary elections. The Eurozone needs to save itself from its own rules and strict economic policies. Exactly what it needs to do and how it should do it is discussed by Vivien Schmidt in Chapter 1. Chapter 2, by Jonathan Zeitlin and Bart Vanhercke, examines the slow but steady ‘socialisation’ of the European Semester, which is an illustration of how the EU may be changing course already. Chapter 3, by Richard Hyman, asks what people, and their representative organisations, can do to promote policy change within the EU, especially within the Eurozone. The analysis of old and ‘new’ forms of protest and resistance to austerity is of particular importance in the context of the 2015 European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) Congress.

In the second part, Martin Myant provides a critical analysis of the current regime’s plans for social investment to spur economic recovery and offers some suggestions on how to better invest socially (Chapter 4). The next two chapters narrow the scope of the conversation, each taking a specific field of social policy. Thus Chiara Agostini and David Natali describe EU coordination of education and training policies and point to the EU’s contradictory take on education investment. Furio Stamati and Rita Baeten demonstrate the EU’s contested influence on national healthcare reforms, providing a comparative assessment. The question of whether the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is in fact a neoliberal Trojan horse is critically addressed by Dalila Ghailani and Aída Ponce.

The volume provides a forward-looking reflection on the EU political context, laying out both risks and opportunities for a new path for Europe. This is why we decided to slightly amend the title of the annual publication, which does more than merely describe ‘Social developments’ but rather provides a fully-fledged state of play of social policy in the European Union.
The European Social Observatory has worked together with the European Trade Union Institute and renowned external scholars to draw up this year's edition of the book. Through this collaborative publication, we aim to contribute to the debate between policymakers, social stakeholders and the research community, while providing accessible information and analysis for practitioners and students of European integration.

We look forward to engaging in a dialogue with you about the crucial issues addressed in this volume, and wish you happy reading.

Maria Jepsen, David Natali, Philippe Pochet and Bart Vanhercke

July 2015
Introduction
The EU and the social legacy of the crisis: piecemeal adjustment or room for a paradigm shift?

David Natali, Bart Vanhercke and Riley Johnson

Let’s not fool ourselves: while prudent recovery in the European economy seems to be underway in 2014/15, the robustness of this recovery is far from guaranteed. Much work still needs to be done at the EU level in areas such as macro-economic policy, financial market regulation, banking supervision, and, especially, taxation and social policymaking. Some may fear that because economic recovery has begun (at least in some Member States), the sense of urgency that motivated European leaders during the crisis will evaporate. Policymakers might indeed come to think, once again, that incremental changes in this or that area will do the trick, thereby neglecting the social legacy left behind by the economic crisis.

The social legacy of the financial crisis is deeply worrying. Total unemployment rates stood at 10.3% in 2014 (11.6% in the Eurozone) and projections for the next years are far from encouraging: unemployment in the Eurozone is expected to average 10.6 per cent in 2016 and 9.3 per cent in the EU as a whole: this is considerably above the pre-crisis levels of 7.5 per cent and 7.2 per cent (Diamond et al. 2015).1 In particular, young people have been hit hard by the recession. All in all, young people are on average 2.6 times more likely to be unemployed than adults. The wide difference in the performance of EU members continues, but last year a number of high-income countries

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1. Unemployment rates ranged from 26.8% in Greece and 24.8% in Spain to just 5.4 and 5.3% in Germany and Austria respectively (ETUI, 2015).
performed badly while some lower-income countries experienced some improvement (ETUI 2015: 33).

Things are no better when looking at other factors. For example, an overall reduction of public investment in the EU is further compounding the problem. In 2014, the level of total investment (both public and private) was 15% below the peak of 2007. Total fixed investment fell from 22.0% of GDP in the 2004-8 period to 19.4% in 2014. In some countries, little net change occurred over this period, while in others, investment fell: Cyprus, Ireland, Greece, Latvia and Spain all saw falls in investment of 10% of their GDPs. Most of the decline occurred in the area of private investment, but public fixed investment also fell by more than 50% in Southern Europe (ETUI 2015: 13). Unsurprisingly then, increasing numbers of people face a lack of access to basic goods and services in the EU. The number of people lacking essential items like housing, food and clothes rose to nearly 16% of the total population in 2012. Furthermore, just over 24% of the European population is at risk of poverty and social inclusion. There has been a significant fall in real household income per head from 2008-2014 (in line with the fall in GDP per head and the fall in employment rates). In other words, an increasing share of Europe's middle class is now at risk of becoming poor at some point in their lives.

These trends should worry policymakers: doing nothing or enacting only incremental changes should not be an option. Yet despite the worrying statistics, EU political institutions have not effectively addressed these problems. While EU policymakers have taken some steps in the right direction, much remains to be done. The following chapters show that 2014 and early 2015 were not a watershed for the EU. While both the policy strategy and institutional contexts have seen some changes when compared to earlier years, these changes may be ‘too late and too little’: a piecemeal adjustment that does not address the fundamental problems of the EU.

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2. If we consider the at-risk-of-poverty indicator calculated on the basis of the median average household income in 2008, before the crisis started, the share of the population at risk of poverty in the EU27 had risen in 2012 by an average of 10.8% (1.8 p.p.), and in the Eurozone (EA17) it had risen by 18% (2.9 p.p.) (ETUI 2015).
The present introduction is organised as follows: section one presents the key facets of the EU’s current situation. We refer to the events that have marked the EU in the last months: the European Parliament with a strong euro-sceptic component; the new strategy pursued by the Juncker Commission to regain a central role; the more growth-friendly programme based on the European Investment Fund and aimed at boosting economic growth, and the initiatives of the European Central Bank (ECB) to reduce interest rates and increase liquidity. These initiatives were then finalised through the introduction of a quantitative easing programme in 2015.

Sections two and three provide a critical review of the state of the EU and its social dimension, which give two opposite but still complementary visions of the EU. Section two, in line with a more pessimistic reading, shows evidence of a very disappointing state of the Union. There is a risk that both the EU (potential exit of the UK) and EMU (with the never-ending Greek crisis) may collapse, and, in parallel, there is an utter lack of improvement in terms of EU fiscal capacity. While in 2013 the Social Investment Package was presented as an opportunity to fix and implement a new growth-oriented paradigm, it has proved to have limited effects. Tensions concerning migration and the weak EU position in the Ukraine crisis are also a worrying threat to the feeble sense of solidarity between EU members.

Section three takes a more optimistic stance vis-à-vis the EU and the progress of its social dimension. The new Commission has placed some emphasis on the need for a stronger social dimension in Europe (including social dialogue). In this context, the ECB has attempted to encourage more growth, while a prudent ‘socialisation’ of the European Semester has taken place. The Juncker Commission has emphasised the need to reinforce the social dimension of the EU. At the same time, the revised governance of the structural funds is an opportunity for a more balanced and effective approach to growth. Section four outlines the main themes in the book and stresses that, beyond optimism and pessimism, the incremental changes introduced to EU governance are not enough to address major socio-economic and political problems. Essential challenges are putting the EU at risk while there is a danger of further damage to its social dimension.
1. Some new features in the EU institutional landscape since the European elections

In political terms, the European Parliament elections were a key moment in 2014. This political event has had further institutional and political consequences that marked the last months of the year and early 2015.

1.1 European Parliament Elections: not an earthquake, but growing tension

Between 22 and 25 May 2014, elections to the European Parliament (EP) were held in the European Union: 500 million voters living in the 28 different sovereign states elected 751 parliamentarians for a five-year mandate.

While the European People's Party lost ground to the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, it remained the largest faction in the new parliament. But the big novelty was the increased consensus in favour of anti-establishment parties: their representation more than doubled to about 24% of seats in the Parliament. These forces are not exclusively on the political right of the spectrum. They include a huge range of parties and groups from the Right (e.g. the French Front national) and the Left (e.g. the Greek Syriza) (Emmanouilidis and Stratulat 2014; Reguly 2014).

While the centre-right and centre-left will still hold the majority of seats – they currently have more than half of the 751 seats in the EU legislature – they will face a key challenge from the anti-EU opposition (Taylor and Emmott 2014). Anti-EU movements suffered from their own heterogeneity and fragmentation in the first months of the legislature. But in late 2014 and early 2015 they started to regroup. This is shown by the formation of two parliamentary groups: the EFDD (Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy) with Britain’s UK Independence Party (UKIP) and the Five-star Movement from Italy; and the Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) led by Marine Le Pen’s Front National and the Dutch PVV and which will also include representatives of Austria’s FPO party, Belgium’s Vlaams Belang, and Italy’s Lega Nord. The priority of these two groups is to dissolve the
Eurozone. These parties could be able to influence discussions in Parliament on very divisive issues such as immigration. The success of these parties is a massive threat for the EU (see the concluding chapter).

1.2 Top candidates for the Presidency of the Commission

One of the key novelties of the Lisbon Treaty was implemented for the first time in 2014: the identification of top candidates for the post of President of the Commission. According to Art. 17.7 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), ‘taking into account the elections to the EP and after having held the appropriate consultations, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall propose to the EP a candidate for the President of the Commission’. This candidate shall be elected by the majority of the EP (Korfer 2014).

The so-called ‘leading candidates’ (Spitzenkandidaten) for the Presidency of the European Commission were in fact nominated to represent their respective European Parliament political Groups in the European elections in May 2014. This meant that a parliamentary electoral campaign took place in which political parties and their candidates competed on the basis of alternative programmes (ibid.).

This competition introduced a new element of political opposition at European level and is expected to alter the institutional balance of the EU. Two issues must be emphasised concerning this development. Firstly, implementation of this provision in the Treaty was not supported by all. Many national leaders were not convinced by the idea of organising the electoral campaign on the basis of leading candidates. More importantly, Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, was strongly against it. Secondly, the EU’s Lisbon Treaty has in fact shifted the balance of power towards the European Parliament, effectively declaring

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3. Six candidates were supported by the major political forces: Jean-Claude Juncker for the European Popular Party, Martin Schulz for Socialists and Democrats, Guy Verhofstadt for the Liberal group, Ska Keller and José Bové for the Greens, and Alexis Tsipras for the Party of the European left.
that national leaders should consult the Parliament concerning nomination of the Commission, that the choice has to reflect the outcome of parliament elections and that the chamber has to endorse the appointment by simple majority (see Schmidt in this volume).

1.3 From Barroso to Juncker: what is new?

After being put forward as a candidate for Commission President by the European Council, Jean-Claude Juncker was elected President of the European Commission in July 2014, in the European Parliament plenary session, by a strong majority of 422 votes.

In the first months of the new Commission, the new President has tried to address the main difficulties of the Barroso Commission: the declining political weight of the Commission in EU institutional dynamics (as a consequence of the inter-governmental turn of the EU); the increased mistrust of European public opinion vis-à-vis the Commission; and the very broad but ineffective agenda of initiatives (Gostyńska-Jakubowska 2015).

To restore the political role of the Commission, Juncker first reorganised its structure. The new structure centralises power with the President and his seven Vice-Presidents. Now the power of legislative initiative, which is the prerogative of the Commission according to the treaties, could effectively be taken from the ‘junior’ Commissioners and placed in the hands of the eight ‘senior’ ones. Any legislative bills initiating from the regular Commissioners will need the approval of their Vice-Presidents before they can be taken forward. There are several reasons for this new organisational set-up: on the one hand, it reinforces the Commission and makes it a true government, and on the other, it avoids excessive legislating (Emmanouilidis 2014). Yet, as stressed by many observers, the process in question has become more complicated; initiatives must now be validated by the Commissioner and the Vice-President concerned before being presented to the College of Commissioners (Robert 2014a).

The above-mentioned application of the Treaty for the designation of the Spitzenkandidaten and the new rules for the selection of the members of the Commission are designed to make it less of a
technocratic and more of a political body, and to help improve the Commission’s image (Gostyńska-Jakubowska 2015).

The new Commission then tried to be more focused. The action plan proposed at the end of 2014 consisted of about 20 legislative proposals (instead of the average of 130 proposals per annum submitted by the Barroso Commission).

1.4 New steps in the EU policy package

As well as these political-institutional changes, new measures were also taken to address the crisis. The key step of 2014 towards a growth-enhancing strategy was the proposal launched by the new President of the Commission, Juncker, for a European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) (see Myant in this volume). The fund, proposed in November 2014, consisted of about €315 billion: with €5 billion coming from the European Investment Bank and an €8 billion guarantee from existing EU funds, designed to secure a contribution of €16 billion in total from the institutions. The resulting EFSI fund totalling €21 billion is expected to generate €240 billion for long-term investments and €75 billion for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and mid-cap firms over the period 2015-2017 (Euractiv 2014a).

Meanwhile, the ECB acted to relaunch the economy while addressing the risk of deflation (Claeys 2014; Claeys et al. 2015). Between June and August 2014, the ECB launched measures to fight low inflation and boost the Eurozone economy through the lowering of deposit rates intended to boost liquidity for banks and then to firms and families. It lowered the deposit rate to -0.1%, meaning that it will effectively charge banks for holding their money overnight. It cut its main refinancing rate to 0.15%, and the marginal lending rate to 0.40% (Euractiv 2014b). Other steps included extending the duration of unlimited cheap liquidity for Eurozone banks, injecting about €170 billion by stopping tenders that withdrew funds spent on past government bond purchases, and preparing for possible future purchases of asset-backed securities to support small businesses. Banks were expected to use the money to lend to households and businesses, thereby directly helping to revive the economy, or take the money and buy assets themselves, or use the funds to substitute for issuing their
own debt. These measures were aimed at making money cheaper and easier to access (Euractiv 2014c). In January 2015, the ECB announced the launch of a 1.1 trillion euro quantitative easing programme to stimulate growth and fight against deflation across the single currency area. In March 2015, the ECB and the national central banks of the Eurozone started a programme to buy about €60 billion of public and private bonds each month until September 2016.

While these events partly altered the austerity paradigm, analysts have been seen to be divided in their assessment of the effectiveness of these measures. The next two sections summarise the sharply contrasting points of view. We first refer to the pessimistic interpretation and then move to a more optimistic evaluation of the state of the EU.

2. Four reasons to be pessimistic: the existential crises of the EU are still to be addressed

First, despite all the reforms mentioned above, there is a risk of radical destabilisation of the EU. As shown by recent events, the Greek crisis has destabilised EMU, and the Eurozone is still at risk. Anke Hassel, Professor of Public Policy at the Hertie School of Governance, compared the relationship between Greece and Germany to a teenage ‘game of chicken’. The game involves two combatants – in this metaphorical case, Greece and Germany – who are both in cars on a collision course with each other. The object of the game is to force the other car to swerve first, with the loser being referred to as a coward or ‘chicken’. Of course, if nobody swerves, both die (or at least are badly injured) in a horrific car-crash. The parallels with the EU economic climate, at least in the first semester of 2015, were strong: both Greece and Germany were trying to get the other to give in to their respective demands, the fiscal equivalent of swerving. If neither changes course, the Eurozone could face fatal consequences. The problem with this game is that the Syriza government in Greece has picked, in Germany, the wrong opponent (Hassel 2015). Indeed, in a classic game of chicken, both combatants are equal. One car does not weigh significantly more than the other, and the consequences for each are therefore equal. This is not the case here in the eyes of Germany. German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble pictures himself in the proverbial Mercedes-Benz truck heading towards a confrontation with his Greek counterpart Yanis
Varoufakis, who is riding on nothing but a scooter. If the two collide, at worst Germany will leave with a dent in its bumper. Greece, on the other hand, will be dead. So, while the EU’s blind focus on austerity has certainly not helped Greece, it is also fair to say that the new Greek government has mismanaged the crisis and has lost most of its allies.

This proverbial game of chicken will ultimately end with a Greek concession, but only after several rounds of high-profile and highly mediatized battles with Germany and the rest of the Eurozone. Greece might win some mostly symbolic concessions, so that Greece will be able say that not a single other Government could have got a better deal. For example, there might be some relaxing of pressure on reform and austerity, which will allow for some social investment (most likely in education) and for some reinforcement of the ‘weak state’ that Greece currently is. American economist Paul Krugman writes that ‘the shape of a deal is therefore clear: basically, a standstill on further austerity, with Greece agreeing to make significant but not ever-growing payments to creditors’ (Krugman 2015). The still present risk of Grexit, however, signals larger problems within the Eurozone. The latter has proved unable to resolve internal tensions derived from the sovereign debt crisis and the limits of an austerity-based plan to exit the recession. The social dimension of Europe is missing from the debate as well as the minimum degree of solidarity required in a union.

A second threat to the Eurozone is Brexit. The United Kingdom is talking about a potential exit from the EU, for reasons entirely independent of Greece’s. Britain has already opted out of the EMU and the Schengen Area. These two decisions indicated the different strategies pursued by London and Brussels in the field of monetary and migration policies. UK Prime Minister Cameron intends to hold a referendum on the matter of EU membership by 2017 and has opened a debate with the EU on several issues. In 2014-2015, both Grexit and Brexit represent a risk that the EU could lose both ground and members.

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4. Among these issues, the UK seems to want to impose a four-year waiting period before EU migrants can claim in-work benefits and to remove jobseekers after six months if they have not found work (Wilkinson and Prince 2015).
Second, the EU still lacks a genuine fiscal capacity and an effective banking union. The former would help to address asymmetric shocks and provide an alternative to internal (social) devaluation as the sole strategy for reacting to economic crisis. The latter would reduce the fragmentation of rules relating to the banking sector and allow for a more efficient cross-border crisis management. Belgian economist Paul De Grauwe compares the Eurozone ‘to a beautiful villa in which Europeans were ready to enter. Yet it was a villa that did not have a roof’ (De Grauwe 2011). To finish the building, the Eurozone must develop some kind of fiscal capacity to act as a stabilizer during financially troubled times. Furthermore, this fiscal capacity – in particular, an EU unemployment benefit scheme - would also double as a renewed ‘social contract’ with EU citizens (Zuleeg 2014). The EU should then facilitate the formation of an EU-wide banking union. The EU needs to forge an agreement on harmonisation of corporate taxation. Eventually, as the EU moves forward, it needs to do so by spending its funds on smart investments (such as education and healthcare). What is more, if we broaden our view to global decisions – see the chapter on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) by Ghailani and Ponce in this volume – the neoliberal agenda is still very much at the heart of the global political economy.

Third, the EU has missed the opportunity of the Social Investment Package and for a true investment strategy. There is widespread agreement among the scholarly community that investment in human capital is fundamental if we want to find a way out of the crisis, to and tackle the unsustainable social imbalances that are undermining the EU project as a whole. But what exactly is the EU’s ‘Social Investment Strategy’? We know it is not a (constraining) ‘Pact’, as the EP had requested. Is it not high time for the Commission to turn the Social Investment Strategy into a concrete programme for action, or risk a huge implementation gap?

Social investment can be interpreted as encompassing the set of policy measures and instruments that promote investments in human capital and enhancement of people’s capacity to participate in both social and economic life as well as in the labour market. The reconciliation of such a growth-oriented strategy with austerity and fiscal consolidation has proved particularly difficult. Bouget et al. (2015) recently identified four main ways in which a focus on fiscal consolidation and a failure to apply
social impact assessments of policy changes have often led to negative effects for the development of social investment policies:

— Firstly, fiscal consolidation has led to cuts in public and social expenditure, including some existing investments in building human and social capital, resulting in reductions in the availability and/or quality of programmes;
— Secondly, fiscal consolidation has led to a move away from successful universal social investment policies to more specific and conditional policies that target those most in need. These targeted policies are often less effective in addressing social challenges and lead to increased stigmatisation and inequality;
— Thirdly, fiscal consolidation has led to the postponement or cancellation of new policies that invest in human and social capital;
— Fourthly, fiscal consolidation has resulted in the prioritising of passive short-term measures aimed at protecting people over the introduction of more enabling and active longer-term measures.

The key areas where recent negative outcomes of social investment are frequently highlighted by experts of the newly established European Social Policy Network (ESPN) are: social insurance and income support; active labour market policies; child and family policies; education; elderly and long-term care; and access to health care. The deterioration of unemployment and minimum income protection (in terms of both length and adequacy) is particularly worrisome, insofar as adequate income protection should be the basis on which more ‘social investment-related’ policies should be built. As stressed in the chapter by Agostini and Natali in this volume, the pressure to cut often appears to be stronger than that to invest (see also Bouget et al. 2015).

Fourth, moving beyond the economic and social domains, there are two major crises affecting the EU to which no effective solution is being found. The increasingly-serious issue of migration is jeopardising intra-European solidarity. ‘Social tourism’ is a difficult and sensitive issue when discussing the problems of the Eurozone. Interestingly, recent studies emphasise the broadly positive long-term influence of migration on host labour markets and welfare states in the EU. Robert A. Mundell, for example, cited labour mobility as one of the key criteria for the success of a single currency (Mundell 1961). This ‘positive long-term influence’ includes fiscal gains for the whole economy of host countries.
Unfortunately, this fact has not yet quite permeated national discourses; many European countries are not doing a very good job at integrating foreign workers into their labour markets. Even when migrants are integrated, they are often integrated into very vulnerable positions. What is more, throughout the year, migration from Africa and the many world regions with political and military tensions (like the Middle East) has become pressing and dramatic. The EU has not been sensitive to the phenomenon and the demand for a common strategy has left room for the reaffirmation of the national nature of the problem (Pascouaou 2014). This indicates a lack of solidarity inside and between the EU members.

On top of that comes the external challenge of Ukraine and the complex relationship with Russia. The Ukraine crisis has shown the limits of EU soft power in the region. The promotion of ‘European values’ through technocratic negotiations and ad hoc sectoral agreements has been seen to be ineffective. The European Neighborhood Policy has been shaped by normative values, to be promoted by focusing solely on cooperation in relatively non-political areas and by avoiding security issues. But the case of Ukraine shows the need for the EU to take a more strategic approach (Nitoiu 2015).

What is more, national governments have steered the diplomatic strategy more than the EU. As reminded by the analysts (see Robert 2014b), the intense diplomatic activity of France and Germany has eclipsed the efforts of the European Institutions. Neither the EU High Representative for foreign affairs and security policy nor the European Council President took part in the cease-fire negotiations between Ukraine and Russia.

The four points mentioned above provide evidence of the troubled state of the EU and the worrying future prospects for the Union if no effective decision is taken.

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5. This whole debate, when analysed, strengthens the case for a pan-European framework of minimum wages.
3. Four reasons to be (prudently) optimistic after all: the EU as work-in-progress

Whether or not European Parliamentary elections and the arrival of a new European Commission are a real opportunity to enhance the EU's social ambitions remains to be seen. But there seem to be at least four reasons for a (prudently) optimistic reading of the state of the EU and its social dimension.

First, recent institutional changes have strengthened the Commission. In line with the new structure of the European Commission, six Vice-Presidents will coordinate integrated ‘project teams’, which may help to achieve a more integrated approach (social mainstreaming). Furthermore, some of the recent reshuffling within the Commission signals a reinforcement of the Directorate-General (DG) for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (EMPL): the important Labour Market Reforms Unit moves from the Directorate-General (DG) for Economic and Financial Affairs (ECFIN) to DG EMPL. As importantly, parts of units dealing with Skills and Qualifications, Vocational Training and Adult Education policy move from the DG responsible for Education and Culture (EAC) to DG EMPL. Nearly one year into office, it would thus seem that the new Director General Michel Servoz – who has 15 years of experience within the Commission’s Secretary General – is proving to be a key asset to DG EMPL.

Second, Marianne Thyssen, the new Belgian Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs, Skills and Labour Mobility, has apparently genuinely undertaken to put Social and Employment issues on ‘an equal footing’ with the economic dimension of the European Semester (Thyssen 2014). The mandate given to the new Social Affairs Commissioner by President Juncker provides some additional leverage, including a strong role in the European Semester and ‘developing social

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6. In addition, Unit JUST D3 (Rights of Persons with Disabilities) and part of Unit JUST D1 dealing with the Directive establishing a general Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation, move from DG Justice (JUST) to DG EMPL.
7. Servoz brings in 15 years of experience within the Commission’s Secretary General (in which he served as Deputy SG), including as coordinator of the EU Semester, the multi-annual financial framework and assessment of new policy proposals.
impact assessments for any future conditional stability support programmes for Euro-area countries’ (Juncker 2014: 4).

The new Social Affairs Commissioner Marianne Thyssen has declared on several occasions, including in her opening address at the 4th Meeting of the Annual Convention of the European Platform Against Poverty, that she will do all she can to place social and employment issues on an ‘equal footing’ with macroeconomic issues within the Semester. But what does that mean in practice? Will the social and employment targets also be made binding? Or will the macroeconomic targets become less constraining? In the end, the rebalancing of the Europe 2020 Strategy will determine its long-term survival (if it gets beyond the planned midterm review). Along the same lines, the Commission has emphasised the role of the European social dialogue in reinforcing its social dimension and addressing major economic and employment problems (see the concluding chapter in this volume).

Third, optimism is also warranted when one considers that over the past three years there has been a slow but certain ‘socialisation’ of the European Semester (Zeitlin and Vanhercke 2014; and this volume). This evolutionary shift can be seen at the level of substantive policy orientations, where it is shown by a growing emphasis on social objectives in the EU’s priorities (as defined by the Commission’s AGS and other official documents) and especially in the CSRs. The progressive socialisation of the European Semester can also be seen in changes to governance procedures, demonstrated by the enhanced role for social and employment policy actors – the Employment Committee, the Social Protection Committee and, to a lesser extent, DG EMPL and the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council (EPSCO) Council – in monitoring, reviewing, and amending the CSRs (ibid.).

Fourth, the social dimension of the Europe 2020 Strategy may well be enhanced through significant innovations in the new programming period (2014-2020) of the European Structural and Investment (ESI) Funds. Thus, the new regulation provides ‘ex-ante conditionalities’ that give the Commission the right to require that Member States – by way of example – develop effective active labour market policies, enact arrangements to ensure sufficient administrative capacity, and adopt coordinated measures to improve access to health services. Another ex-
ante condition is that Member States are required to have a national strategic policy framework for poverty reduction that involves relevant stakeholders in combating poverty (EP and Council of the EU 2013).

4. The book, section by section

Whatever the interpretation of the recent events mentioned above, the EU has not been able to address its main problems. The chapters in this volume provide evidence that EU strategy is still limited in its ability to solve both the social consequences of the crisis and the more fundamental political threats to European integration. The present edition consists of two parts. In the first part, contributors to the book provide a critical review of the political prospects of the EU and of the institutional dynamics after the EP elections of 2014.

Chapter 1 of this book explores the state of the Eurozone and examines its current political, economic and social trajectory. Vivien Schmidt then proceeds to offer several suggestions for how the EU, and specifically the Eurozone, can foster further economic integration and progress. If the EU and the Eurozone do not learn how to work together, there will continue to be increasingly negative consequences for all countries concerned.

Chapter 2 is a more focused look at the European Semester, which is a policy coordination tool used by the EU to encourage change and reform in Member States. According to Zeitlin and Vanhercke, there has been a partial but progressive ‘socialisation’ of the content of the European Semester, which is, in part, a response by the EU to the rising discontent with austerity in the European populace. However, this does not tell the whole story: the EU has evolved, and the socialisation of the European Semester is an example of reflexive learning, which in and of itself is another form of socialisation.

8. The Commission can ask Member States to revise their Operational Programme to that effect, and non-respect of the conditionalities can even lead to the suspension of payments. ANNEX XI. Ex ante conditionalities. PART I: Thematic ex ante conditionalities and PART II: General ex ante conditionalities, L 347/438, EP and Council of the EU (2013).
Chapter 3 asks an important question emerging from a bitter reality: since the social rights and protections won by labour movements have been being eroded over the last few years, do any effective forms of resistance against this erosion remain? According to Richard Hyman, the traditional forms of protest are, unfortunately, by themselves ineffective. However, a combination of traditional and new, cross-national forms of protest could produce desirable effects to combat neoliberal hegemony.

The second part of the book focuses on individual issues of interest in the broad EU puzzle. This group of chapters looks at instruments and policy fields that have been at the core of EU debate in the last few months. Chapter 4, by Martin Myant, addresses the issue of socialisation in a different way: with a critical assessment of Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker’s investment plan. According to the author, the plan, despite good intentions, is a woefully inadequate measure in the fight to restore social rights and protections in Member States affected by the financial crisis. In order to have real success, any investment plan requires first the relaxation of current austerity rules and quotas.

Chapter 5 analyses the EU’s approach to education. Agostini and Natali look at both the manner in which the Commission speaks about education policy and the way it deals with this policy. Eventually, the authors conclude that while education has come to the forefront of the EU’s policy agenda, the EU has not reformed its own fiscal consolidation stance enough to give Member States sufficient resources for revitalizing education. Essentially, the EU has made grand speeches about education, but done little to actually show that its intentions are genuine.

Chapter 6 contributes to the dialogue from the same angle as the previous chapter, but with reference to healthcare reform instead of education policy. However, instead of assessing the current position of the EU as in the previous chapter, authors Stamati and Baeten demonstrate how exactly the EU is capable of formulating (or discouraging) healthcare reform in Member States. The authors arrive at a conclusion similar to the authors of the previous chapter: although the EU expresses concern for the state of healthcare in the Eurozone and elsewhere, its current fiscal policies impede Member States from achieving substantive reforms.
Chapter 7, by Dalila Ghailani and Aída Ponce, ends the book by critically assessing the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Their conclusion is straightforward: no-one but the people around the negotiating table grasps, even vaguely, what TTIP will contain by the end of the negotiations. The negotiators make strong claims about the benefits of the future partnership on the basis of contested studies, and this is resulting in increasing suspicion and outright worries among trade unions and civil society groups as to the real implications of the proposed agreement for workers. As for the investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism, the way in which the European Commission has handled the public consultation has not, to say the least, helped to smooth the waters.

The concluding chapter by Natali sheds light on the true political risks for the EU, which include the progressive destabilisation of the political scene through the rise of anti-EU forces. This trend is at the heart of the EU political dilemma; the EU needs to be repoliticised, but there is a risk that this sort of move could further weaken EU integration. Such a political risk would also be a challenge for the trade union movement. The chronology by Cécile Barbier summarises the key events of the year in the area of social and economic affairs.

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References


Changing the policies, politics, and processes of the Eurozone in crisis: will this time be different?

Vivien A. Schmidt

Introduction

The Eurozone crisis continues to pose major challenges for the EU and its Member States. The problems stem from the Eurozone’s flawed policies, toxic politics, and rules-based processes. By framing the crisis as one of public debt (rather than private excess), then diagnosing the causes of the crisis as behavioural (Member States not following the rules) rather than structural (linked to the euro’s design), EU leaders produced policies that have failed to provide lasting solutions to the crisis. Underpinning the mistaken analysis is EU leaders’ long-standing policy narrative about the euro, promising that it would produce convergence toward export-oriented growth and ‘competitiveness’ so long as Member States followed the stability-based rules. When the sovereign debt crisis struck, rather than seeking to fix the euro by adding the missing elements to monetary union, or seeking to moderate its effects through counter-cyclical policies, EU leaders doubled down on the rules, insisting that growth would follow from fiscal consolidation (rapid deficit and debt reduction) for all, combined with structural reforms (focused on increasing labour market flexibility and reducing social welfare costs) for those countries falling foul of the rules.

The policies have left Europe at risk of deflation, with slow growth, high unemployment, rising inequality, and a humanitarian crisis threatening the poorest Europeans, in particular in Southern and Eastern Europe. The politics in response have become increasingly Eurosceptic and volatile, as citizens’ loss of trust and confidence in national governments and the EU have resulted in the cycling of incumbent governments and the rise of extremist parties and populist movements. The processes have only exacerbated these politics and the economics.
EU governance processes have imposed major constraints on Member States’ economic policy-making, thereby limiting their potential responsiveness to citizens’ concerns at the same time that they have upended the EU’s long-standing institutional balance. Eurozone decision-making has combined excessive intergovernmentalism (as the overly dominant European Council turned the Commission into a secretariat while sidelining the European Parliament) with growing supranationalism (as the European Central Bank (ECB) ‘saved the euro’ in exchange for Member State austerity and structural reform while the Commission took on an expanding role in fiscal surveillance). The resulting EU policy-making processes have involved ‘governing by the rules’ and ‘ruling by the numbers,’ through macroeconomic stability-based rules setting specific numerical targets for deficits and debt, with austerity and structural reform mandated for those who fall foul of the rules and numbers.

For all this, 2014 may very well come to be seen as a watershed year for the EU. The European Parliamentary elections, in which for the first time the leader of the winning majority was appointed President of the EU Commission, may serve to reinforce the influence of the European Parliament (EP) while increasing the political legitimacy of the Commission and, thereby, its autonomy vis-à-vis the Council. Moreover, politics have come back in not only through the EP election campaigns across the EU but also via the Council, as some Member States contested the rules and pushed for greater flexibility in the processes. As for the Commission, it has become more and more flexible over time in its interpretations of the rules, even as the ECB has successively reinterpreted its mandate — both for better results. The problem is that all EU actors have essentially reinterpreted the rules ‘by stealth’: by not admitting it in their discourse. Although such incremental changes to the rules do help, they cannot solve the crisis, especially because the silence about the need for change cuts off debate about what could and should be done.

So the question is whether significant changes in the policies, politics, and processes will take place in 2015. The EU has a new EP, a new Commission with a new Commission President, a Council with some new faces, and the recognition by all and sundry that the EU economy remains in trouble. But will this time really be different, with EU actors taking the bold steps necessary to solve the crisis once and for all? The
response to the Greek crisis in July 2015 suggests not. And little is likely
to change in any case with regard to the overall policy programme until
EU leaders change their policy narrative about the euro and about the
sources of growth, which demands significant investment as well as a
loosening on the demand side rather than continued austerity or even
just stability. Tinkering around the edges of the policies and the narrative
is not likely to be enough.

In an effort to suggest ways in which this time could be different, this
chapter offers proposals for further European economic integration,
discussing the challenges and opportunities, possible economic
initiatives, and suggestions for revamping fiscal surveillance as well as
decentralising the European Semester. The chapter ends with thoughts
about how to rethink the future governance of the Eurozone as well as
European Union governance. It begins with an analysis of the problems
of Eurozone policies, politics, and processes.

1. Challenges posed by the Eurozone crisis: policies,
politics, processes

1.1 The problems of the Eurozone

The problems for the Eurozone go back to its beginnings in the
Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s. Member States at that time gave
up monetary sovereignty without setting up a common pool of
centralised resources. Instead, fiscal responsibility remained within the
Member States along with the long-established principle of Member
State responsibility for covering the social costs of adjustment.
Whatever the reasons — such as a desire to maintain control over
national budgets and resources or a fear of having to pay for the
mistakes of others — this meant that the Eurozone was unprepared to
respond to a major crisis. But having no mechanism in place once a
crisis of this magnitude struck was a major challenge. It required vision
and courage, both of which turned out to be in short supply.
With the economic crisis beginning in 2008, instead of imitating the US and the UK, with an aggressive monetary policy, major fiscal stimulus, and an immediate cleanup of the banking sector, the Eurozone had a passive monetary policy, introduced a stimulus that was stopped too soon, and paid little attention to the banking sector. Furthermore, when the sovereign debt crisis hit in 2010, the monetary authorities (ECB) continued to deploy a restrained response, the political authorities (Council) pushed fiscal tightening, and EU institutional actors generally, fearing the financial markets’ response, did not make private creditors bear the losses, which were transferred instead to in-country public authorities (and taxpayers) (see, e.g., Mody 2015). Moreover, in exchange for the creation of loan-bailout mechanisms to provide ‘economic solidarity’ for countries at risk — the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) — EU Member States signed up to ever-more rigid legislative pacts and treaties.

Fiscal austerity and belt-tightening followed across Europe. Moreover, for countries in trouble, loan bailouts were provided at punishing interest rates without any initial debt restructuring and with programmes mandating rapid deficit reduction and structural reforms. For countries at risk of needing a programme, policies of rapid deficit reduction were also implemented. In both instances, the demand for rapid deficit reduction guaranteed that governments would engage in across-the-board cuts that reduced growth prospects not only in the short-term — through significant economic contraction that massively increased unemployment and debt-to-Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratios — but also in the medium-term by cutting education (see Agostini and Natali this volume), training, and Research & Development (R&D) support. Additionally, government reductions in public sector wages, pensions, social assistance, healthcare (see Stamati and Baeten this volume) and other public services also brought social injustice to the level of a ‘humanitarian crisis.’ The poorest citizens of these countries found themselves without access to adequate nutrition, affordable healthcare, or shelter while increasingly high unemployment produced waves of emigration of the more highly skilled, especially youth (see reports by Council of Europe 2013, Caritas Europe 2015, and the EP 2015).
As a result, after over five years of austerity and structural reforms, the EU is still in the midst of economic crisis. Although the worst moments of the crisis — between 2010 and 2012 — may be behind us, the crisis continues to burn, if more slowly, in the face of deflationary pressures, continued high unemployment, with poverty (Frazer et al. 2014) and human rights violations (Council of Europe 2013; European Parliament 2015) making for a tangible increase in ‘human misery’ across Europe.

1.2 The Eurozone’s flawed policies

The Eurozone’s problems can be blamed largely on the flawed policies that have contributed to the EU’s poor economic performance. These policies involve failures with regard to crisis framing, diagnosis, choice of remedies, and a lack of deep solutions.

The first of the failures stems from the (mis)framing of the crisis as one of public profligacy, which was inappropriately generalized from the case of Greece. For all other countries, the problem was rather one of private debt resulting from the massive overstretch of the banks, the increasing indebtedness of households, and the mispricing of sovereign risk by the markets (De Grauwe and Ji 2012; De Grauwe 2013; Blyth 2013). But framing the crisis as one of public debt in the periphery fueled resistance to any form of deeper economic integration on the fears that it would create a ‘transfer union’ in which Northern Europeans would pay for debts accrued in the South.

The second failure is the (mis)diagnosis of the problem as behavioural, seen as emerging from the Member States’ failure to follow the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) (Jabko 2015). Throughout the 2000s, Member States in the periphery like Spain and Ireland were models of rule following, in contrast to countries like Germany and France, which broke the rules in the mid-2000s (albeit for good reasons, i.e., not to cut spending in a recession). The real problem was structural, in which the ECB’s ‘one size fits none’ inflation-targeting monetary policy produced increasing divergence rather than convergence between surplus and deficit countries (Enderlein et al. 2012; De Grauwe 2013; De Grauwe and Ji 2013). Insisting that all countries tighten their belts at the same time to become more ‘competitive’ ignores the interdependence of surplus and deficit
countries and the moving average problem at the heart of such efforts (e.g., Skidelsky 2013; Matthijs and Blyth 2011; Wolf 2013). Moreover, the policies themselves are fundamentally asymmetric in effect, since even if they might work for the export-led model of Northern Europeans, they leave Southern Europe with no alternative other than to enter into a never-ending downward spiral of wage repression (Scharpf 2013, 2014a).

The third failure comes from the chosen remedies, centered on pro-cyclical policies of ‘sound’ money, budgetary austerity, and ‘structural reform,’ instead of counter-cyclical policies that could have generated growth through macroeconomic stimulus, industrial investment, and socioeconomic support (Scharpf 2012, 2013, 2014a; De Grauwe 2013). The continued problems for Member States under surveillance or in programmes had much less to do with their indebtedness or ‘competitiveness’ than with the ‘sudden stop’ of market finance, itself due to the uncertainty generated by EU leaders’ pronouncements or (in)action with regard to deeper European economic integration (Jones 2010, 2015a).

The ultimate failure results from the lack of adequate solutions that leave an incomplete risk pool and insurance mechanism put in place more by default than design (Schelkle 2015; Jones 2015b). While critiques of the Eurozone as unworkable because it is not an Optimum Currency Area (OCA) are legion (e.g., Eichengreen 1991, 2012; Feldstein 1997), they all tend to assume by definition that the EU cannot share risk the way equally heterogeneous entities like the United States do through fiscal federalism (Henning and Kessler 2012). But although the EU will certainly never become a federal state like the US, there are many ways to deepen economic integration so as to make it more robust in terms of weathering asymmetric shocks and the pressures of the global financial markets. Alternative solutions would have been to complete the monetary union with a financial union (Jones 2015b) or even a fiscal union through some form of debt mutualisation (e.g., Eurobonds) plus macroeconomic stabilisers (e.g., an unemployment fund – Dullien 2012 – or a ‘cyclical adjustment fund’ – Enderlein et al. 2013).

The results of these policies speak for themselves in terms of their effects on citizens’ welfare, health, and job prospects. Youth unemployment was at 20.9% in the euro area as a whole in March 2015, with over 40%
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in Italy (at 43.1%) and over 50% in Spain (50.1%) and Greece (50.1% in January) (Eurostat 2015). A Council of Europe report (2013) concluded that austerity programmes in response to the crisis had undermined human rights in key areas, largely as a result of public social spending cuts, and especially in countries under international bailout programmes — e.g., the Troika demand that public spending on health in Greece not exceed 6 per cent of GDP. For 2014, moreover, a Caritas Europe report (2015) detailed the extent of the problem, finding that more than 1/3 of the population in five EU Member States were at risk of poverty or social exclusion and one in three children live in poverty in 14 of the 28 EU countries. Additionally, a European Parliament (2015) report on seven countries detailed the slashes in spending on education, the transfer of health costs from state to citizen and the reversal in gains in citizen health along with a massive rise in unemployment. Most damning was the finding that spending cuts tended to ‘impose horizontal and indiscriminate cuts across the policy areas they targeted, to meet financial savings that were determined in advance’ (ibid.), rather than specifically target the wasteful uses of public resources. State administrative capacity in such countries has naturally been negatively affected by the cuts as well as by freezes in public sector wages. More generally, public investment in infrastructure has stalled across the Eurozone area, thanks to the ‘golden rule’ or ‘debt brake’ that Member States adopted as part of the rules — which also acts as an impediment to growth and competitiveness.

1.3 The EU’s increasingly volatile politics

As the Eurozone’s economic performance has worsened, citizens’ attitudes towards both their national governments and EU governance have declined dramatically. Citizen dissatisfaction has been fueled not only by the economics, however, but also by the politics in which seemingly apolitical decision-making processes at the EU level leave them little political recourse at the national level to change the policies (see Schmidt 2006). The result has been the increasing turnover of incumbent governments, the rise of new parties on the extremes, and a growing loss of trust in the EU and in national governments.
Increasing political volatility comes from citizens’ perceptions that their preferences — whether expressed through the ballot box, social partnerships, social movements, or in the street — don’t count (Mair 2013). The citizens’ response to such perceived disenfranchisement has been to punish national politicians with growing frequency and intensity, leading to the increased cycling of incumbent governments (Bosco and Verney 2012). Disenchantment with national leaders has become the rule even in core countries, with France being a case in point: President Hollande has the lowest popularity rating of any president of the Fifth Republic (at 12% in November 2014). Governments are generally more fragile, with governing majorities often on a knife’s edge, while winning mainstream parties have been having more difficulty forming governments. Even more problematic for the EU has been the emergence of anti-democratic governments, as in Hungary, and the continuing rise of far right extremist parties, such as the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn in Greece, the True Finns and the Sweden Democrats.

Increasing Euroscepticism and anti-European feeling is part and parcel of the political volatility. This is evidenced not only by the rise of the hard right extremes but also of the less extreme populists on the right, the left, and in the centre. Notably, such parties can be found not only in the countries hardest hit by the crisis, in Southern and Eastern Europe. They include those largely unaffected by the crisis economically, mainly in Northern Europe and Scandinavia (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2013; Usherwood and Startin 2013) as well as in Germany with the meteoric rise of the AfD (Alternative for Germany) in 2014. Importantly, public disenchantment with the EU can also be found in the polarisation of views across national European public spheres, in particular between Northern and Southern Europe (Kriesi and Grande 2015).

The only sign of light with regard to populist parties have been Greece’s Syriza and Spain’s Podemos (see Hyman this volume). What has made these new parties credible to large portions of the electorate has not only been that they engage openly with difficult questions about the distribution costs of fiscal consolidation, but also the fact that their initial exclusion from power puts them in a good position to bring real renewal to their countries’ politics and generate citizen-friendly ‘structural reforms’ focused on reducing corruption, improving tax
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Collection, and promoting social justice. They oppose the continuation of austerity and structural reform programmes in their current form. With the electoral victories of Syriza to national office and Podemos to local office (most notably to the office of mayor of Madrid), their ability to deliver on their promises will be put to the test. For the moment, however, it is too early to say what effect they will have, although the protracted negotiations of Syriza with the EU on a new debt package suggest that they have not been able to change the Eurozone policy narrative or the agenda, much as they have tried. The main question for Syriza, then, will be whether it manages to bring much needed reforms to the country in the domain of anti-corruption efforts, strengthening state administrative capacity, and collecting taxes despite the continued austerity demanded by the Eurozone leaders.

At the EU level, the results of the European Parliament elections were also a sign of the rise of euroscepticism. Notably, Marine LePen’s Front National (FN) received the largest share of votes in France and Nigel Farage’s Independence Party (UKIP) in the UK — although Prime Minister Renzi’s massive 40% victory for the social democrats (the PD, Partito Democratico) in the Italian contest (a first in the postwar history of Italy) suggests that all is not so dark. In the end, extremist parties now make up around 20% of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs).

Although the EP elections in 2014 did not do much to reverse the eurosceptic trend, they did stop the erosion in participation: the rate was only a half point lower than in 2009, at 42.54% in 2014. Despite the fact that national political concerns continued to dominate the vote, the debate was more centred on European issues. And the campaign itself was more politicised, thereby generating more citizen interest. EP parties ran their separate candidates for Commission President in EU-wide campaigns and held televised debates, even though the results were mixed in terms of citizen interest or awareness. While a majority of voters were aware of the ‘Spitzenkandidat’ in core European countries like Germany and France, most in the UK were not.

The problem of political legitimacy remains for the EP, however. The question is: how legitimate is a parliament for which 56.9% of the electorate have not voted? And how legitimate is that parliament when, among those voting, close to a third went for extremist parties that have
little chance in national elections? The elections have left the EP with a thinning center hemmed in by extremists of the right and left. As a result, the majority will necessarily be made up of a ‘grand coalition’ of centre right, centre left, and liberals, under the leadership of a former Luxembourg Prime Minister who was also one of the longest standing members of the European Council. Under these circumstances, the politicisation of the EP, in which debates and votes would be more clearly identifiable along traditional right/left lines in order to give citizens a clear choice among parties on the left and right, has yet to occur.

In the interim, the 2014 EP elections have also been important for EU decision-making processes. The appointment by the Council of the leader of the winning party as Commission President has conferred a new political legitimacy on the Commission and its President, as he now is the directly elected representative of the people. This may help rebalance the institutional equilibrium of Eurozone governance.

1.4 The EU’s rule-based governance processes

As a result of the crisis, the EU’s long-standing ‘democratic settlement,’ in which all EU institutional actors were involved in decision-making in their different ways, has become unbalanced. Intergovernmentalism became the primary mode of governance, eclipsing the Community Method. The European Council became the predominant institutional player in Eurozone governance, with the European Parliament mostly absent and the Commission largely subordinate to the Council (Fabbrini 2013; Schmidt 2015). This shift has led Habermas (2011) to warn against the dangers of ‘executive federalism,’ in which the tremendous shift of economic and budgetary power to the EU level has occurred without any concomitant increase in citizens’ political involvement.

Supranationalism has also increased significantly. Even as the Commission was weakened in its traditional role of initiator, it gained greater supranational powers of oversight in the context of the European Semester. Additionally, the ECB became arguably the most important actor when it came to responding to existential crisis moments, with its technical solutions accompanied by a political quid pro quo demanding
the Member States to engage in fiscal consolidation and structural reform. Moreover, the ECB’s new responsibilities with regard to the Banking Union and the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) all increase its supranational powers, adding yet another set of supranational regulatory and bailout bodies to those already established, such as the ESM and the soon out-of-business EFSF.

The growing predominance of these two modes of governance is the outcome of the reinforcement of rules-based governance during the Eurozone crisis. At the inception of the euro’s sovereign debt crisis, European leaders became obsessed with rules, numbers, and pacts, including the ‘Six-Pack,’ the ‘Two-Pack,’ and the ‘Fiscal Compact,’ each more stringent on the nature of the rules, more restrictive with regard to the numbers, and more punitive for Member States that failed to meet the requirements. In the absence of any deeper political or economic integration, the EU ended up ‘governing by the rules’ and ‘ruling by the numbers’ in the Eurozone (Schmidt 2015). Austerity policies focused on rapid deficit reduction along with pressures for structural reform — often shorthand for reducing labour rights and protections — wreaked havoc on ‘social Europe,’ in particular in countries in the periphery under conditionality.

Slowly but surely, however, under pressure from deteriorating economies and increasing political volatility, EU institutional actors have been reinterpreting the rules by which they have been governing the economy. They have done this in a variety of ways, such as by expanding their mandate, shifting emphases, approving derogations, or increasing flexibility. But they have not done this formally. Instead, EU actors have been informally and incrementally reinterpreting the rules without admitting it in their discourse to the public. This has helped to slow the economic crisis but not to end it. The reinterpretation of the rules ‘by stealth’ has done little to reduce public disaffection. Nor has it done anything for social Europe, as poverty, misery, and inequalities rise, as unemployment stays unsustainably high, and as both skills and hopes are lost for an entire generation of unemployed youth. In the previous Commission (2009-2014), only the ‘youth guarantee’ represented a pro-active attempt to deal with the social policy problems generated by the economic policy for the Eurozone. In the new Commission, in contrast, the new ‘investment plan,’ which promises to
raise €315 billion for investment in the real economies of Member States, at least begins to address the problems of growth.

That said, reinterpreting the rules by stealth has enabled EU actors to bring about incremental changes that have kept the European economy alive, though not well. Austerity has slowly been abandoned in favor of moderation, with structural reform now the principal rallying cry.

The European Central Bank (ECB) has moved from ‘one size fits none’ rules for monetary policy — which exacerbated (rather than reduced) Member States’ economic divergences — to ‘whatever it takes’ (in the famous phrase of ECB president Mario Draghi in July 2012). The pledge in 2012 to buy Member State debt if necessary and the promise in 2014 to engage in quantitative easing (begun in early 2015) has brought the ECB close to a lender of last resort in all but discourse (Buitert and Rahbari 2012) — although its Charter precludes full Lender Of Last Resort (LOLR) status. But although the seeming ‘hero’ of the crisis, the ECB’s push for strict conditionality through austerity and structural reform as a quid pro quo for its intervention to stop market attacks has contributed to the Eurozone’s economic slowdown and human misery. Moreover, the ECB also risks problems of political legitimacy when it sends secret letters to Prime Ministers threatening withdrawal of Central Bank support if they do not follow ECB demands. After the uproar in Spain in 2013 in response to revelations that Trichet had written to Zapatero, the issue again hit the headlines in November 2014 when it came to light that Trichet had written Irish PM Brian LENihan a letter that essentially pushed the country into a harsh bailout package while protecting senior bondholders from losses in order to preserve confidence in the European banking system.

In the meantime, the Council has largely continued to govern by the ‘one size fits one’ rules of intergovernmental negotiation that have given the most powerful Member State (i.e., Germany) outsized influence to impose its preferences for ever-stricter rules (Jacoby 2015). This has unbalanced the traditional Franco-German ‘couple’ (Fabbrini 2013), with the Council now dominated by Germany in coalitional alliances with other Northern and Central Eastern European leaders. But even though Germany has kept up a discourse focused on austerity and structural reform, it has intermittently agreed to instruments of deeper integration and added growth to its stability discourse as well as, in
2014, flexibility. Notably, though, Chancellor Merkel claimed in a June speech to the Bundestag that flexibility was already embedded in the rules, so there was no need to change them. During 2014, France and Italy in particular pushed the Council for even more flexibility, politicising the budgetary oversight process of the ‘European Semester’ without, however, actually contesting the stability rules and numerical targets. Such politicisation was part of a game to legitimise themselves to national constituencies by ensuring ever more flexible rules-reinterpretation while using the EU’s outside pressure to keep up the internal push for reform. But although this strategy may have helped them legitimise their reform packages at home, it at the same time turns the EU into the scapegoat, and adds further grist for the populists’ mill.

In all of this, the EU Commission has taken on the role of enforcer. In the absence of real remedies to the crisis, such as a fiscal union or Eurobonds, the Commission was stuck with searching for solutions ‘like the drunk who looks for his lost keys under the lamp post’ because ‘that’s where the light is’ (Mabbett and Schelkle 2014). Recognizing this reality, as economic output performance deteriorated, the Commission increasingly made exceptions and flexible adjustments for non-programme countries, as in 2014 when it gave France and Italy further extensions on meeting the deficit criteria. But the Commission consistently denied its flexibility publicly — emphasizing its strict and uniform enforcement of the ‘one size fits all’ rules of budgetary oversight — so as to circumvent the political pressures and objections from pro-austerity Council members.¹

The story has been different for programme countries. In the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) (2013: 13) critique of the Greek bailout, it condemned the Commission for ‘the focus of its reforms more on compliance with EU norms than on growth impact.’ A similar critique was echoed in a June 2014 report by the French Commissariat on Strategy with regard to the European Semester, suggesting that the efficacy of the approach ‘merits discussion’ (Nicolaïi and Valla 2014: 16). In fact, although the European Semester process became more open over time with regard to including social issues in considerations

and recommendations (Zeilin and Vanhercke 2014), these were not necessarily translated into action by Member State governments. The heavy emphasis on rapid deficit reduction was most apparent in the Commission’s Annual Growth Surveys, beginning with the 2011 report which put fiscal consolidation first, addressing unemployment through labour market reforms second, and leaving other more growth-friendly and socially concerned actions to third place. This ensured that Member State governments would address the deficit above all other things, largely without concern for growth or social justice. Notably, only in the 2015 Annual Growth Survey, written in November 2014 in view of the arrival of a new Commission, was the order reversed, with investment coming first (European Commission 2014).

Finally, even though the European Parliament (EP) continues to have almost ‘no size at all’ in terms of setting policy, its critiques of Council and Commission action along with its successful push to have the appointment of Commission President linked to the winning party in the EP elections has ensured it an increasing presence, if not yet influence over policy.

So where does the EU go from here? Incremental changes to rules are not the bold kinds of actions required to move Europe beyond the crisis once and for all. But they are for the moment all that is possible. In what follows, therefore, I make a few recommendations for further reinterpreting the rules along with EU actors’ roles.

2. Further European economic integration, but how?

The new realities of 2015 present a number of challenges and opportunities. The opportunities come from the potential rebalancing among EU institutions that follows the EP elections. The challenges follow from the continuing problems related both to the Eurozone’s economics and politics.

2.1 Today’s challenges and opportunities

The question for today is whether and how the Eurozone, with a new Commission and new institutional leaders, can provide some fresh
solutions by changing the policies, politics, and processes. Avenues already exist. Debates among political leaders in the Council have produced agreement that growth is to be the focus of economic policy, albeit not to the detriment of stability, and that flexibility is acceptable, so long as it remains within the established rules. The new Commission President has proposed an Investment Fund (see the chapter by Myant, this volume) and a range of other initiatives. Unfortunately, little in terms of lasting solutions providing deeper integration has been introduced into official discussions. However, there are a lot of ideas already out there, as EU institutional actors, think-tanks, academics, and some Member State leaders have already suggested a number of different ways forward.

The new realities of 2015 may also offer new opportunities to break the institutional impasse. The inauguration of new institutional leaders, with a new Commission headed by the leader of the newly elected majority in the EP, is promising with regard to restoring the institutional balance in the EU as a whole. Eurozone governance needs to become like most other areas of EU legislation, which means it should mainly use the Community Method for legislation. This would mean giving the EP more ‘size’ by bringing it into all Eurozone decision-making, while reducing the intergovernmental dominance of the Council in Eurozone governance. The EP’s new direct connection to the Commission not only may give the directly elected representatives of EU citizens more voice in Eurozone governance affairs, and thereby give the citizens a sense that their voice counts after all. It may also increase the Commission’s autonomy from the Council.

The Council itself should become a more open and transparent arena for political debate about the rules. Moreover, the ECB should limit its focus to euro-related issues of monetary governance, leaving economic policy orientation to the other institutional actors, while doing all the necessary work as quasi lender of last resort and bank supervisor.

Finally, the new Commission has greater potential independence with regard to taking bolder initiatives and proposing new ideas. This is as a result of its new double accountability — to the EP and the Council — as a result of the appointment by the Council of a Commission President who represents the majority in the European Parliament. Serving two
masters may actually give the Commission greater authority to exercise leadership independently of both.

This could re-empower the European Commission, enabling it to go back to doing what it does best, which is acting as a vivier d'idées, or a breeding ground of innovative ideas in which possible solutions on the right, left, and centre get debated and new syntheses proposed. Such re-empowerment could be crucial to finding new ways out of the Eurozone crisis, given the importance of technical actors in slow-burning crises in generating innovative ideas that political actors could take up in the fast-burning moments. It might also enable the Commission to tell the truth, that it is indeed exercising flexibility in its interpretations of the rules and calculation of the numbers, and enable it to provide legitimising arguments for why and how it is doing so.

The Greek crisis could have constituted a new opportunity to solve the EU’s Eurozone Crisis. New negotiations on Greek debt, and the danger of Grexit brought a renewed fast-burning crisis that helped concentrate minds. The question was how to resolve this particular crisis in a win-win manner. It may help to recognize that large numbers of European citizens, not just Greeks, are fed up with austerity — witness the rise of Podemos in Spain, the protests against water fees in Ireland, the growing strength of Sinn Fein, and the rumblings in Portugal, not to mention the problems Hollande has had holding on to his left. The only good way out would have been to propose a solution that reset the whole EU approach. Instead, Syriza was pushed to accept continued austerity and structural reform in exchange for another bailout. Most concessions alienated not just the Northern European leaders, who felt that Greece had not followed ‘the rules,’ or the Central and Eastern Europeans, who were hostile because they went through harsh austerity too, and are poorer than the Greeks, but even other Southern Europeans, committed to continuing their own efforts to impose structural reforms.

The EU needs a reset in terms of policies, with a new vision and a new narrative about where it is going and why. Although this could have been a byproduct of the Greek crisis, it could not have been focused on Greece alone. The only way out is to take the high road, and to offer an overall way out of crisis for all Member States. But to do this is to move
toward deeper economic integration and some more quasi-‘federal’ solutions.

Any such solutions will not be easy. The problems stem from several sources: continued diverging preferences with regard to policy remedies, as discussed above; institutional obstacles such as the unanimity rule, in which any one Member State can veto any Treaty-based initiative; and legal obstacles, given the Treaty-basis of many of the rules. Equally problematic are differences in economic philosophies, in particular between the ordo-liberalism of Germany and EU institutions intent on getting Member States to solve their own problems by themselves and the more pragmatic approaches to economic governance supportive of more collective solutions. This especially affects potential EU-wide social policy solutions, such as proposals for a ‘social investment state’.2

2.2 Policy proposals for further economic integration

There are many arguments for further integration of the Eurozone, in particular in view of making it more effective and legitimate. The policy proposals listed below are not mutually exclusive, although some may serve similar purposes and are mutually substitutable. Many of these policies would make EU Member States more fiscally intertwined, and would therefore necessitate more EU policy coordination. The European Semester therefore would take on added importance (see next section).

- **Mutualisation of debt:** This could involve issuing Eurobonds (up to, say, 60%) to stop once and for all the market attack on sovereigns. Alternatively, repackaging old debt overhangs (especially Italy) and restructuring the debt or lowering interest rates to near zero while pushing the dates for repayment out to thirty years, fifty years or more. Neither of these alternatives requires much centralised coordination or deficit/debt rules. The

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mutualisation of debt via Eurobonds, once established, would enable the ECB to engage more readily in Outright Monetary Transactions (if ever required) and in quantitative easing (Claessens et al. 2012). This would mean that, much like US states, Member States could go bankrupt (and go to the ESM for a loan-bailout) without jeopardizing the whole system (Henning and Kessler 2012).

— Emergency ECB Financing: An alternative, however, in particular for countries under pressure from the markets, would be for the ECB — instead of flooding the capital markets with its 1.2 trillion quantitative easing programme (risking asset price inflation) — to be freed from the prohibition of monetary state financing and to provide emergency finance to Member States with above-average rates of unemployment (provided they accept and enforce no-exceptions wage stop for three years — the kind of Keynesian enforced short-term wage controls employed in the 1950s and 1960s to great effect).

— Solidarity-Related Policy Instruments: These could include a cyclical adjustment fund to stop countries from over-heating or over-cooling and/or an unemployment insurance fund. As funds, these instruments too would not require much in the way of policy coordination, just continued monitoring, as Member States put money in or take money out depending upon whether they are over-heating or deflating, or they are suffering from high unemployment (Enderlein et al. 2013).

— EU Revenue-Producing Instruments: Regardless of whether debt-related or solidarity-related instruments are generated for the EU, it also needs to have its own sources of revenue. This entails further integration and EU level coordination. The EU has little revenue generated for itself and instead depends on the Member States for resources for its operating budget. This has been highly problematic because the EU is consistently underfunded in terms of its operations, especially because much of its budget goes to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). As Maduro (2012) has argued:

3. Thanks to Fritz W. Scharpf for this suggestion. See also Scharpf 1991: chapter 5.
‘financial solidarity in the EU must be detached from transfers between states and related, instead, to the wealth generated by the process of European economic integration.’ Examples abound:

- a financial transactions tax (FTT), modeled on the Tobin tax initiative, and expanding the FTT already in process through enhanced cooperation for a limited number of Member States (but which seems to be slated to go into national coffers);
- a European corporate tax that could also involve harmonization of national corporate tax so as to ensure that European corporations pay a reasonable tax in their home countries, and that multinationals are no longer able to game the system, and instead pay appropriate taxes;
- a Value Added Tax (VAT) on EU generated wealth related to cross-border transactions and/or online sales (as part of the new EU Digital services market) that could pay for the spillover effects of the Single Market, geared to environmental, urban, and social problems (Maduro 2012);
- a solidarity tax (or fund) levied on all citizens and residents of the EU, targeted for poverty alleviation. Initially, it could be voluntary, possibly collected via national taxes through a box checked on national tax forms that would then be transferred to the EU to administer (Schmidt 2012).

2.3 The future of fiscal surveillance

There are a number of ways in which the new Commission has already been reinterpreting the rules and legitimating it. Most significantly, the new Commission has been presenting structural reform as a quid quo pro for greater flexibility through slower deficit reduction (e.g., in the cases of France and Italy — much to the annoyance of the Germans and the Finns). It had been even more explicit in the 2015 Annual Growth Survey that countries differ greatly in problems and potential solutions, so that there is no ‘one size fits all’ with regard to recommendations or decisions (European Commission 2014). The Commission has also stated that money pledged to the Juncker Investment Fund will not count against the deficit.
Further possibilities include:

— **Deductibility of Economic Investment:** For example, why not leave off the balance sheets growth-enhancing investments in infrastructure projects, education, training, research and development? This seems to be the idea behind the deductibility of Member State investment in conjunction with the Juncker Investment Plan, but why not make it the case for all such investment (Schmidt 2012)?

— **Deductibility of Social Investment:** Why not make any efforts toward improving skills and human capital deductible as part of the ‘social investment’ initiative of the EU that seeks to promote growth in knowledge-based economies and human capital (De Vincenti and D’Alema 2011).

— **Carrots and not just Sticks:** Beyond this, why not use carrots as well as sticks to encourage structural reforms, by providing project financing and poverty relief in exchange, or even just mandating that budget cutting for programme countries not interfere with the EU’s own goals for ‘Social Europe.’ Actually, why not make taking steps to accomplish Europe 2020 goals focused on investment in education, training, and R&D as well as on reducing youth unemployment and poverty count for delaying deficit reduction?

— **Try to find a way to make the statistics more transparent** and less punitive for countries in trouble. Eurostat calculations of country deficit and debt based on norms of comprehensiveness and ‘mark to market’ tend to disadvantage countries that the markets consider less viable. As an economy falters, and markets lose faith, statisticians are likely to re-categorize public enterprises as loss-making and therefore part of their deficit. This makes it much harder for already weak countries to recover, and makes it more likely that they will fall foul of the rules (Mabbett and Schelkle 2014: 15-17).

### 2.4 Decentralising the European Semester

The European Semester is highly centralised, largely to ensure sufficient consistency and adequate oversight in the Member State application of the stability rules. In this process, the Commission has been the ‘enforcer’ in a centralised exercise imposing hard and fast sanction-triggering numbers (however flexibly interpreted). Moreover,
as the Commission’s own Annual Growth Strategy report (2015) admits, its democratic legitimacy ‘has sometimes been called into question.’ Its effectiveness is also in question, in particular since a low percentage of recommendations in country reports have been taken up. Moreover, the imperative of rapid deficit reduction meant that countries in programmes or at risk of programmes tended to implement across-the-board cuts that did nothing with regard to growth producing structural reform and were often socially unjust.

By empowering local actors through the decentralisation of the process, the European Semester could help generate more workable kinds of ‘structural’ reforms, fine-tuned for each Member State’s political economy. Were the rules themselves to become more positively flexible within such a decentralised process, say, by encouraging Member State take-up of the Europe 2020 goals, the European Semester itself could become a boon for social Europe.

More generally, the Commission should be given a different role within a more decentralised system of supervision and support by opening up the process to national actors — experts, members of parliament, NGOs, labour representatives, and other stakeholders (see Zeitlin and Vanhercke, this volume). While the Commission should continue to coordinate policy, the European Semester needs to be as decentralised as possible so that the Member States take ownership of it. Some of this is already stated in the 2015 Annual Growth Survey, but I reiterate it:

— From Community Enforcer to Enabler: The Commission should become the Community ‘Organizer’ or ‘Enabler’ by overseeing a highly decentralised process in which national parliaments, NGOs, and social partners are a regular part of the ‘National Semester.’ One might pattern this on the ‘Open Method of Coordination,’ but most importantly it is the Member State that should ‘transpose’ the process into something that fits with national patterns of consultation.

— The national level processes should establish the major priorities for structural reforms, with the Commission providing advice and official statistical data, etc., to all parties involved.

— Deliberations at the EU level should ensure that the Commission itself is more ‘democratic’ internally, with greater involvement of
other Directorates General (DGs) and openness to their contributions.

- **EU level processes** related to the European Semester should bring the European Parliament into the decision-making.
- **Programme countries** should also be entitled to the flexibility that normal Member States benefit from within the European Semester — and be quit of the Troika.

### 3. Governing the Eurozone

#### 3.1 Proposals for democratising the Eurozone

Decentralising in order to democratise the European Semester is not sufficient to ensure the effectiveness and legitimacy of Eurozone governance. Most importantly, EU Member States need to bring in the European Parliament into regular decision-making on Eurozone policy. For this, it would have to move back from intergovernmentalism to the Community Method. This change would ensure more political debate, and balance the outsized influence of individual Member States in the Council to some extent.

For the EP to be fully part of the process and the Community Method the main _modus operandi_, however, Treaty-based rules would need to become ordinary legislation, meaning that they would be open to amendment through political debates and compromise. Opt-outs for individual Member States would also be allowed, subject to denial by qualified majorities (Scharpf 2014b). The benefits would be many, but in particular we would see an end to the unanimity rule that imposes a lock-in via treaties, which once agreed cannot be undone because of the decision-trap of the unanimity rules. The UK sagely has the rule that one Parliament cannot bind the hands of the next. All democracies allow amendments to Constitutions by a supermajority (generally 2/3). Only the EU enables treaties to be unchangeable because of the unanimity rule. The Council has informally been attempting to get around this anyway, e.g., with the EFSF set up through multiple bilaterals and the Fiscal Compact agreed outside the treaties (to get around the UK veto).
The recent proposal for a special Eurozone Parliament, in contrast, is a bad idea, in particular because all Member States except two (UK and DK with opt-outs) are slated to become members at some point in the not too distant future. And how would such a Eurozone Parliament be chosen? From the existing EP? Or newly elected, to concentrate only on this? And at what level of abstention in voting could this body still be politically legitimate? Instead of setting up a Eurozone Parliament, special sessions of the EP could be set up for Eurozone questions, in which everyone has voice and can be heard, but votes are the purview of Eurozone members, assuming that the policies will affect them alone. That said, where policies affect others, and/or other Member States want to be a part of them, they too should be able to vote. It would be better to spend one’s time figuring out how to revitalize the existing EP and make it better linked to the national parliaments, rather than to create another special body.

3.2 Rethinking European Union governance if Eurozone governance deepens

With proposals for greater deepening of economic integration, some have argued for a ‘core Europe’ in which a compact group of Member States agreeing to fiscal union would be surrounded by a larger circle constituted by a looser group united by the Single Market. But this ignores the reality of what the EU is. With the exception of the all-encompassing single market, the EU is essentially made up of clusters of Member States in overlapping policy communities with variable boundaries in terms of membership — not just the members of the Eurozone but Schengen (with the UK and Ireland out but Switzerland, Norway and Iceland in), Common Security and Defense Policy (Danish opt-out and all others opting in), and the Charter of Fundamental Rights (UK and Polish opt-out). Moreover, the number and variability of the EU’s policy communities are likely only to increase over time as a result of enhanced cooperation in a range of areas, with ‘regional

4. These include the Glienicker group (2013), the Eiffel group (2014), the Future of Europe initiative (2012), and President Hollande (2013).

5. I like to call the EU a ‘region-state,’ as a regional union of Member State nations in which the creative tension between the supranational Union and its Member States ensures both ever-increasing regional integration and ever-continuing national differentiation (Schmidt 2006).
clusters’ of Member States in areas such as security, energy, and immigration (Tocci 2014).

Creating a hard core around the Eurozone may make other potential community clusters more difficult to pull together, with the other clusters likely to be characterized by an increasingly high degree of differentiation without integration — already the case for transport, communications, and infrastructure — or even fragmentation and the risk of disintegration — in areas such as energy, the environment, migration, mobility, and asylum (ibid.). Moreover, given the differences among Member States on these issues, there is no guarantee that even a hard core around the Eurozone will expand to incorporate these other policy areas.

Imagining the Eurozone as the core disregards the effects of the Eurozone crisis, which has created an increasing division in economic identity constructions, in particular between Northern and Southern Europe but also more generally between inside and outside the Eurozone. It is unclear that a smaller hard core would be able to come to agreement more readily than the larger EU membership can. Moreover, creating such a hard core would be most likely to permanently alienate Member States who resist euro-membership, such as the UK, Denmark, and Sweden. And this would be likely to further the cause of ‘Brexit’ (British exit from the EU), if the UK were to feel itself fully marginalized from a significant role in EU governance.

In addition to these problems are further practical questions such as which Member States are to be included and which excluded, in particular if Member States to be left out might have capacities necessary for the core to succeed in another given area (e.g., Britain in defense and security policy; Sweden on the environment). Moreover, if all Member States are notionally to become members of the core at some later date (in particular if the Euro forms the ‘core’), does it make sense to exclude them now? As it is, most Member States belong to some aspect of Eurozone governance. All Member States signed up to the SGP, the European Semester, and the ‘Six-Pack’ legislation (requiring all members above 60% debt to move toward compliance and be subject to the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure); all but the UK adhered to the Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance (the so-called ‘Fiscal Compact,’ which reinforces the legislation above
by making it a treaty as well); 23 Member States joined the ‘Euro Plus Pact’ (17 Eurozone members plus Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania, focused on improving competitiveness, employment and fiscal consolidation); and 17 (Eurozone) Member States signed up for the ‘Two Pack’ (strengthening provisions of the European Semester and financing mechanisms such as the ESM and the EFSM) (Tocci 2014).

The EU, in short, cannot be made up of one ‘hard core.’ It does better to be understood as having many overlapping policy clusters, which through their overlap creates a soft core encompassing a large majority of Member States (Schmidt 2009). That soft core also includes the Eurozone.

But how, then, can we conceive of a reset of European economic governance within and beyond the Eurozone? How does the EU get beyond ‘governing by the rules’ and ‘ruling by the numbers?’ The reinterpretations of the rules that have already led to a more politicised Council, a potentially more autonomous and doubly accountable Commission, a more empowered EP, and an ECB acting akin to an LOLR suggest the beginning of the way beyond rules-based governance. The recommendations for more policies promoting economic and social solidarity would add to this. But more coordinated EU economic governance is also necessary. With a more decentralised European Semester, the existing EU-wide system of Member State budget development and oversight adds bottom-up processes to top-down ones. But the top-down processes could and should also be reformed. They need not remain stuck with the numbers-targeting rules.

Instead of speaking and/or acting as if the rules and numbers are set in stone, they should be understood as general guidelines — which is what they actually have become in practice. The specific targets could therefore be revised upward or downward in yearly budgetary discussions of what the EU economy as a whole requires for growth and prosperity. Such revisions have actually already started informally, with the shift away from the insistence on austerity to an insistence on growth and investment. But it could be formalized as a yearly exercise in which the Commission could make recommendations based on ECB forecasts of the needed inflation rate in consultation with the decentralised National Semester Councils of the Member States, to be
then deliberated in the Council — among Eurozone and non-Eurozone Member States alike — with the recommendations then considered in the EP in consultation with national parliaments. Such an EU-wide system of budgetary coordination would thus come closer to an EU-level economic governance in tune with the real needs of national and EU economies, responsive to changing realities and more open to the needs of European Member States’ heterogeneous economies.

**Conclusion: will this time really be different?**

The danger for the EU, given the Eurozone crisis that has been a catalyst for increasing polarisation in terms of politics and identity, is differentiated disintegration. The best remedy against this is for EU leaders to develop new visions of what the EU is and where it should go along with new political processes that bring citizens and parliaments back into policymaking at national and EU levels. This is particularly important for Eurozone governance, which has strayed from the EU’s long-standing democratic settlement through an excess of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. As for the European Semester, if it continues, it needs to be increasingly decentralised to ensure that greater flexibility comes with legitimating discourse. Beyond this, the EU needs to get Eurozone policy right in order to ensure better economic performance. And this means deepening economic integration in ways that substitute initiatives that provide real economic and social solidarity for the punitive rules and numbers. Unless EU and Eurozone Member States hang together, they will hang separately — with increasingly negative consequences for all, not just for Southern Europe.

So the question is, again: Will this time really be different? Can the EU change its policies, politics, and processes in such a way as to resolve the Eurozone crisis once and for all?

Much suggests that this is unlikely. Politically, public trust in national and EU institutions has fallen dramatically together with support for European economic integration while citizen dissatisfaction with national governments and disaffection from the EU has been on the rise. This trend has translated into increasingly volatile national politics. Populism has been growing, incumbent governments have increasingly been voted out of office, and extremist parties with anti-
Euro and anti-EU messages have gained attention, votes, and even seats in both national parliaments and the EP.

The toxic politics have been fueled by the poor economic performance of the EU, and in particular of Eurozone members, along with increasing divergence between the export-rich surplus economies of Northern Europe and the rest. Eurozone policies focused on ‘governing by the rules and ruling by the numbers’ have not remedied the situation. Austerity budgets requiring rapid deficit and debt reduction accompanied by admonishments for ‘structural reform’ have not worked. Debt to GDP has risen in countries most at risk while growth remains elusive and poverty and inequality rise along with unemployment, jeopardizing political stability. And yet the EU has appeared unable to change course.

EU leaders seem locked into such policies by institutional logics that make formally changing the rules almost impossible so long as there is significant disagreement among the Member States about what to do and how to do it (in particular given the unanimity rule for revising treaties). The political logics have only reinforced such institutional gridlock, in particular when EU leaders are worried about electoral losses to the extremes on the right or the left. Moreover, having committed themselves to a course of action that has led to increasingly restrictive reinforcement of the rules, EU leaders have found it difficult to legitimate changing course, even when they are so inclined. The new bailout agreement in response to the current Greek crisis, moreover, with its harsh austerity terms imposed on and accepted by the radical left government, has seemed only to reinforced the coalition supporting governance by rules and numbers.

Finally, against this background, it is not surprising that there has been little political will or sufficient trust among the Member States to take steps to resolve the crisis once and for all. Suggestions for deeper economic integration focused on more positive remedies do come up for discussion periodically, such as the ones mentioned in this chapter, including some form of mutualisation of debt, different forms of social solidarity, proposals for investment strategies, or even harmonization of tax policies. But with the exception of a banking union (a big exception), they haven’t got very far.
For all of this, 2014 has been different: change is in the air. The public mood has been shifting. Even as the extremes have garnered more votes, public trust in EU institutions and national governments now shows an uptick, after precipitous declines since the beginning of the crisis. This may be due at least in part to a sense that policies, politics, and processes may be changing for the better.

First of all, politics came back in. The EP campaign in particular drew attention to the political differences among party candidates through high profile debates and national campaigns. Some EU Member State leaders in the Council were also contesting the rules more openly and debating the merits of stability versus flexibility, while all were now calling attention to the need for growth. As for the policies, the Commission was being increasingly flexible in its interpretations of the rules, with more derogations on the numbers, while the ECB was taking further steps to solve the crisis, now through quantitative easing. And the newly elected Commission President pledged to establish an Investment Fund (European Council 2014) and to combat youth unemployment and poverty through targeted programmes.

Only time will tell whether the change in mood in 2014 will be followed by a change in the EU’s economic prospects, with less volatile politics, more effective policies, and better governance processes. The Commission’s ability to lead remains an open question, as does the willingness of the Council to allow it. Moreover, even though the EP elections have given EU citizens a more direct voice in EU governance in principle, the legitimacy derived from that voice is not assured in practice given the high rate of abstentionism in EP elections that also brought in a large extreme right contingent. Additionally, national politics have become increasingly unstable, as new challengers on the extremes have been gaining voice and votes. If the European economy were to remain in the doldrums, or to get worse, while the politics continues to be volatile and the policies seem ineffective, 2014 would still constitute a watershed year. This time would indeed be different, but as a turn to the worse rather than the better.

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6. Trust in EU institutions went from a high of 57% in spring 2007 down to a low of 31% in spring 2012, in 2013 and spring 2014, then jumped up to 37% in autumn 2014; trust in national governments went from a high of 43% in spring 2007 to 24% in autumn 2011 and a low of 25% in autumn 2013 then back up to 29% in autumn 2014. Eurobarometer EB 82 (2015).
Changing the policies, politics, and processes of the Eurozone in crisis: will this time be different?

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Economic governance in Europe 2020:
socialising the European Semester against
the odds?

Jonathan Zeitlin and Bart Vanhercke

Introduction: what is at stake?

Since the onset of the Euro crisis, the EU has introduced a series of far-reaching changes in its institutional architecture for economic and social governance. At the heart of this new architecture is the ‘European Semester’ of policy coordination. Through the European Semester, the Commission, the Council, and the European Council set priorities for the Union in the Annual Growth Survey (AGS), review National Reform Programmes (NRPs) and issue Country-Specific Recommendations (CSRs) to Member States, backed up in some cases by the possibility of financial sanctions. The process is graphically represented in Figure 1. The European Semester brings together within a single annual policy coordination cycle a wide range of EU governance instruments with different legal bases and sanctioning authority, from the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), to the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP), and finally to the Fiscal Treaty to the Europe 2020 Strategy and the Integrated Economic and Employment Policy Guidelines. This process, in turn, has given EU institutions a more visible and intrusive role in scrutinizing and guiding national economic, fiscal, and social policies, especially but by no means exclusively within the Eurozone.

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1. An earlier and expanded version of this chapter was published as a Report prepared for the Swedish Institute of European Studies (SIEPS), which provides fuller references for each section (Zeitlin and Vanhercke 2014).
The rapid evolution of the European Semester has raised a series of hotly contested theoretical, empirical and normative questions about the nature and dynamics of the EU’s emerging socio-economic governance architecture. These questions, in turn, reflect deep and longstanding divisions not only among analysts of EU governance, but also among European policy actors themselves.

The first set of questions addressed concern the coordination of social and economic policy within the EU and its Member States. Has the integration of EU social policy coordination, as developed through the Open Method of Coordination on Social Protection and Social Inclusion (Social OMC), into the Europe 2020 Strategy and the European Semester resulted in its subordination to economic objectives of fiscal discipline, budgetary austerity, and welfare retrenchment imposed by the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) and the Economic and Financial Affairs (ECOFIN) Council? Or does such integration offer new opportunities for social and employment policy actors to mainstream objectives such as the fight against poverty
and social exclusion across the new governance architecture of the European Semester?

A second, crosscutting set of questions addressed concern the impact of the new governance architecture on the relationship between EU institutions and the Member States. Has the European Semester reinforced intergovernmental decision-making within EU socio-economic governance, as many influential commentators claim? Or have the new procedures of the ‘Six-Pack’, ‘Two-Pack’, and ‘Fiscal Compact’, even if approved and initiated by the European Council, materially elevated the Commission’s supranational powers and prerogatives over national policy-making?

A third, less evident but no less important set of questions addressed concern the nature of the European Semester as an evolving governance process. Should the European Semester be understood as a more effective framework for enforcing national compliance with EU rules and policy recommendations, as many economists and policy-makers claim? Or does the EU’s new socio-economic governance architecture offer opportunities for joint exploration and mutual learning among Member States about how to pursue multi-dimensional objectives and provisional solutions to uncertain problems in diverse national contexts, as theorists of experimentalist governance advocate? (e.g. Sabel and Zeitlin 2012).

Based on extensive analysis of EU documents as well as a series of interviews with high-level policymakers, we argue that since 2011, there has been a partial but progressive ‘socialisation’ of the content and procedures of the European Semester. We define this progressive socialisation in terms of an increasing emphasis on social objectives in the EU’s priorities and Country-Specific Recommendations; an intensification of social monitoring, multilateral surveillance, and peer review; and an enhanced role for social and employment policy actors, especially the EU Employment and Social Protection Committees. We interpret these developments as not only a response by the Commission and other EU institutions to rising social and political discontent with the consequences of post-crisis austerity policies among European citizens but also as a product of reflexive learning and creative adaptation on the part of social and employment actors to the new institutional conditions of the European Semester. We consider such reflexive learning as another form of ‘socialisation’.
The chapter draws on four rounds of expert interviews with current and former members of the European Commission (13 from the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (DG EMPL), 3 from the Secretariat General (SECGEN), and 1 each from DGs ECFIN, Health and Food Safety (SANTE), and Regional and Urban Policy (REGIO). Other respondents are from EU Committees, including Secretaries and former Secretaries employed by the Commission (5 each from Employment Committee EMCO, SPC, and European Policy Committee EPC), the European Council Secretariat, the European Parliament, and European NGO networks. A total of 38 separate people were interviewed, 8 of them more than once. This chapter is also based on near-complete access to the papers of EMCO and the Social Protection Committee (SPC) during this period. Wherever possible, we have tried to refer to the publicly available version of these documents if they exist. Taken together these qualitative sources allowed us to carefully check the results through triangulation: any claims made by respondents have been confronted, first, with the views of other interviewees and, second, with as many available written sources as possible.

1. Policy orientations

The first European Semester in 2011 was clearly dominated by the pursuit of fiscal consolidation and macroeconomic austerity, with limited concern for social cohesion and inclusion goals (Vanhercke 2013; Pochet and Degryse 2012). But as the sovereign debt crisis within the Eurozone morphed into a broader economic and employment crisis, leading to a rapid erosion of public support for the EU, a significant rebalancing between social, economic, and employment objectives became visible in the policy orientation of successive European Semesters.

1.1 The Annual Growth Surveys

The 2011 AGS had set three overarching priorities for the EU: ‘rigorous fiscal consolidation for enhancing macroeconomic stability’, ‘labour market reforms for higher employment’, and ‘growth enhancing measures’. The 2012 AGS replaced these with a broader and more socially balanced set
of priorities, including ‘tackling unemployment and the social consequences of the crisis’ alongside ‘pursuing differentiated growth-friendly fiscal consolidation’, ‘restoring normal lending to the economy’, ‘promoting growth and competitiveness for today and tomorrow’, and ‘modernising public administration’. Both the 2013 and 2014 AGSs reaffirmed these more balanced priorities.

1.2 Pacts and packages

As EU institutions came under increasing pressure to tackle the deepening economic and employment crisis, the Commission and particularly DG EMPL responded by launching a succession of socially oriented ‘pacts’ and ‘packages’. Foremost among these were the Employment Package (April 2012), the ‘Compact for Growth and Jobs’ (June 2012), the Youth Employment Package (December 2012), and the Social Investment Package (February 2013). In addition to specific policy measures (such as the Youth Guarantee) and EU recommendations (on child poverty and active inclusion), a notable feature of these pacts and packages was that Member States’ implementation of the proposed measures should be reported on, monitored, and reviewed within the European Semester (European Commission 2013d).

1.3 Country-Specific Recommendations

As the policy priorities of the European Semester, expressed through the AGS and other Commission initiatives, reoriented themselves towards a more socially balanced stance beginning in late 2011, so too did the CSRs.

In 2012, seven Member States received CSRs addressing poverty reduction and three addressed Roma inclusion. Five Member States received recommendations regarding the effectiveness of their social protection systems. 17 States received recommendations on pension reform, and five on health and long-term care. Most Member States also received recommendations on education, training, and active labour market policies (ALMPs), many of which requested the states to improve the quality, coverage, and effectiveness of individually targeted employment services.
These trends were extended in 2013 when 11 Member States received CSRs on social inclusion and poverty reduction, linked in three cases to the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure. 15 CSRs addressed pensions and 16 health and long-term care, with some explicit emphasis on ensuring their adequacy and accessibility, especially in the explanatory text (based on the longer Commission Staff Working Documents). Nine Member States also received CSRs on improving the effectiveness and efficiency of their social protection systems, while most again received recommendations on education, training, and ALMPs.

In 2014, the social scope of the CSRs continued to expand. Thus 12 Member States received recommendations on poverty and social inclusion, while 19 received recommendations on reform of their health-care and/or pension systems. In the latter case, the accompanying communication from the Commission emphasized that the purpose of such reforms is to ensure that these systems ‘continue to be socially adequate’ and ‘to provide universal access to high-quality care’, as well as to be cost-effective and financially sustainable (European Commission 2014: 8-10). As in previous years, of course, not all CSRs that dealt with social and employment issues can be considered ‘socially orientated’, and a number of countries continued to receive recommendations to reform their wage determination systems to better reflect productivity developments at firm and sectoral level (6 Member State, MS), reform their employment protection systems (2 MS) or strengthen job search requirements for unemployment benefits (1 MS).

But such recommendations were overshadowed by the much larger number of CSRs urging Member States to improve their education, training, and activation systems (most MS), reduce early school leaving (8 MS), improve skills (12 MS), implement the youth guarantee (8 MS), enhance educational outcomes and access to the labour market for disadvantaged groups, including those with a Roma or migrant background (7 MS), increase the availability, accessibility, and quality of childcare facilities (9 MS) and promote the employability of older workers, for example through expansion of lifelong learning (11 MS). Eleven Member States received recommendations to ensure the adequacy and coverage of their social assistance and unemployment benefits, while six were exhorted to improve the accessibility and quality of their public social services, especially those targeted at low-income people.
2. Governance procedures

The substantive reorientation of the European Semester towards a more socially balanced policy stance from 2011 to 2014 was accompanied by a set of organizational and procedural developments which have reinforced the role of social and employment policy actors in its governance.

2.1 Drafting the CSRs: a more collaborative process

The progressive opening up of the CSRs to social issues, as our 2014 interviewees explained, reflects the fact that the process of drafting them has become increasingly collaborative within the Commission itself. The groundwork for the CSRs is prepared by Country Teams led by SECGEN, with bottom-up input from desk officers and support from horizontal policy units across a wide range of DGs, including, when relevant, the DG Health and Food Safety (SANTE), the Education and Culture DG, DG Enterprise and Industry, and DG Justice and Consumers, as well as the other three ‘core’ DGs: ECFIN, EMPL, and Taxation and Customs Union (TAXUD). Although DG ECFIN ‘holds the pen’ in drafting the Commission Staff Working Documents, which provide the rationale for the CSRs, this is a ‘collegial exercise’, which means it is based on written contributions from all the relevant DGs, and reviewed in the Country Teams. Only the In-Depth Reviews under the MIP are written independently by ECFIN and then circulated for comment to the other DGs. The CSRs themselves are drafted by the Country Team leaders, drawing on intelligence, ideas, and some wording supplied by the various DGs. These are then discussed by the Directors of the four core DGs (SECGEN, ECFIN, EMPL, TAXUD), before being submitted for approval to the full College of Commissioners, which often makes final changes.

Our interviewees also concurred that the process of drafting the CSRs has become increasingly deliberative and ‘evidence-based’. As one Country Team leader put it, ‘if you want a CSR, then you need to provide evidence, and this evidence needs to be in the Staff Working Document, and it needs to be well argued... if you don’t have hard numbers and figures on a specific CSR, then forget it’. A DG EMPL official involved in the process underlined how this emphasis on
evidence and argument could overturn any implicit hierarchy among the participating units.

A clear case in point cited by this interviewee was that of the 2014 CSRs that included the implementation of the youth guarantee scheme. The inclusion of the scheme was initially opposed by both DG ECFIN and SECGEN, but DG EMPL eventually succeeded in getting it through by using evidence from the SWDs and the Country Teams.

The centrality of evidence and argument within the CSR drafting process has pushed the participating Commission services to upgrade their intelligence-gathering and analytical capacities. Thus, sectoral fact-finding missions by the various DGs are increasingly coordinated through the Country Teams by SECGEN. The latter DG has also intensified the exchange of information and perspectives with Member States by increasing the number of bilateral meetings to four or-five per year. DG EMPL in particular has substantially enhanced its analytical capacities in recent years. For example, it has stepped up work on social and employment indicators, made thematic fiches more operational, and introduced radar charts for work on the efficiency and effectiveness of social protection systems, all in order to participate in the process ‘on an equal footing with DG ECFIN’. This quest on all sides for better knowledge about the actual situation in Member States has also led to a ‘cross-fertilization’ between the Commission’s analytical work in preparing the CSRs and the multilateral surveillance reviews of CSR implementation conducted by EMCO and the SPC (discussed in section 3.4), which are increasingly attended not only by officials from DG EMPL, but also from SECGEN, and in some cases ECFIN, SANTE, and other concerned DGs.

2.2 Reviving the Social OMC

The other major developments which have reinforced the role of social and employment policy actors in the European Semester were driven less by the Commission than by the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council (EPSCO) and its preparatory committees. The first of these was the 2011 initiative by Member State representatives in the SPC, subsequently endorsed by EPSCO, to ‘reinvigorate’ the Social OMC in the context of Europe 2020. Member
States were invited to prepare regular National Social Reports, which were to be developed in ‘close partnership’ with civil society stakeholders as well as subnational authorities, and submitted alongside the NRPs. In 2014, 19 Member States submitted NSRs, which were generally longer, more standardised, and more substantial than they were the first time around. The SPC also took over responsibility for the production of an annual Social Europe Report, a punchier and more reader-friendly replacement for the previous Joint Social Report, but which included the same core features: key policy messages, country profiles, and an in-depth analysis of social trends in the EU (SPC 2014a).

2.3 Extending social and employment policy monitoring

In addition to taking primary responsibility for the continuation of the Social OMC, the SPC has established itself as a significant player in monitoring, reviewing, and assessing national reforms within the European Semester, alongside EMCO, EPC, and EFC (Economic and Financial Committee).

At the EPSCO Council’s request, EMCO and the SPC have developed a Europe 2020 Joint Assessment Framework (JAF) for monitoring the Employment Guidelines (cf. Vanhercke 2013: 109). The results produced by the JAF feed in turn into the Employment and Social Protection Performance Monitors developed by the two committees at the request of EPSCO and the European Council. The Social Protection Performance Monitor (SPPM) also highlights common social ‘trends to watch’, where indicators in a significant number of countries are moving in the wrong direction relative to the Europe 2020 targets and guidelines (SPC Indicators Sub-Group 2012). For a graphical representation of the SPPM, see Figure 2 below. In 2013, the SPC Indicators Sub-Group developed, in cooperation with the Council Working Party on Public Health at Senior Level (WPPHSL), a Joint Assessment Framework in the field of health in order to complement the existing framework focused on employment, social inclusion, and pensions.
Both EMCO and the SPC are committed to using the JAF, Employment Performance Monitor (EPM), and SPPM as analytical tools that can underpin multilateral surveillance and support Member States in establishing their reform priorities, identifying good practices, and stimulating mutual learning. They also feed these tools into the broader EU policy debate. Furthermore, they serve as an important point of reference for discussions within the committees about amendments to the Commission’s proposed CSRs.

Finally, in response to the debate on the ‘Social Dimension of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)’ initiated by the President of the European Council in 2013 (President of the European Council 2013; Irish Presidency 2013), the SPC and EMCO developed, at the request of the Commission and the EPSCO Council, a new ‘Scoreboard of Key Social and Employment Indicators’ (also known as the ‘Social Scoreboard’). This was designed to ‘serve as an analytical tool allowing better and earlier identification of major employment and social
problems, especially any that risk generating effects beyond national borders. This Social Scoreboard, which is intended to complement the JAF, EPM and SPPM, currently comprises 5 indicators, and was included both in the 2014 Joint Employment Report and the Commission communication on the CSRs (European Commission 2013b: 6; SPC 2014d).

Alongside this new Social Scoreboard, the Commission decided on its own initiative to add a set of auxiliary social and employment indicators to the portfolio used in the Alert Mechanism Report and In-Depth Reviews of the MIP, in order ‘to better reflect the social implications of macroeconomic imbalances’ and ‘help to improve the design of the policies recommended to countries undergoing macroeconomic adjustment’ (European Commission 2013b: 4-5). The 2014 Alert Mechanism Report (AMR) included nine new auxiliary indicators, most covering both absolute levels and change over the preceding three years: the year-on-year percentage change in employment; the activity rate (15-64 years); the long-term unemployment rate; the youth unemployment rate; the youth Not in Education, Employment or Training (NEET) rate; the proportion of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion; the at-risk-of poverty rate; the severe material deprivation rate; and the proportion of persons living in households with very low work intensity (European Commission 2013c, table A.3).

2.4 Intensifying multilateral surveillance and peer review

This extended social and employment policy monitoring has gone hand-in-hand with a significant intensification of multilateral surveillance and peer review within both EMCO and the SPC, in response to successive requests from the EPSCO Council. Since 2011, EMCO has systematically sought to deepen and reinforce multilateral surveillance of the implementation of Member States’ employment policy reform commitments. EMCO begins in the autumn with a review of the

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2. These indicators are the unemployment level and changes; the NEET [not in employment, education, or training] and youth unemployment rate; real disposable income of households [Gross Household Disposable Income, GHDI]; the at-risk-of-poverty rate for the working age population; and inequality (S80/20 ratio).
previous year’s CSRs, grouped by theme to facilitate horizontal discussion and comparison across Member States. The reviews are framed by a series of thematic and country-specific background documents prepared by the Commission, the EMCO Indicators Group, the Member State under review, and a discussant country. The resulting conclusions are formally adopted as a multilateral position by the full committee and integrated with indicators from the JAF to produce the country-specific element of the Employment Performance Monitor. They are also reported to the Council (EMCO 2014a) and serve as the ‘primary evidence base’ for discussing the new set of proposed CSRs (EMCO 2013a).

Whereas until 2012 SPC peer reviews occurred once a year and focused (rather superficially) on the NSRs, now multilateral surveillance activities are conducted throughout the year, with in-depth thematic reviews in the autumn and country reviews in the spring focused on Member States’ implementation response to the previous year’s CSRs. SPC Members were asked in 2012 if they were ready to give country surveillance a new orientation that would be ‘less descriptive, more critical’ and more analytical (SPC 2012a), which our 2014 interviewees confirm has, in fact, occurred. On overlapping issues such as employment and healthcare, SPC country reviews of CSR implementation are conducted jointly with EMCO and (since 2013) with the WPPHSL, but not with the EPC and EFC (on which more below). As in EMCO, the conclusions of the country reviews are summarised in a written report, which is submitted to the Council, and feeds into discussions on the new set of proposed CSRs (SPC 2014b).

The SPC’s thematic reviews in particular are aimed at fostering mutual learning and stimulating multilateral discussion on promising approaches to specific policy challenges identified as common ‘trends to watch’ by the SSPM. They invite countries performing weakly in a particular area to examine those achieving better outcomes. The whole process is facilitated by background papers prepared by the Commission which provide an analysis of the identified trends based on the SSPM, the JAF, and other indicators. Thematic reviews also include final evaluations of the work done over the year in the context of multilateral surveillance, which feed into the SPC’s annual Social Europe Report, as well as into more specialized reports on issues such as child poverty, pension adequacy, and long-term care (SPC 2013a, 2014b; 2014 interviews).
Clearly, both EMCO and the SPC are looking for ways to combine ‘tougher’ multilateral surveillance in employment and social policies with increased opportunities for deliberation and mutual learning (cf. Vanhercke 2013: 111). Commission officials as well as committee members see this mutual surveillance process as a ‘game changer’, making exchanges within the committees less ‘cozy’ and more incisive than in the past, while also transforming ‘the bilateral discussion on the CSRs between Member States and the Commission into a multilateral decision making process’ (interviews 2014; EMCO 2013a).

Perhaps the most innovative developments in terms of mutual learning are the pilot *ex ante* reviews of prospective social reforms conducted by the SPC. These grew out of a proposal from the Commission for *ex ante* coordination of plans for major economic policy reforms. The EPC took up this proposal and conducted two pilot exercises in 2013-14, covering reforms in seven Member States and across a series of policy fields.

In response to these initiatives from the Commission and the EPC, the SPC decided in the autumn of 2013 to launch a ‘feasibility test’ of its own for *ex ante* coordination of major social policy reforms within the framework of the OMC. Five Member States (CY, EE, IT, SI, RO) volunteered to present their planned reforms in the fields of minimum income, incapacity-for-work benefits, active inclusion, long-term care, and pensions respectively. Presenting countries appear to have particularly appreciated the exercise, as they benefitted from ‘experience-based feedback of other Members who had implemented similar reforms in the past’, including what not to do, and ‘received concrete advice on how to improve the policy design of the envisaged reforms and work toward acceptance of difficult policy choices’. Since potential spillovers proved difficult to identify, these *ex ante* pilots ‘proved to be less a coordination exercise and more a learning exercise’, said one participating Commission official. Inspired by the SPC’s experience, EMCO conducted its own first *ex ante* pilot review in October 2014 (2014 interviews; SPC 2014c, SPC 2013b).

At the same time, EMCO and the SPC have also continued to organize an extensive programme of voluntary peer reviews of good national practices through the European Employment Strategy (EES) Mutual Learning Programme and PROGRESS (Programme for Employment and Social Solidarity). Many of these peer reviews have focused on core
themes related to Europe 2020, such as youth unemployment, flexicurity, extending working lives, and others (Jessoula et al. 2013). DG Employment has now agreed with the SPC and EMCO to connect the next generation of peer reviews under the new Employment and Social Innovation (EaSI) programme much more closely to the CSRs and to the ex-ante reform discussions. Peer reviews may be organized to support Member States seeking more detailed input from other countries on the design of their proposed reforms (interviews 2014).

2.5 Enhancing the influence of social and employment policy actors

Such intensified monitoring, multilateral surveillance, and peer review has in turn formed the basis for enhanced input by EMCO and the SPC into the adoption of the CSRs, which are the culmination of the European Semester. In the first European Semester of 2011, the SPC (and Ministers of Social Affairs more generally) were largely excluded from the review and adoption of the CSRs.

Beginning in 2012, however, the social players began to acquire a more influential place in the CSR process, drawing on the expertise gained through the extended monitoring, mutual surveillance, and peer review activities described above, as well as through political challenges to the jurisdiction of economic policy actors over social policy issues within the Council (cf. Vanhercke 2013).

The mounting pressure for reorientation of the European Semester and revision of its governance procedures gained additional momentum and political salience during 2013 through the EU-wide debate on the social dimension of the EMU. Thus, in response to an initiative by Herman Van Rompuy, the EU Ministers of Employment and Social Affairs issued a ringing declaration on the social dimension of ‘a genuine EMU’ in May 2013 (European Commission 2013a). EPSCO ministers called for a strengthening of the governance role of the EES and the Social OMC, building on the employment guidelines, monitoring instruments, peer reviews, and multilateral surveillance procedures. Furthermore, the SPC Ministers demanded the development of mechanisms to facilitate ‘more effective interaction’ between the Council formations involved, ‘especially as regards the adoption and review of the
implementation of Country-Specific Recommendations (EU Ministers of Employment and Social Affairs 2013). At the same time, several authors (see for example Stamati and Baeten, this volume) argue that health authorities are only marginally involved in the European Semester process and remain extremely reluctant to engage in the EU level debates. As a result, ‘economic’ actors remain for now largely dominant in the area of healthcare, in spite of prudent attempts of the ‘health’ actors to enhance their influence (Baeten and Vanhercke 2015).

2.6 Towards a revised procedural framework for the European Semester

The highly charged conflicts over the organization of the second European Semester gave rise in turn to a substantially revised procedural framework for the 2013 cycle. The Irish Presidency went to considerable lengths to ensure that arrangements for reviewing and amending the CSRs would be based on a clearer allocation of responsibilities and cooperation in areas of overlapping competences between the various committees and Council formations involved (Irish Presidency of the EU 2012).

Thus, the SPC presented the results of their review of the implementation of the 2012 CSRs on pensions to a meeting of the EPC alternates, and participated in a joint meeting with the EPC and EMCO to finalize amendments to the 2013 CSRs on issues of cross-cutting responsibility (such as pensions and health care). Unlike in 2012, the views of the SPC and EMCO on the CSRs appear to have received a full hearing, and cooperation with the EPC and EFC is generally agreed to have proceeded much more smoothly than the preceding year (SPC 2013c; EMCO 2013b; interviews 2013).

Underlying this revised procedural framework for the European Semester were new decision-making processes and working methods within and between the committees involved. In each case, amendments to the CSRs were required to be supported by qualified majority voting (QMV) to test the support among Member States for changes to the Commission’s proposals and then the amendments had to be justified by reference to the results of the multilateral surveillance reviews conducted within the committees.
Since EMCO and the SPC had always worked through consensus decisions or occasionally a simple majority vote, the adoption of QMV for amendments to the CSRs (in 2012 and 2013 respectively) represented a quantum shift in procedure for both committees. The move to QMV by the two committees means that ‘any changes agreed…could be strongly defended by the Presidency in Council’ (EMCO 2013a). QMV likewise strengthens the two committees’ position in negotiations with the EPC (which also uses this procedure in relation to the CSRs) and the Commission, which has resisted on principle any substantive modification of its policy recommendations. Voting in the committees on proposed amendments can thus be seen as an institutional mechanism for forcing the Commission to deliberate multilaterally with Member State representatives on the CSRs by demonstrating their capacity to reach a qualified majority.

Multilateral surveillance within the committees is likewise crucial to the review and amendment of the CSRs. Only issues that have been extensively discussed by Member States during the multilateral surveillance process stand a chance of securing the needed qualified majority vote within the committees. Both EMCO and SPC draw extensively on evidence from their multilateral surveillance reviews in negotiating with the EPC and EFC and Commission over the adoption of amendments to CSRs. The more accurate and detailed the evidence about national challenges and CSR implementation the committees are able to provide, the more likely their proposed amendments are to be accepted. Under the ‘comply or explain’ rules of the European Semester, the Council is expected to provide a written explanation of its reasons for modifying the Commission’s recommendations. Both committees refer explicitly to these mutual surveillance reviews in the formal reports justifying their amendments (Council of the EU 2012, 2013, 2014b).

In 2014, the Greek Presidency strictly followed the same arrangements for the organization of the European Semester developed by the Irish Presidency. For the most part, these arrangements again appear to have worked relatively smoothly, with one conspicuous exception, attributable in part to the very tight time pressures under which the final review of the Commission’s draft CSRs was conducted. Prior to a joint meeting with EMCO and the EPC in June, the SPC reviewed and voted by QMV on proposed amendments to the CSR in the social field. When it came to the joint meeting, however, the vote on five CSRs went
counter to what had been previously agreed on in the SPC (either because some national delegations were overruled by their finance ministries, or because some delegates were absent when the votes were taken). Since the EFC and EPC do not formally recognize the SPC’s legal right to participate in the amendment of the CSRs, the SPC chose to submit its own separate opinion to the Council on ‘recommendations falling within the competence of Ministers responsible for social protection issues irrespective of the proposed legal basis’, rather than endorsing the outcome of the joint meeting.

This incident resulted in a public exchange of letters to the Council from the SPC and EMCO Chairs, in which the former defended his committee’s proposed amendments on substantive grounds, while the latter insisted that such joint meetings are ‘the only feasible and effective way of ensuring commonly reached compromise decisions from both the ECOFIN and EPSCO committees, thereby allowing for a meaningful discussion in both Council formations’, and should not be questioned afterwards by either side. The Greek Presidency upheld EMCO’s position, and the opinion of the joint meeting was adopted by both the EPSCO and ECOFIN Councils. Poland and the Czech Republic took their pensions issues all the way to the European Council, where their amendments failed. The clear lesson from this principled but quixotic defeat is that at least for now, the SPC can only hope to obtain amendments to the CSRs on social issues when the committee works closely together with EMCO in joint meetings with the EPC and the EFC, rather than trying to go it alone (Council of the EU 2014a; 2014 interviews).

2.7 Amending the CSRs

In 2012, a well-informed EMCO source estimated that proposed social and employment policy amendments had no more than a 10 per cent chance of success. In 2013, interviewees from both EMCO and SPC estimated that one-third of all such proposed amendments to the CSRs were adopted without objection by the Commission, while the success rate for contested amendments had reached 50%. While these are only rough estimates by our interviewees, they nevertheless seem to point to the fact that in 2013, there were 14 non-consensual amendments to the CSRs, of which 10 concerned social and employment issues, compared
to 11 in 2012, of which eight concerned social and employment issues (own calculations from Council of the EU 2012, 2013).

Most of these amendments concerned details, focusing on better contextualization of individual CSRs in relation to Member State challenges and reform measures. It was also sometimes possible to obtain ‘horizontal’ amendments to CSRs addressed to multiple Member States. The key case in point in 2013 concerned pension reform, the flashpoint of conflict the previous year between the SPC, the Commission, and the economic policy actors. Thus for eight Member States (AT, BE, CZ, ES, FI, FR, LU, MT), an across-the-board injunction to ‘link the statutory retirement age to life expectancy’ was replaced by a recommendation to ‘increase the effective retirement age’. The comply-or-explain text underlined the importance of allowing Member States to choose among alternative paths to reaching the objective: ‘It was agreed that there are different channels to raise the effective retirement age and, hence, to address challenges to the pension system and the sustainability of public finances. The original Commission text, focusing only on raising the (statutory) retirement age, appeared too prescriptive and narrowly defined’ (Council of the EU 2013).

As a result of these experiences, the European Semester synthesis report by the Lithuanian Presidency of the Council of the EU (2013) recommended specifically that:

— ‘The Commission continues to enhance its dialogue with Member States when preparing CSR proposals, sharing the underlying analysis and making further efforts towards evidence-based recommendations’

— ‘The Commission should ensure that its CSR proposals are sufficiently precise as regards policy outcomes but not overly prescriptive as regards policy measures so as to leave sufficient space for social dialogue and, more generally for national ownership; more detailed recommendations could refer to

3. See also SPC (2012b): ‘A genuine multilateral discussion necessitates full participation of the Commission in the policy dialogue... For recommendations to be successfully implemented and to become an effective instrument for change, it is crucial that an enhanced policy dialogue
Economic governance in Europe 2020: socialising the European Semester against the odds?

Social policy in the European Union: state of play 2015

Despite the SPC’s failure to win its separate amendments to the 2014 CSRs, non-consensual revisions on social and employment issues continued at a similar rate to the previous year, accounting for 10 of 11 successful amendments adopted over the Commission’s opposition. Six of these amendments concerned pension CSRs, where the Commission returned to its previous year’s recommendation that Member States align the statutory retirement age with increased longevity. The Council endorsed the SPC’s view that there were alternative pathways to tackling pension challenges, notably by raising the effective age of retirement. Amendments of employment CSRs focused mainly on better contextualization to take into account the specific situation in Member States and the ongoing reform measures, based on evidence from EMCO’s multilateral surveillance (Council of the EU 2014b; 2014 interviews).

3. Summary, discussion and conclusions

By way of conclusion, we return to the three sets of key questions about the nature and dynamics of the EU’s emerging socio-economic governance architecture with which we began.

3.1 Economic vs. social Europe?

Regarding the first set of questions about the coordination of social and economic policy, the core claim of this chapter is that since 2011 there has been a progressive ‘socialisation’ of the European Semester. This evolutionary shift is visible at the level of substantive policy orientations, in terms of a growing emphasis on social objectives in the EU’s priorities. CSRs have expanded considerably from year to year in social scope (the range of ‘social’ topics covered) and ambition (asking for
recalibration, not retrenchment, of social policies), even if the expanding volume and coverage of these social CSRs is still counterbalanced by other imperative recommendations on fiscal consolidation under the SGP.

The progressive socialisation of the European Semester is equally visible at the level of governance procedures, in terms of an enhanced role for social and employment policy actors – EMCO the SPC, DG EMPL and the EPSCO Council – in monitoring, reviewing, and amending the CSRs. Jurisdictional struggles continue with the economic policy actors about overlapping issues, especially those linked to the SGP and the MIP. But the revised procedural framework for the European Semester introduced in 2013, coupled with the detailed knowledge of the situation in the Member States, has made it possible for EMCO and the SPC to obtain amendments of the Commission’s draft CSRs on both larger and smaller issues – provided that they work together and argue their case effectively in joint meetings with their counterparts on the ECOFIN side.

In addition to carving out a place within the European Semester process, the SPC has made effective use of the knowledge base, governance instruments, and working methods developed through the Social OMC to play a proactive role in monitoring and assessing national performance against the EU’s common social objectives and indicators. Thus Member State representatives in the committee have exploited the flexibility of the Social OMC to develop their own social reporting initiatives at both the national and EU levels across all three of its policy strands. And they have also taken the lead in the development of ex ante review of planned social reforms, which DG EMPL now sees as the next step in deepening policy debate, peer review, and mutual learning within the European Semester itself (2014 interviews).

Our interviewees were more ambivalent about the new social monitoring instruments introduced as a result of the 2013 EU-wide debate on strengthening the social dimension of the EMU. The December 2013 European Council approved the integration of a scoreboard of key employment and social indicators into the 2014 European Semester. But contrary to the original hopes of EPSCO and the Commission that this scoreboard would be used as an early warning system for signaling ‘serious employment and social imbalances...that could threaten the
stability of the EMU’, the European Council concluded instead that ‘the use of this wider range of indicators will have the sole purpose of allowing a broader understanding of social developments (European Council 2013: pars. 38-9; EU Ministers of Employment and Social Affairs 2013; European Commission 2013b). Highly placed interviewees wondered how much had really been accomplished considering the intensity of the political struggle needed to get this scoreboard adopted and the fact that its initial use in the Commission’s 2014 communication on the CSRs was rather critically received by social Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), trade unions and MEPs (Euractiv 2014). The latter should not come as a surprise in view of ongoing debate around the European social model (Pochet 2006).

In regard to the auxiliary social indicators incorporated into the MIP, our interviewees were similarly divided. Like other auxiliary indicators which form part of the MIP, there are no thresholds attached to these social indicators. They are therefore primarily used to interpret the situations in Member States which have already been selected for In-Depth Review, and to assess the social consequences of proposed corrective measures.

A continuing weakness of the EU’s evolving socio-economic governance architecture is the limited involvement of non-governmental stakeholders at both the EU and national levels. Neither social partners nor civil society organizations currently play any significant role in the European Semester, despite calls for strengthening social dialogue, while EMCO meets periodically with the EU social partner organizations and is planning to involve their secretariats in its thematic reviews (EMCO 2014c). At Member State level, the continuation of voluntary NSRs has not compensated for the very restricted participation of both civil society and subnational actors in the preparation of the NRPs (Committee of the Regions 2014). Here, too, however, there are some signs of movement, as the new Structural Funds Regulation enacted in 2013 earmarks 20 per cent of all European Social Fund (ESF) monies for ‘promoting social inclusion and combating poverty’, and makes access to this funding conditional on the adoption of ‘a national strategic framework for poverty reduction aiming at the active inclusion of people excluded from the labour market’, involving ‘relevant stakeholders’ and providing ‘a sufficient evidence base to...

3.2 Intergovernmentalism vs. supranationalism?

In regard to the second set of questions raised at the outset about the relationship between EU institutions and the Member States, the evolution of the European Semester illustrates the limited ability of received categories like ‘intergovernmentalism’ and ‘supranationalism’ to capture the dynamics of post-crisis socio-economic governance. The European Council, to be sure, remains the political master of the Semester process, formally responsible for approving all documents and decisions, including the CSRs, and is the final arbiter of any disputes (at least until the Court of Justice becomes involved). But the European Council cannot and does not run the machinery of the Semester itself. In procedural terms, the role of the Commission has been greatly reinforced by the Six-Pack, the Two-Pack, and other post-crisis measures, since it is now formally responsible for setting the Union’s socio-economic priorities through the AGS, selecting Member States for In-Depth Review, issuing draft CSRs, and proposing eventual sanctions under the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) and Excessive Imbalance Procedure (EIP). The Commission’s abilities to oversee Member States’ economic, social, and employment policies have also increased significantly since the crisis, through the build-up of analytical capacities within DG ECFIN and DG EMPL, the appointment of dedicated ‘European Semester officers’ in national capitals, and the establishment of cross-DG Country Teams led by SECGEN.

But the Commission’s grasp of national situations remains relatively broad-gauge and it cannot really compete with the fine-grained knowledge of policy challenges and developments possessed by specialized committees of Member State officials like EMCO and the SPC. These committees are therefore able to add very substantial value to the European Semester process through their monitoring, multilateral surveillance, and peer review activities, which they have continuously extended and intensified since the crisis. The committees have also been able to push back against what Member State representatives perceive as ‘over-prescriptive’, ‘one-size-fits-all’ recommendations from the Commission, which seek to define both the objectives and paths to
reach said objectives without taking proper account of national contexts and competences.

In so doing, however, these committees have not generally sought to ‘water down’ the Commission’s recommendations, but rather, to build national support for social and employment policy reforms by adapting them better to domestic institutional and political realities, based on an emerging ‘European view’ of how such reforms should be carried out in different policy fields. By demonstrating their ability to amend the Commission’s draft CSRs through QMV, these committees have also been able to force the latter to engage more deliberatively with Member States about their content in multilateral and bilateral fora. Although significant differences in perspective persist between the Commission and some of the committees – for example, on the relative priority of increasing the statutory vs. the effective age of retirement – there is growing cross-fertilization and complementarity between their analytical and evidence-gathering work. The same could be said of the relationship between the Commission, the Council, and Member State administrations within the European Semester.

3.3 Compliance vs. learning?

What of the third set of key questions raised at the outset about the relationship between compliance and learning within the European Semester? Many prominent actors within both the Commission and the Council certainly understand the Semester as a framework for enforcing national compliance with EU rules and policy recommendations and overcoming past implementation deficits. And the Semester has undoubtedly been used by the EU institutions to put pressure on Member States to address the specific policy challenges flagged by the CSRs. But there is wide disagreement among analysts and policy makers about the extent to which the CSRs have, in fact, been implemented. The Commission claims that 80% of the CSRs have been implemented, while others (especially German officials) have complained that it is more like 10-20%, and a detailed analysis carried out on behalf of the European Parliament shows a more mixed picture (Commission interviews 2014; European Parliament 2013). Both EMCO and the SPC have produced lengthy reports on social and employment policy reforms introduced by Member States since the crisis (e.g. EMCO
No sanctions have yet been imposed on any Member State under the European Semester, including those states under the MIP, and this seems only likely to occur under very exceptional circumstances. There can be no question of formal sanctions for failure to implement recommendations issued under the Employment Guidelines, though there can be consequences in relation to the structural funds. Under the new Structural Funds Regulation covering the 2014-2020 programming period, there are three levers the Commission can use to bring pressure on Member States to implement the CSRs. The first is *ex ante* conditionality: Member States are expected in their Operational Programmes (OPs) to target expenditure on priorities related to the CSRs, and the Commission can refuse to approve their OPs if they fail to do so. The second lever is reprogramming: where new priorities emerge through the CSRs, the Commission can request that Member States redirect a proportion of their structural funding to meet these priorities, to which the Member State in question is obliged to respond. The final lever is suspension: if a Member State fails to comply with recommendations under the corrective arm of the EDP or the MIP, the Commission is obliged to bring forward a proposal for the progressive suspension of its structural funding. Significantly, from the perspective of this chapter, ‘programmes or priorities which are of critical importance to addressing adverse economic or social conditions’ are exempted from both suspension and reprogramming, including investments related to the youth guarantee scheme or ‘supporting poverty reduction’. The maximum rate of suspension of funding is reduced for Member States experiencing above average rates of unemployment or poverty. So far, no such proposals for suspension have been tabled by the Commission, though according to our interviewees some reprogramming has occurred (Regulation No. 1303/2013: Art. 23 and Annex III; 2014 interviews DG EMPL and DG REGIO).

Our 2014 interviewees suggested that there are wide differences between Member States in how seriously they take the CSRs, depending on a variety of domestic considerations, including public attitudes towards European integration, the political sensitivity of the issues at
stake, and the national fiscal situation, among others. ‘The more you need from Brussels, the more weight the CSRs carry’, one Member State official observed. Political attitudes towards the EU and issue salience are likewise crucial. In some countries, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, the CSRs make the evening news and are widely discussed, especially where they touch on hot-button issues such as reform of wage indexation, pensions, or social housing. In countries at the other extreme like the UK, where all messages coming from Brussels are politically suspect, the CSRs are largely ignored.

The national influence of the CSRs also depends on how they are used by domestic actors. ‘Certain Member States are happy to receive a certain CSR’, remarked one high Commission official, ‘because it gives legitimacy, and the Commission gives it a push’. Governments sometimes go as far as to request a CSR on a particular issue, but our interviewees were unanimous in reporting that the Commission is increasingly unwilling to play this game. Conversely, CSRs are often picked up by opposition parties and other domestic actors to put pressure on the national government on controversial issues. As another Commission official put it, the ‘opposition can use it to say, listen, government, you have not sufficiently addressed this and that, and this confirms our assessment…. ’ The same Member State official quoted earlier concurred: ‘if you have a healthy democracy, somebody will be able to use the CSRs. It’s going to be very strange if there is a country where the whole Parliament, from left to right, says no, this CSR we’ve received now, this is really not something we should do’. The broader question of the national influence and domestic usages of the European Semester and the CSRs is one that would fruitfully repay further empirical research.

If there is little consensus on the effectiveness of the European Semester as a top-down compliance mechanism, our 2014 interviewees were surprisingly positive by contrast about the extent of joint exploration and mutual learning, both actual and potential, developing under the European Semester. Such learning was generally considered to be most limited in the country reviews of CSR implementation, partly because of the routinized process and the intense time constraints involved. But even there, some prominent committee members argue that participants learn about what other Member States are doing and draw inspiration and lessons for their own policies, especially when
they need to introduce something new (such as the minimum wage in Germany). Mutual learning and genuine policy exchange were considered to be more intense within the thematic reviews of CSRs, which take place in the fall during the ‘low period’ of the European Semester cycle when ‘there is a bit more time to dedicate to substance’. Within the SPC, as we have seen, the thematic reviews cast weakly performing countries as examiners of their better performing peers, while encouraging them to focus on the identification of policy approaches which could and could not be transferred to meet their own domestic challenges. The thematic reviews are also the moment within both committees when the greatest efforts are made to mobilize specialized expertise across national ministries and the Commission services in order to pose probing questions and stimulate an open policy debate.

Participants in the review process likewise emphasize that its iterative character has produced a strong learning and consensus-building effect within the committees. Another prominent SPC member went further, arguing that in policy fields like pensions and long-term care, Member State representatives in the committee were moving, as a result of the Semester process, towards ‘a common European view on social issues’, based on a shared knowledge base and understanding of national differences, and a broad ‘agreement that when you reform your…system, there are certain things you should and not do.’

There is wide agreement, finally, among both committee members and Commission officials, that the ex ante reviews of major policy reforms piloted by the SPC offer a particularly promising setting for mutual learning and genuine deliberation among Member States. This has the potential of being the next big thing’ in the European Semester, commented one committee official.

A final crucial question raised by the multiplication of CSRs on social issues and the widening of their policy scope is how far such mutual learning activities can contribute practically to helping Member States tackle complex, multi-dimensional problems to which no one has prefabricated solutions. It is to be hoped that ongoing reforms of the multilateral surveillance, performance monitoring, peer review, and mutual learning programmes will enable EMCO, the SPC, and the Commission to tackle such problems more operationally, including by
working more closely with front-line officials in Member States. They have already begun to do this, for example, through collaboration with the recently established Network of EU Public Employment Services, which should help to ensure that such European mutual learning activities involve the ‘right people’ – those directly involved in the formulation and implementation of national policies – unlike what has sometimes occurred in the past (cf. Greer and Vanhercke 2010).

3.4 Socialising the European Semester: actors and processes

The progressive ‘socialisation’ of the European Semester analysed in this chapter can be interpreted as a response by the Commission and other EU institutions to external developments. Most notable among these is the rising social and political discontent with the consequences of post-crisis austerity policies among European citizens demonstrated, for example, by falling levels of public support for the EU in the Eurobarometer surveys and successive electoral defeats for incumbent governments in many Member States. But the socialisation should also be understood as the product of reflexive learning and creative adaptation on the part of EU social and employment actors to the new institutional conditions of the European Semester. This process began with the employment policy actors within EMCO and DG EMPL who were already familiar with the challenges of debating their positions with the economic policy actors, and who took the first steps to strengthen their intelligence-gathering and analytical capacities through the development of new monitoring instruments, the intensification of multilateral surveillance, and the introduction of QMV on amendments to the Commission’s draft CSRs.

But their example was quickly emulated by the social policy actors within the SPC and the Social Policies Directorate of DG EMPL. These actors not only followed suit in developing new instruments to monitor and analyse the social dimension of the European Semester, deepening multilateral surveillance of CSR implementation, and adopting QMV for amending the CSRs, but also proactively used the institutional acquis and flexibility of the Social OMC to introduce new social reporting initiatives at both the national and EU levels and to launch an innovative programme of ex ante peer review of major social reforms. Other EU policy communities, including the social NGOs and trade
unions assembled in the EU Semester Alliance (2014), have likewise begun to mobilize organizationally and politically to make their voices heard within the European Semester and influence its outcomes. The mid-term review of the Europe 2020 Strategy, coupled with the appointment of a new Commission in October 2014, represents a golden opportunity to build systematically on these emergent developments within the European Semester in order to ensure that the EU’s post-crisis socio-governance architecture continues to become more socially balanced, contextually sensitive, and learning-orientated. This golden opportunity, of course, may or may not be taken.

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Austeritarianism in Europe: what options for resistance?

Richard Hyman

Introduction

In much of Europe, the social rights and social protections won by labour movements have recently been seriously eroded, and are further threatened by neoliberal austerity. Efforts to resist have been largely unsuccessful; but is an effective fight-back possible? In the next section I briefly outline how the ‘new economic governance’ of the European Union (EU) has reinforced this erosion, particularly with the economic crisis and the ensuing pursuit of austerity. I then survey a range of forms of protest and opposition, notably through trade union action (section 2), before turning to a discussion of ‘new’ social movements (section 3). In conclusion I suggest that a nuanced evaluation of success and failure is necessary, and I propose that the articulation of different forms of resistance – cross-nationally and between different actors – is essential in order to stem the neoliberal hegemony.

1. Brussels versus workers’ rights?

The sovereign debt crisis was facilitated, and at the same time reinforced by, the embrace of neoclassical fiscal orthodoxy within the institutions of the EU. Deflationary macroeconomic priorities date back to the establishment of EMU. The economic logic of ‘correction’ was simple: deflation in order to achieve ‘internal devaluation’ as a substitute for the unavailable option of currency devaluation. A priority was to attack public sector employment, pay and pensions, and to reduce and privatise public services. The recipe was both socially regressive and – in a context of stagnation or recession – negatively pro-cyclical: austerity fuels recession (ETUI 2013: 8; 2014: 17).
Though some see a softening of this process (Zeitlin and Vanhercke 2014), most writers consider that the ‘new EU economic governance’, launched as part of the Europe 2020 agenda in 2010, marginalised ‘social Europe’ even further (Bieler and Erne 2014; Degryse 2012; Jolivet et al. 2013; Pochet 2010). It institutionalised the ‘European Semester’, a process whereby Member States are required to submit draft budgetary plans which are assessed for compliance with the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), leading to Country-Specific Recommendations (CSRs) for both economic and structural reforms.

The effect was ‘a continuing shift of power away from national [level] as well as the European Parliament to the European Council [and] expert groups, which have no political legitimation’ (Pühringer 2014: 9). In particular, the Compact and Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) include the principle of ‘reverse qualified majority voting’: sanctions against a Member State deemed in breach of the requirements can be prevented only by roughly three-quarters of the weighted votes in the Council.

Typically, fiscal ‘sustainability’ translates into pressures for pension cuts, wage restraint and cutbacks in social protection and public services (Stamati and Baeten 2015). This includes pressures to marketise health services. As Greer (2014: 13) concludes, ‘health care and policies in the EU are now incorporated into a new system of fiscal governance that is deliberately stacked in favor of fiscal objectives and finance ministries’. In addition, ‘modernisation’ of collective bargaining has become ‘a widely used euphemism that, in practical terms, points to a higher political pressure [for] wage restraint and...more decentralized wage-setting mechanisms’ (Rocha 2014: 15). The result, as Oberndorfer (2013) deemed it, has been ‘a Troika for everyone’.

More generally, the growing dominance of DG ECFIN over Commission policy in the social field, and its negative view of both public provision and employment protection, have made the crisis the occasion for attacks on established workers’ rights. Many governments, not only in the programme countries, have weakened statutory protections for standard employment contracts and encouraged the spread of precarious contracts (Heyes and Lewis 2014). Closely linked to that has been the erosion of mechanisms of social concertation between...
governments, unions and employers which were previously widely acclaimed as a source of consensual adaptation to economic challenges.

Furthermore, ‘the core actors of the Eurozone are encouraging Member States to establish governments capable of acting without trade union support’ (Culpepper and Regan 2014: 724). In Cyprus, for example, ‘the onset of the economic crisis and the austerity policies that began in 2011 and intensified in 2012–2013 effectively undermined... the previously celebrated institution of the “social dialogue”’ (Ioannou and Sonan 2014: 15). The rejection of social dialogue in part reflects the increased weakness of trade unions, and also a belief that governments which impose radical change in the face of trade union resistance are more likely to win the ‘confidence’ of speculators, bond markets and ratings agencies.

The outcome is by now well documented. In many countries there has been a substantial decline in collective bargaining coverage: most dramatically in the case of Portugal, where the number of workers covered by collective agreements fell from 1.9 million in 2008 to 0.3 million in 2012 and 0.2 million in 2013 (Rocha and Stoleroff 2014: 168). The impact of ‘structural reforms’ has been in many countries a rapid growth of a low-wage sector with weak unionisation and little or no collective bargaining. Not surprisingly, inequality increased between 2008 and 2012 in the majority of EU Member States (ETUI 2014: 46), intensifying the risks of continuing recession and increasing the proportion of the population at risk of poverty or social exclusion – whether through unemployment, in-work poverty caused by ‘atypical’ employment contracts, or loss of social benefits and services for those outside the labour market. In the Eurozone, those at persistent risk of poverty increased from 8.8% in 2008 to 10.1% in 2012, and those suffering severe material deprivation from 5.9% to 7.7% of the population (European Commission 2015: 300). In particular, loss of affordable healthcare services has been a major source of poverty for those in employment and outside employment alike (ETUI 2014: 51).

In such a context, the question then is: ‘Is resistance futile?’ (Bailey 2014). Bailey’s answer is, in effect, not necessarily. However, it is inadequate to rely on traditional repertoires of action. To fight back against the odds requires strategic imagination, new alliances and transnational learning and solidarity. In this respect, the resources of
modern information technology have created new opportunities. But the crisis, and the neoliberalism which provoked it, also creates a dilemma. As the former Greek finance minister has put it (Varoufakis 2015), 'Europe’s crisis is far less likely to give birth to a better alternative to capitalism than it is to unleash dangerously regressive forces that have the capacity to cause a humanitarian bloodbath, while extinguishing the hope for any progressive moves for generations to come'.

2. **Trade unions: between opposition and damage limitation**

2.1 Contradictions of union activism

With often depleted resources as a result of a long-term loss of membership, unions at the national level have not been well placed to respond to the crisis: ‘generally they have been in disarray when confronted by a historical process in which they no longer feel involved’ (Dufresne and Pernot 2013: 14). There is evidence both of radical or conflictual initiatives, and of a reinforcement of cooperation and partnership; often the two types of response have been paradoxically interconnected. Radical actions, whether company-level conflicts or national strikes, have often been defensive in their objectives.

As suggested above, governments seeking to impress international creditors may welcome confrontation with trade unions as a demonstration of fiscal rectitude. Conversely, efforts to seek consensual solutions through social dialogue have confronted an intensified opposition of class interests (who will pay for the crisis?) and diminished space for positive-sum outcomes.

‘There can be no return to business as usual’ was an almost unanimous trade union reaction when the crisis first hit. Yet historically, trade unions have consolidated their institutional status as pragmatic negotiators, and their predominant aim has seemed to be to negotiate with those wielding political and economic power for a tighter regulatory architecture for financialised capitalism rather than leading an oppositional movement for an alternative socio-economic order. Two familiar and intersecting contradictions of union action have been
evident. One – articulated by Varoufakis – is the dilemma of short-term imperatives versus long-term objectives. A Belgian union leader commented: ‘it is easy to say: we need to change the balance of forces. But that does not tell us how to proceed…. Our members expect us to look after their immediate interests’ (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2013: 124-125).

The second contradiction is between the global economic crisis and trade union action that is essentially national or indeed sub-national in character. The supranational trade union organisations – the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) at global level, and the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) – were largely consigned by the unexpected crisis to primarily the role of spectators, with little impact on the evolving policy responses at national and supranational levels. Both confederations produced sound analyses of the economic roots of the crisis and proposals for expansionary policy responses. In the case of the ETUC, this involved a frontal critique of the ‘new economic governance’ introduced by the EU. In a statement entitled Solidarity in the Crisis (2011), it denounced EU policies as ‘totally unacceptable to the trade unions of Europe’ and called for a radical reversal. This denunciation was followed by an analytically impressive call for a ‘social compact for Europe’, adopted in 2012. However, the crisis and its aftermath have brought a radical shift in the balance of forces, gravely weakening trade unions. Indeed the dominant response at national level has been to defend and enhance competitiveness, meaning a struggle of country against country, workplace against workplace, intensifying the downwards pressure on wages and conditions.

The onset of the crisis provoked a variety of conflictual responses at the workplace level, including a spate of sit-ins against job cuts and plant closures reminiscent of the struggles of the 1970s. France in 2009 saw a number of episodes of ‘boss-napping’, a situation where senior managers were held hostage by workers. In three cases, workers threatened to blow up their factories with gas cylinders. This radicalism, however, was consistent with ‘the presence of a strong, generalised cultural acceptance of direct action in labour issues’ (Hayes 2012: 190), which can be traced back to the French revolutionary tradition. Such actions were typically spontaneous initiatives from below, not coordinated and often not supported by the official national
unions. Nor did radical forms of action imply similar radicalism of objectives. In most cases, such workplace struggles seemed gestures of defiance and despair, with little belief that they would prevent announced closures or job losses (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2013).

Another outcome of the crisis has been a widespread reinforcement of wage moderation, with employers, in some cases pressing for downwards renegotiation of existing pay agreements. Negotiations over restructuring and job reductions, with the aim of agreeing on some form of ‘social plan’, were common across most countries. Even in conjunction with symbolic protest action, unions have often endeavoured to manage the crisis through peak-level social dialogue. This dialogue is what Urban (2012) has called ‘crisis corporatism’. Most unions have accepted, tacitly or explicitly, the dictates of national ‘competitiveness’ (Marginson and Welz 2014), becoming ‘responsible co-designers of austerity’ (Bohle 2011: 100). As noted above, this has intensified downwards pressures on wages and conditions.

Crisis corporatism is inevitably antipathetic to cross-national solidarity. It may also erode within-country solidarity: the most forceful resistance has typically involved public sector unions, whose members have borne the brunt of austerity but have often been deprived of private sector support. In Ireland, for example, there was barely concealed antagonism between public and private sector unions. In Italy and Portugal, there were major divisions between the main confederations. To a lesser extent, the same has been true in Belgium. Italy has seen a number of coordinated national strikes and protest actions, but in most cases these protests have not involved cooperation between all three main confederations.

2.2 The contradictions of crisis corporatism

The contradiction between national conceptions of economic self-interest and a politically informed rhetoric of cross-border solidarity has been very apparent in the aftermath of the crisis. Despite official awareness at national levels that (at least in the medium term) ‘European policy is national policy’ (Foglar 2011: 8), short-term preoccupation with challenges at the national level has assumed
priority. Beyond largely ineffectual protests, there has been little coordinated cross-national response. ‘Since 2008-2009, increasingly massive mobilisations have essentially been organised at national level without taking account of the timetable proposed by the ETUC... and most often lack a transnational dimension’ (Dufresne and Pernot 2013: 21). Hence resistance to austerity has tended to involve a ‘patchwork of often uncoordinated action’ with ‘no thought-through strategic plan for getting mass support to bring down the plans of the Commission’ (Scherrer 2011: 36). There has been an evident contradiction between the global nature of the economic crisis on the one hand, and trade union action that is essentially national or indeed sub-national in character.

Lemb and Urban (2014: 50-1) conclude that while unions attempt ‘in especially crisis-torn countries to brace themselves against the economically, politically, and socially disastrous crisis policy...there is little sign of a broad Europe-wide trade union resistance’. In Germany, ‘the European crisis and the far-reaching economic, social, and political dislocations that neoliberal austerity policy has unleashed appears from those employed here as problems occurring far away [and] a solidary management of the crisis in Europe is less important or unimportant’. This is despite the efforts of most northern trade union movements, including those in Germany, to express their support for their counterparts in the south, and particularly in Greece. In a Europe dominated by the hegemony of neoliberalism, however, unions have been largely unable to win over public opinion by highlighting the common ‘risk community’ and pointing to progressive, solidaristic solutions.

This reflects a more general failure of trade unions to win the battle of ideas. In general, Eurobarometer surveys show a rather low level of trust in trade unions, and overall that level has deteriorated since the crisis. Figure 1 shows the net trust expressed in the six largest EU countries, together with Greece, from 2005-2010. Most countries had negative net trust before the crisis and it only became more and more accentuated in most countries; only in Germany does trust remain positive. The countries worst affected by the crisis have tended to show the greatest decline.
Three caveats are, however, in order. First, there is a general increasing
distrust in most national institutions. For example, in the autumn 2010
Eurobarometer, net trust in unions across the EU 27 was -11. Net trust
in political parties was -65, and in national government it was -39. The
national parliament had a net trust rating of -31, big business one of -29
and religious institutions were at -10. Second, the meaning of the Eurobarometer survey results may be questioned. As Figure 2 indicates,
a different pattern emerges when respondents are asked whether the
concept of a trade union brings to mind something positive or negative:
in most countries the responses are positive, though indeed the crisis
countries stand out as more negative. Third, it is unclear why respondents distrust trade unions: is it because their militancy is
blamed for the crisis, or because they are regarded as not militant
enough in defending the victims of the crisis? In some of the worst
affected countries, the latter may be a plausible explanation.

Those worst affected by the crisis – in particular young people, those
with precarious contracts, women, immigrants – are least likely to be
unionised. However, in many countries trade unions have made serious
efforts in recent years to recruit such groups and to represent their interests (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2013; Pedersini 2010). To give just one example: at the 2011 congress of the German metalworkers’ union IG Metall, its president, Berthold Huber, made youth policies the first item in his address, declaring that ‘IG Metall with over 200,000 young members is the biggest youth organization in Germany’. Temporary agency work, which has grown very rapidly among new workers in German metal-working, has been a major union theme since 2008, with a campaign for equal pay and for transition to permanent employment. Another initiative launched in 2009 in response to the declining opportunities for apprentices to secure permanent jobs at the end of their training, was Operation Übernahme. Young members themselves devised the campaign themes, materials and actions for Operation Übernahme. The demand for them to be ‘taken on’ into permanent employment was a key issue in the 2012 bargaining round, and it achieved at least partial success. As a result of these initiatives, young workers’ membership in Germany seems to have stabilized or even increased (Dobbert 2010).

Despite a widespread assumption that young people see trade unions as conservative, boring and old-fashioned, and prefer the greater
spontaneity and openness of other forms of social action, hard evidence for this assumption is limited. Recent Eurobarometer data displayed suggest that while young people (age 15-24) are considerably more likely than others to consider demonstrations an effective means of making their views felt, they are also more likely to consider strikes effective; they are less likely to think that voting makes a difference, but no less likely to think it useful to join a political party; they are somewhat more likely to consider joining a non-governmental organisation (NGO) an effective step, while roughly average in thinking the same of joining a union. Of course, there is a gap between attitudes and actions. But this Eurobarometer result points to an openness in perspectives and also implies that there is no clear dichotomy between being pro-union and pro-NGO. Indeed a key question is how far trade unionism and new social movements may interact.

3. New social movements, new social protests?

3.1 Trade unions versus social movements?

It is common to contrast trade unions with their elaborate formal decision-making structures, and more spontaneous, often activist-led social movements and NGOs. As I discussed in the previous section, such a dichotomy is questionable. Almost universally, unions emerged as social movements that challenged key principles of the prevailing social and economic order. With time, however, unions became increasingly dependent for their survival on institutionalised internal routines and formalised external relationships with employers and governments. As Gramsci noted (1977), negotiation with external interlocutors could yield an ‘industrial legality’ which could bring organisational (and material) advantages, yet could also weaken the organic, ideational resonance with those whose aspirations unions sought to voice. Trade unions are themselves – or at least should be – ‘non-governmental’ organisations; there is a considerable literature which insists, as did Herberg (1943: 406) long ago, that any trade union is at one and the same time ‘a business-like service organization, operating a variety of agencies under a complicated system of industrial relations’ and ‘an expression and vehicle of the historical movement of the submerged laboring masses for social recognition and democratic
self-determination... The union, as an institution, is thus in the grip of a very real contradiction. The task of sustaining collective commitment and organisational effectiveness – within the limits imposed by a hostile environment – required a delicate alternation between encouraging militancy and containing it. Much recent debate on the prospects and character of ‘social movement unionism’ is precisely an effort to identify a progressive reconciliation of this contradiction.

One should also note that an analogous tension applies to all NGOs. McIlroy (2000: 3) highlights a distinction in the literature ‘between insider and outsider groups. Insider groups are accepted as legitimate by government and regularly consulted over policy... Insiders feel pressure to distance themselves from direct action and may become prisoner groups, dependent upon government. Outsider groups, in contrast, have no wish to become involved in routine relations or are unable to achieve recognition by government. They may lack the skills and resources to take the inside track or eschew it because of radical ideology and objectives. Outsider groups rely on mass protest and strikes or civil disobedience’. Trade unions in many countries shifted from primarily outsider status to an insider role in the twentieth century (though this became jeopardised under neoliberalism), but many other NGOs (for example, in the field of social policy, women’s rights or the environment) have followed a similar trajectory. At the European level, a domestication of contention was extended beyond trade unions to other representatives of ‘civil society’ through the ‘civil dialogue’ launched in 1994: a project to gain the EU some of the legitimacy of popular social movements drawn into ‘partnership’, while also diminishing the latter’s spontaneity and accentuating their bureaucratic aspects. Just as in trade unions, insider status has provoked internal conflict, with battles (as among the German Greens in the 1980s) between ‘fundamentalists’ and ‘realists’.

A notable feature of the crisis has been the emergence of a range of new ‘outsider’ movements, particularly in the worst affected countries, generating a form of ‘subterranean politics’ (Pianta and Gerbaudo 2014). The actions have tended to display a high participation of young people, often with a focus on the predicament of the ‘precarious generation’ most affected by the crisis.
3.2 Spain

Certainly the best known example is constituted by the Spanish Indignados or Movimiento 15-M, which developed from demonstrations on 15 May 2011, organised largely through social media. The Indignados have been described as ‘a movement with two souls’ (Taibo 2013): one soul comprising activists with a background in the alterglobalisation campaigns (as in many other European countries, supporters of ATTAC were prominent in the protests) or in demonstrations against the Iraq war (of which the right-wing Spanish government was a strong supporter); the other soul comprising young people, mainly highly educated and with little or no background in political activism, whose hopes of a comfortable career have been dashed.

A particularly important issue in Spain (though also evident elsewhere) has been the impact of the crisis on families previously encouraged to take out mortgages to buy their homes but no longer able to sustain repayments on properties the value of which had collapsed. The Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca (Platform of Mortgage Victims, PAH), created in 2009 in Barcelona, soon became a nation-wide movement, in particular organising occupations of vacant properties for those made homeless by the banks (García Lamarca 2014). Another development which overlapped with the M-15 movement was the formation of different coloured ‘tides’ of public employees and users of their services, such as the Marea Blanca in the health sector and the Marea Verde in education: the colours worn in mass on demonstrations against cuts and privatisation.

Spanish trade unionism is numerically weak by west European standards (density around 15%) but the two main confederations, Comisiones Obreras (CC.OO) and Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT), became entrenched in public policy-making after the fall of the dictatorship in the 1970s. For many Indignados, they were as much part of the problem as were the mainstream political parties, at best negotiating the terms of austerity rather than leading forceful opposition. ‘The politicians rob us, the unions sell us, the employers enslave us, the banks swindle us and the press lies to us’ ran one slogan. Yet ‘the divide between the world of trade union activists and that of the Indignados was less clear-cut than claimed by some’ (Béroud 2014: 29), and by 2012 there were signs of a growing rapprochement. Key sections
of M-15 decided to support the general strikes called by the main confederations in that year, while the confederations for their part began to play an important role in the Mareas. The Indignados, in turn, helped enlarge the repertoire of trade union action, calling for ‘inclusive’ strikes in which the unemployed, students, precarious workers and other citizens could participate (Cerrillo Vidal 2013: 43).

3.3 Portugal

In Portugal, as in Spain, ‘trade unions have been involved in organizing mass protest action, although their capacity for mobilization was surpassed on various occasions by more spontaneous demonstrations of protest’ (Rocha and Stoleroff 2014: 152). In particular, the two main confederations CGTP (Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses) and UGT (União Geral de Trabalhadores), unlike their Spanish counterparts, have been fundamentally divided. While the former has maintained ‘all-out opposition’ to the Memorandum of understanding (MoU), the latter ‘has been more cautious’ and was willing to negotiate the terms of austerity (Rocha and Stoleroff 2014: 172).

Union division increased the space for other vectors of resistance. Though unemployment has been less severe than in Spain, over half of young Portuguese workers had temporary contracts even before the crisis. In 2007 the movement Precários Inflexíveis (PI, Precarious but Inflexible) emerged as a virtual association of unemployed and precarious workers. Several hundred protestors took over the streets of Lisbon and other cities on 12 March 2011. This was one of the biggest demonstrations since the Portuguese revolution of 1974 (Estanque et al. 2013). The initiative helped inspire the May protests in Spain, which were in turn followed by the occupation of the Praça do Rossio in Lisbon in May, in part in solidarity with the Spanish Indignados (Baumgarten 2013). Created in June 2012 (with a strong involvement of activists from the CGTP and the Partido Comunista Português), the movement Que se lixe a troika! Queremos as nossas vidas! (Fuck the Troika, We Want Our Lives Back) has since played a major role in challenging externally imposed austerity, often coordinating protest demonstrations with the CGTP (Campos Lima and Martin Artiles 2014).
Although most initial protests occurred independently of the trade unions, as in Spain, there has been some subsequent convergence. PI cooperated with the CGTP in anti-government protests in October 2012, and helped mobilise the general strike in the following month. In its Manifesto, PI insists that trade unions remain the most representative associations of workers, but adds that the world of work has changed and that trade union structures must change to accommodate temporary workers, those forced into dependent self-employment and the unemployed. ‘Insisting on an antagonism between those who, for various reasons, are remote from experience of organisation and the world of trade unionism helps nobody and weakens the working class as a whole’. And indeed, Accornero and Ramos Pinto (2015: 501) conclude from their study of protest events that ‘labour has remained throughout the most significant protest actor’.

3.4 Greece

In Greece, resistance to Troika-imposed austerity was strongly influenced by the Spanish example, with Amesi Dimokratia Tora! (Direct Democracy Now!), formed in May 2011, helping initiate a mass occupation of Plateia Syntagma (Constitution Square, in front of the parliament) as a forum for direct discussion and debate. The label Aganaktismenoi was soon applied as a direct equivalent of Indignados. As in Portugal and Spain, Greek trade unions are weak in terms of membership, particularly in the private sector. Traditionally, they have had little financial need for members because of payments received from the welfare fund (ergatikí estía) to which all private sector workers are required to contribute.

As in Spain, those groups resisting austerity often dismissed the unions as components of the established institutional structure; but there also developed a certain rapprochement. Thus the unions ‘were obliged...to invent new repertoires of collective action and to mobilise new power resources. Within this framework, more radical types of demand and new alliances have emerged’ (Karakioulafis 2015).

One form of resistance, which has often involved coalitions of trade unions and other social actors, has been the mounting of legal challenges – in constitutional courts or supranational bodies – to
austerity measures. Kilpatrick and De Witte (2014: 5) suggest that ‘Greek unions and worker-pensioner associations have adopted the most active and multi-pronged approach to fundamental rights challenges’. This has included a complaint to the International Labour Organization (ILO) by the main union confederations, which resulted in an implicitly critical report (ETUI 2014: 65; ILO 2011). The Greek unions also submitted a successful complaint to the European Committee of Social Rights (an institution of the Council of Europe, a body completely separate from the EU), on the grounds that some of the legal changes were incompatible with its European Social Charter. Kilpatrick and De Witte (2014: 5) add that – in a broader European perspective – ‘the dominance of trade unions and associations of pensioners (former workers) in taking legal challenges has meant that work rights and occupational pensions have been central to many challenges whilst there are few traces of challenges to health and education cuts’. However, in Portugal and Spain, constitutional review mechanisms have been used in response to ‘cuts (or reduced coverage) of welfare benefits and health care services. Housing was a special focus of legal mobilisation in Spain.’ In Portugal in particular, legal challenges have successfully blocked a number of austerity measures (Rocha and Stoleroff 2014).

3.5 Italy and beyond

In Italy, almost 30% of workers aged 15-24 are unemployed and almost 40% of those in work are on temporary contracts. Perhaps for this reason, all three main confederations established special unions for precarious workers in the late 1990s (Burroni and Carrieri 2011; Leonardi 2001). Such initiatives were, however, double-edged: while offering a dedicated structure for mainly young workers with non-standard contracts, they risked segregating such workers from the unions’ ‘core’ membership (Murgia and Selmi 2012).

Some of the most prominent actions on behalf of these workers, however, have occurred outside the formal framework of trade unionism. The San Precario movement, named after the fictitious ‘patron saint’ of temporary workers, was created in 2004 to highlight the issue of labour market insecurity, in similar ways to PI in Portugal. But the methods were distinctive: mimicking Italian religiosiety, activists
carried effigies of San Precario during their demonstrations, invented the prayer of San Precario and combined street theatre with political campaigning.

Italy has been an important locus of resistance to the EU privatisation agenda. A long process of creeping privatisation of municipal water supplies provoked a number of local initiatives, which led to the formation in Florence in 2003 of the Forum Alternatif Mondial de l’Eau (FAME, Alternative World Water Forum). The Forum Italiano dei Movimenti per l’Acqua (FIMA, Italian Forum of Water Movements) was established three years later as an unusually broad alliance of local groups, NGOs, trade unions and religious organisations. When the Berlusconi government in 2009 adopted a law requiring municipalities to put water provision out to private tender, the movement used its constitutional right to organise a referendum, calling for a campaign of ‘civil obedience’ to overturn the legislation. The result of the vote in June 2011 was a 95% majority against privatisation on a 57% turnout (Berlusconi had hoped that abstentions by his supporters would prevent the required 50% threshold being met). Displaying its contempt for democratic process, the European Central Bank (ECB) in its ‘secret letter’ two months later effectively called on Berlusconi to ignore the result, demanding ‘the full liberalisation of local public services... through large-scale privatisation’ as a condition of a rescue package, but with the change of government the plans were dropped after the constitutional court ruled against regulations designed to circumvent the popular vote.

The Italian achievement, it has been said – with only a degree of hyperbole – ‘really shook the whole of Europe’ (Fattori 2013a: 378). In 2012, the European Federation of Public Service Unions (EPSU) launched a campaign for a European Citizens’ Initiative – a mechanism introduced in the Lisbon Treaty, which took effect in 2009 – on the right to water (Fattori 2013b). Right2Water, a broad coalition of unions and NGOs, was established to manage the campaign, and succeeded in obtaining almost double the number of one million citizens necessary for demands to be discussed by the European Parliament (EP). In part, this initiative can be seen as a part of a longer-term struggle to defend public services (Marcon and Zola 2007), from the mobilisations against the 'Bolkestein Directive' for the liberalisation of services in 2005-6 to the current fight against the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP). But the principle of ‘water as a human right’ acquired particular sensitivity, and the Italian experience has been replicated elsewhere. The Troika bail-out packages included a requirement, in the case of Portugal, to privatise the state-owned water company, <i>Aguas do Portugal</i>; and in Greece, to sell off a large number of public assets, including the water companies for Athens and Thessaloniki. In the first case, a major campaign, <i>Agua de todos</i> (water for all), gathered 40,000 signatures, and achieved a parliamentary debate in October 2014. In Thessaloniki, a referendum was organised despite government attempts to block it. EPSU took a lead in coordinating financial support and volunteers to help as international observers. The referendum took place in May 2014, at the same time as local elections, and achieved a 97% vote against privatisation.

In France, as in the other countries discussed, labour market insecurity is a particular problem for young workers, with 23% unemployed in 2011 and 55% of those employed having temporary contracts. The term <i>Génération précaire</i> (‘precarious generation’) was coined by a young, minority ethnic worker in the fast-food sector in a book describing his efforts to build collective action and organisation among fellow workers (Mabrouki 2004). Somewhat ironically, however, the label was adopted in the following year by graduates and university students protesting against the abuse of internships, often paid at a fraction of the minimum wage or else unpaid. ‘We have work but not employment’, they declared, and attempted to organise strike action by interns and demanded legislative reforms with some success.

In most countries, labour market insecurity does not create a homogeneous ‘precariat’ (Standing 2011) or a simple polarisation between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, but affects in different ways social groups with contrasting capacities for collective mobilisation. In France, there is a history of institutionalised student organisation and often ritualised protest, analogous to the impressive demonstrative actions of the numerically weak trade unions and at times undertaken jointly. If the tactics have sometimes been innovative, most of the time the protests of the highly educated but precariously employed have addressed familiar interlocutors through traditional channels. In some ways, suggest Béroud and Yon (2012: 175), the closest French equivalent to the outrage of the
Indignados has been the violent rioting in the impoverished banlieues, ‘where the protests unfold outside the customary frameworks of collective action’.

3.6 Social protest in comparative perspective

Social protests have of course been a global phenomenon. Ortiz et al. (2013) document 843 events between 2006 and mid-2013, showing an upward trajectory. They also find a disproportionate prevalence of social protests in ‘high-income countries’. Their data indicate that among these countries, the protests are dominated by Europe, with the majority of the largest taking place in France, Italy, Portugal and Spain (Ortiz et al. 2013: 34). Understandably, protest has been greatest in countries particularly affected by austerity. One notable early example was Iceland, which is not a member of the EU but was the first European casualty of the global financial crisis. The collapse in 2008 of the three main private – and deregulated – banks led to a devaluation of the króna by some 50% against the euro. Mass protests, with demonstrators banging pots and pans outside parliament, led to the resignation of the government. A grassroots movement emerged, known as Mauraþúfan (the anthill), which convened an assembly of citizens to draft a new constitution (Castells 2012: 31-43). A subsequent grassroots campaign also ensured that in two referendums, in 2010 and 2011, voters rejected proposals to repay British and Dutch banks which had lost reserves invested at unrealistic interest rates in Iceland.

Ortiz et al. attempt to classify the reasons for protest. In the high-income countries, five broad but related issues predominate: inequality and the demand for fiscal justice; cuts in public services and pensions, and privatisation; corporate power and deregulation; the power of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), including the ECB; and the absence of ‘real democracy’. Protests are most often directed against governments, but also against the IFIs, the EU, corporations and employers and the politico-economic system as a whole. Though trade unions, NGOs, political parties and established community groups are prominent in many of the protests, so are ‘new agents for change’, and ‘mass middle-class involvement’ which ‘indicates a new dynamic’ (Ortiz et al. 2013: 31). Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume a simple dichotomy between ‘old’ and ‘new’ agents of protest: ‘at least in part, the
agenda and the objectives of the newly emerged social movements and the trade unions coincide’ (Campos Lima and Martin Artiles 2014: 142).

3.7 Social movements: six variations on a theme

From a cross-national comparative perspective, six key features of social movements can be addressed. The first is the complex interconnection between national and supranational dynamics. On the one hand, there has been a rapid process of mutual learning across frontiers. The ‘Arab Spring’ provided an inspiration for many of the mass protests from 2011 onwards. ‘Occupy Wall Street’ informed the Blockupy protests against the ECB in Frankfurt and the actions of UK Uncut in London. The Indignados were emulated across southern Europe. There was ‘a kind of contagion effect, suggesting the presence of learning processes and the modular character of the mobilization’ (Fonseca 2014: 47). Yet ‘on the other hand, institutional differences, different traditions of political and social participation and the degree of trust in the political institutions help explain some of the marked differences of the protests in European countries, in particular as to their relationship to conventional channels such as political parties and trade unions’ (Campos Lima and Martin Artiles 2014: 145). The national prevalence of most protest activity has meant that there has been only limited coordination at the EU level, where the key decisions underlying austerity are taken (Planta and Gerbaudo 2014). But there are exceptions: notably, the campaigns against water privatisation mentioned above.

A second key theme is the central role of social media in the ‘new’ forms of protest and resistance (Estanque and Fonseca 2014; Loader et al. 2014). Social media provides a channel for discussing grievances, formulating demands and coordinating action, and for disseminating the initiatives – and any incidents of repression by the authorities – to a mass public. For some, such as Castells (2012) or Mason (2012), this new means of communication – taken for granted by the generation which is worst affected by austerity – permits autonomy rather than authority and explosive spontaneity rather than the routines of traditional organised negotiation with governments and employers. However, Gerbaudo cautions against uncritical ‘techno-optimism’. Social media channels are fragmented and individualised, and do not
automatically generate collective identities and collective action. What is necessary, argues Gerbaudo (2012: 12), is a ‘choreography of assembly’ which functions in ‘directing people towards specific protest events, in providing participants with suggestions and instructions about how to act, and in the construction of an emotional narration to sustain their coming together in a public space’. Such choreography is typically undertaken by an often invisible and perhaps reluctant core of activists who provide a form of ‘soft’ leadership.

The third key feature of social movements is that the ‘choreography of assembly’ involves reclaiming public spaces as arenas for discussion and debate as well as demonstration. Drawing from the Egyptian example of Tahrir in January 2011, the ‘movements of the squares’ in southern Europe claimed a space for new forms of participative democracy (Gerbaudo 2014). While the first actions were directed against governments (national but also supranational), it was a logical step to target the financial institutions which both initiated the crisis and drove the austeritarian response. Occupy Wall Street in September 2011 achieved echoes not only across North America but also in Europe, with the first Blockupy protest in Frankfurt in May 2012. In London, an occupation began in October 2011 outside St Paul’s Cathedral, the nearest location to the Stock Exchange that protestors could use.

A fourth, but related, aspect of the protests is the ‘defence of the commons’. As outlined above, this has involved, most obviously, resistance to privatisation, particularly when imposed by the Troika. But there is also a less defensive dimension, as proposed in the series of World and European Social Forums since 2001, to ‘reinvent the world’. The link between the quality of work, the quality of living and the environment is made explicit: neoliberal global capital destroys nature as it destroys workers. Some protests have demanded what Fattori (2013a: 385) calls ‘commonification: the introduction of elements of self-government of the good by the citizens’. This accords with the spirit of many of the ‘new’ forms of protest: it seeks to assert elements of participative democracy which in some ways are novel but in others can be traced back to ancient traditions.

Fifth, the notion of ‘commonification’ links in some respects to the idea of a ‘social and solidarity economy’. This concept is sometimes used primarily to encompass producer and consumer cooperatives, which
have a very long history (ILO 2010). But the newer understanding of économie solidaire or economia solidária points to a more specifically political strategy to resist neoliberal globalisation (Draperi 2007; Laville 2007).

The crisis and austerity have generated a range of grassroots initiatives in response to the dual effects of the loss of jobs and income, and cutbacks in public services. This has been evident, for example, in Spain and Greece. Sotiropoulos and Bourikos (2014) describe a rich variety of ‘exchange and distribution networks’ involving not only ‘social groceries’ but also networks of non-monetary distribution and exchange and informal healthcare networks providing ‘make-shift clinics’ and a range of other social services. Most notably, the Syriza party took a strategic decision to focus on developing such networks. Its leader, Alexis Tsipras, declared (Dericquebourg 2013) that ‘in these times of crisis, resistance and solidarity are both necessary, but solidarity is more important’, and the party directed its efforts to the collective provision of food, medicine and housing. Syriza created an initiative entitled Solidarity4all (2013), which was in part an appeal for international support but also explained in detail how the party was helping build self-organised collectives covering pharmacies, social kitchens, social groceries, evening classes, cultural clubs and legal support teams.

A sixth feature common to all the movements is the need to build cohesion out of diversity. Mason (2012: 66-79) identifies the social roots of the revolts as ‘the graduate with no future’ and ‘the Jacobin with a laptop’. Yet as already noted, the constituencies of deprivation and anger are more heterogeneous. They include the young, unskilled and poorly educated whose protests in some countries have been particularly violent but with no clear political focus. Also important are older workers who are victims of workplace closures or public sector job cuts, and who in most countries no longer have trade union representation (Faniel 2012). As Andritsos and Velegrakis argue (2014: 1), in Greece, the ‘struggles have their origins in different social strata, geographical scales, political views and perspectives’. 
3.8 Making sense of diversity

The diversity reflected in these six key features results in obvious problems of aggregation of interests and objectives. In this context, Gerbaudo (2014: 2) argues that a distinctive feature of recent mass protests has been the effort to reclaim “the ancient belief that there is such a thing as “the people”, and that this collective actor is the ultimate source of sovereignty and legitimate power”. The slogan ‘we are the 99%’ coined by the Occupy movement similarly expresses a thesis that might be termed progressive populism. Yet clearly the oppositions underlying crisis and austerity are more complex than 99% versus 1%. A substantial proportion of the population, even in the worst affected countries, see themselves as at least partial beneficiaries of the existing system, whatever its irrationalities and degradations. At least they believe that they have more to lose than to gain in contesting it. At best, the notion of the 99% can be considered a myth which inspires self-confidence and solidarity and so might eventually make the slogan self-fulfilling. Yet the downside, as Juris et al. point out (2012: 436), is that ‘the Occupy movements with their majoritarian populist impulse and organizational logic of massing large numbers of individuals in concrete physical spaces have had difficulty recognizing and addressing internal specificity and difference’. Hence, the divisions and potential conflicts of interest according to class, gender and ethnicity can easily be disregarded, whereas a genuinely popular movement needs to admit and negotiate these. I return to this issue in the conclusions.

The ultimate question is this: can mass protest overcome austeritarianism? Waves of protest fade, either because of repression by the authorities or protest fatigue among the participants, or both. Accornero and Ramos Pinto (2015: 508-509) emphasise the potential of the developing cooperation between ‘old old’ and ‘new new’ movements of resistance. ‘Time will tell, but we would emphasise two aspects: it is evident that neither the massive demonstrations, nor the multiplication of the general strikes, nor the months-long strike of the dockworkers seem to have had much effect in reversing the application of austerity measures. The weapons of anti-austerity mobilisation are, at first sight, blunt. Yet intriguing synergies have emerged from the participation of these two types of actor in anti-austerity protests.’ From a broader perspective, Ortiz et al. (2013: 36-37) conclude that some two-thirds of the protests
examined ‘achieved neither their intended demands (when demands are stated) nor results toward alleviating the expressed grievances’.

Yet this implies that the other one-third do achieve some success; as Bailey (2014: 8) suggests, ‘the less malleable and containable nature of innovative, elite-challenging forms of contention – provided they are carried out by a sufficiently large number of participants to avoid straightforward repression – are more likely to prompt concessions from policy makers seeking to maintain or bolster their own governing capacity.’ Moreover, Ortiz et al. add that ‘many of the protests are engaged with long-term structural issues that may yield results in time, while incremental, short-term or symbolic achievements may prove to be precursors to a comprehensive shift in power structures’. Indeed, the aim of many of the mobilisations has been to shift the political agenda by redefining the discourse of crisis to demonstrate that there is indeed an alternative to austeritarianism.

**Conclusion: the variable geometry of resistance**

A number of conclusions stem from the discussion that has preceded. First, to return to a previous point, the focus of resistance to austeritarianism must be international, even though it occurs in nationally specific contexts. This is one of the central arguments developed in recent decades by the alter-globalisation movements. Trade unions have their own, more institutionalised international structures, but internationalism is less embedded in everyday trade union action. Generalising international solidarities – I use the plural deliberately – has to be a priority. And internationalism means little if it is purely a concern of ‘international experts’; it must be built into the routine discourse and practice of labour movements.

Second, building solidarity is also a challenging task within countries. As already argued, different social and economic groups have been affected in significantly different ways by crisis and austerity. An understanding of a common fate and common interests, is not objectively given but is an objective requiring a difficult struggle. Unity cannot be built by a linguistic sleight-of-hand – ‘the people united’ – but requires sustained dialogue and debate. Otherwise, the interests of the weakest are easily submerged beneath a spurious conception of
commonality. The same is true in the case of attempts to build coalitions between trade unions and other NGOs, for example, in order to mobilise and organise precarious workers, or to build effective political campaigns. In many countries one can identify a trajectory in trade union relations with social movement NGOs: first, unions tended to dismiss them as unrepresentative challengers to their own status as encompassing workers’ organisations; then, they often adopted an instrumental approach, turning to NGOs when they needed allies; finally, in at least some countries, accepting that real coalition-building must involve mutual respect and a willingness to enable NGO partners to help shape the agenda in the light of their own priorities (Frege et al. 2004; Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2013).

Third, it follows that the construction of solidarities at both national and international levels involves vital cognitive and discursive elements. In this context, della Porta (2012: 276) notes that ‘the proposals and practices of the Indignados and occupying movement – as well as those spread in and by the Arab Spring – resonate in fact with (more traditional) participatory visions, but also with new deliberative conceptions that underline the importance of creating multiple public spaces, egalitarian but plural’. For Melucci (1989), the creation of a collective identity is a process of negotiation over time which contains three aspects: shaping a cognitive framework within which the environment is understood and goals and tactics are formulated; fostering social relationships among participants; and stimulating an emotional dynamic among those involved. Such processes are somewhat alien to most trade unions (or have been lost over time), but have been vital for many of the ‘new’ social movements.

Fourth, it is necessary to address the systemic nature of the crisis, but in comprehensible terms. A century ago, Rosa Luxemburg wrote that ‘bourgeois society stands at the crossroads, either transition to socialism or regression into barbarism’. The lineaments of the second alternative – economic subjugation, political oppression, environmental devastation, military aggression – are even starker today than when she wrote. Movements of resistance must embrace the principle that ‘capitalism is the reality, but not our perspective’ (Urban 2014: 41). To be effective, different modes of resistance must be mutually supportive, and informed by a vision of an alternative. The challenge, as always for those pursuing a different socio-economic order, is to formulate
alternatives which are concrete, comprehensible and attractive. Iglesias of Podemos said recently: ‘this is what the enemy expects of us, that we use words that nobody can understand, that we remain a minority in the shelter of our traditional symbols. This way we would pose no threat’ (Lambert 2015). The issue is partly one of language, which should simplify without trivialising; but it is also to provide concrete examples of economic solidarity outside the market. Some of these examples were discussed above.

Finally, today’s barbarians rely on the demoralisation of their victims. Resistance may well draw its inspiration from anger, but to be translated into constructive action it requires self-confidence in the capacity to initiate change. ‘To be truly radical is to make hope possible rather than despair convincing’, wrote Raymond Williams (1989: 118). ‘Hope is coming!’ was Syriza’s election slogan. In dark times, to build hope is perhaps the most difficult challenge, and not only because hopes can so easily be disappointed. But fatalism and surrender should not be the only options. Another world – and another Europe – is possible.

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The European Commission's investment plan: a critical appraisal and some alternatives

Martin Myant

The idea of a systematic plan to boost investment and hence to spur economic recovery across the European Union has been thrust into the centre of European policy-making by the new President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker. The details of his proposal took shape fairly rapidly in the last months of 2014 and the first months of 2015 and met with a generally positive, if sometimes slightly sceptical, welcome. The proposal promised a boost to investment equivalent to 0.8% of EU GDP to run over a three-year period.

An EU-wide stimulus to boost growth was not a new idea. Measures to increase demand by running fiscal deficits were proposed by the European Commission and also the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in late 2008. However, that was a short-lived episode and was reversed with the strong emphasis on fiscal discipline and austerity especially from 2010. The idea of stimulating investment then made periodic appearances as a means to promote growth that could run alongside severe constraints on current spending. Thus in June 2012, the European Council agreed on its Compact for Growth and Jobs, intended as a means to boost growth, which contained a commitment to a €120 billion investment package.

However, the Eurozone continued to record negative growth in 2012 and 2013 and the Juncker plan is intended to help reverse that trend. It has clearly been developed in the face of political constraints, which rule out the general stimulus recommended in 2008-2009, that would require abandoning austerity and adopting greater flexibility in fiscal rules. The same political constraints also rule out increased capitalisation of the European Investment Bank (EIB), which would require contributions from all EU Member States. The result is an investment plan, which is likely to contribute to some increase in investment, but
not enough to satisfy legitimate needs, and not enough to provide a substantial economic stimulus in the context of continuing policies of fiscal restraint.

Section 1 of the present chapter provides a background to the meaning of the term ‘investment’ and to its place in economic policy. The following sections then develop a critical assessment of the Juncker plan by setting it against different criteria, including its structure and justification (section 2), the proposed means of financing and the conditions of repayment (section 3), and the governance of the scheme and arguments for running it at the European level (section 4). Section 5 concludes by setting out some suggestions for alternative, arguably more promising, approaches to investment.

1. Defining ‘investment’

A standard economic definition of investment is ‘capital formation – the acquisition or creation of resources to be used in production’ (Coen and Eisner 2008). It is frequently understood as the production of physical goods that can then create more goods in the future, although, as will be argued in the discussion of education and research, investment does not always need to lead to visible physical results. A common contrasting usage presents investment as putting funds into financial assets, with no direct relationship to any productive activity. For economic policy purposes the economic definition is the appropriate one. Investment can then play a role in an economy, both as a basis for long-term growth and to provide an immediate stimulus.

Basic textbook macroeconomics, starting from Keynesian theory, explains depression in terms of a level of aggregate demand below the level required to achieve full utilisation of a country’s resources. This can be corrected by injecting demand into the economy, and increased investment is one way to achieve this, albeit neither the only nor the quickest way. For a rapid stimulus, the best method is to increase the purchasing power, and hence the consumption, of the lowest paid as they are the most likely to spend it quickly. Reducing taxes on company profits, or on the highest personal incomes, will have less effect as a smaller proportion of any increase is likely to be spent. In this respect the stimulus packages of 2008-2009 were relatively ineffective, often
amounting to little more than reductions in business taxes which were continued even as cuts were made within the new austerity agenda (Watt 2009).

The most obvious reason for choosing to stimulate an economy specifically through investment is a desire to boost longer-term growth, with the short-term stimulus to demand as a welcome by-product. It has further justifications as the stimulus may be easier to finance from private sources and may also pay for itself from higher incomes in future years, assuming that the investment takes appropriate forms. In fact, a specific advantage of investment over other forms of stimulus is that it can attract private finance to boost the impact of public spending.

As indicated, investment is usually taken to mean physical products: buildings, machinery and the like. In national accounts, this comes under the heading of ‘gross fixed capital formation’, which includes investment in commercial businesses intended to enable production of goods and hence to bring financial returns in the future. It also includes investment in infrastructure, such as roads and public buildings, that may be publicly funded and that will not lead directly to financial returns, but could be expected to do so indirectly by increasing productivity across the economy (for example, by improving communications and access to a previously remote area). Fixed capital formation also includes private house building, which appears closer to private consumption in that it improves living standards but has no necessary implications for future production.

By way of contrast, an interpretation of investment as spending now that increases production in the future points to the case for including some activities that appear in private or public sector accounts as current expenditure, along with consumption, but which should bring long-term benefits. Research spending has been reinterpreted in national accounts from consumption to an addition to fixed capital, albeit with difficulties and simplifications in how it will be measured. Education has been reinterpreted in European Union and EIB thinking not as consumption but as investment in human capital, as it leads to higher productivity of people in the future (European Investment Bank 2006: 2-3). However, in national income accounts only investment in fixed assets that can be used for education appears as investment. Ongoing activities are classified as consumption.
The choice made between different possible interpretations of investment has implications for the criteria to be used in an investment plan. The EIB has recognised that assessing the viability of an investment project requires an assurance that facilities will be used, and that depends on availability of finance for future current spending (European Investment Bank 2011: 18-21). This implies that countries facing the most severe fiscal restraints will be less able to justify investment in education, irrespective of the benefits it might bring if adequately financed. Indeed, as will be argued, the conception of the Juncker plan as running alongside austerity leads to severe limitations on the kinds and locations of investment likely to be financed.

2. The Juncker investment plan

2.1 A plan for the ‘last chance’ European Commission

The importance of an increase in investment for economic recovery in the European Union is clearly recognised in Jean-Claude Juncker’s proposal for a comprehensive investment package, approved at the European Council meeting on 18 December 2014; more details and clarifications surfaced in the following weeks (European Council 2014, European Commission 2015a). The European Commission President predicted at least €315 billion in additional investment over the three years of 2015-2017, giving this a central place in the ‘last-chance’ European Commission’. A caveat was that the investment plan came with accompanying requirements for Member States ‘to intensifying structural reforms’ and to pursue what was described as ‘growth-friendly fiscal consolidation’ (European Council 2014: 1). These requirements, it will be argued below, will weaken its effectiveness.

The justification and background to the Juncker plan are set out in various public and policy statements, above all in a substantial report produced by the so-called Special Task Force on Investment in the EU, set up in September 2014 with representation from the European

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1. The President warned that voters were losing patience with EU bureaucracy and a failure to create prosperity. In his view it is therefore the ‘last-chance Commission’ (http://www.euractiv.com/video/juncker-will-be-last-chance-commission-309405).
Commission, the European Investment Bank (EIB) and Member State
governments. Its final report (Special Task Force 2014), produced in
December 2014, gave a justification for the plan and filled in details on
possible ways forward. Significantly, the Task Force left no doubt of a
perceived need for substantial investment. Member States were
immediately encouraged to identify projects awaiting implementation
and a list of 2000 projects was quickly prepared with a cost of €1300
billion, of which €500 billion could be committed in the next three
years (Special Task Force 2014: 10).

The following sections examine the Juncker proposal against a set of
questions that provide a basis for judging its likely outcomes and also
for assessing possible alternatives. In particular, the proposal for an
investment plan needs to explain why investment is necessary, where
such investment should be directed, why such a scheme has not been
implemented so far, how it will be financed, how credits will be repaid,
which (new) institutions will be involved, what governance structures
will be set up, what other measures might be needed to make it effective
and, finally, why such a programme should be organised at the European
level.

2.2 Why do we need investment?

A simple argument for special measures to increase investment is
provided in the aforementioned Special Task Force’s report. Investment
had fallen 15% below its pre-crisis peak in the EU and this was said to
be the major cause of continued economic stagnation. Two immediate
reservations are, first, that the ultimate cause of low investment
remains to be proven: it could be low overall demand or austerity
policies, indicating that targeting investment might be the wrong
starting point. Secondly, the Juncker plan would cover only about one
quarter of the gap it identifies.

Moreover, there are substantial differences in the extent of the decline
in investment between countries. Table 1 below compares investment as
a percentage of GDP in 2014 with the period of the pre-crisis boom.
While GDP had recovered, investment remained depressed, with
particularly severe declines in Greece, Ireland, Cyprus, Romania, Spain
and the Baltic Republics. Most of the decline was in private investment,
but public fixed investment also fell by more than 50% in Ireland, Spain and Greece. Some other countries stood up rather well, with investment recording an increase in Germany. Using the criterion of the fall in investment from pre-crisis levels therefore provides a justification for an investment with a geographical bias towards those countries where investment has fallen the furthest.

Table 1  **Gross fixed capital formation as per cent of GDP in a sample of EU countries, 2004-2008 and 2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2004-2008</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eurozone</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from AMECO database ([http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/ResultSerie.cfm](http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/ResultSerie.cfm)).

It could be argued that these declines should not be interpreted entirely negatively, as the level of investment up to 2008 was partly directed into unproductive assets, notably private housing, and was based on high levels of credit that proved unsustainable (Gros 2014). This argument can justify ensuring that investment is well-directed in the future, but it is not a persuasive argument against an investment plan
as such. The sustainable level of investment remains unclear after the crisis, which followed in large part from banking activities unrelated to real investment. There were significant construction booms in a few EU Member States, but the subsequent fall in investment affected almost all activities and sectors, in many cases with no obvious relationship to any conceivable past over-investment. Indeed, investment has been brought to extraordinarily low levels in a number of countries, leaving unemployed people and unused productive capacity that could contribute to a revival of well-directed investment activity. A final point is that, as indicated by the list of projects prepared by Member States (Special Task Force 2014), there are identifiable needs for new investment both in public sector activities and in the private sector.

However, a strong case for an investment plan does depend on more than just evidence of past decline. It needs to be demonstrated that it will bring positive results. Here the Juncker proposal is cautious, predicting an increase in investment but giving no details on its wider impact. It does give general indications of the aims and these broadly correspond to the priorities of Agenda 2020 (European Commission 2010), covering transport and energy infrastructure, education, health, research, information and communication technologies, innovation, renewable energy, environmental infrastructure, urban renewal and social fields. The investment plan is also to provide financial support for smaller businesses.

In fact, the effects of the immediate stimulus are relatively easy to predict in terms of GDP and to a lesser extent employment. If nothing else changes in the economy except the level of investment, there will be an immediate and equal increase in GDP. That may be reduced if other economic activity is squeezed out, but this is unlikely in a period of high unemployment and low long-term interest rates. The increase in GDP would probably be greater than the initial increase in investment thanks to the Keynesian multiplier effect. This further increase is harder to predict, in terms of timing and extent, and depends on the nature of the investment. Labour-intensive activities with a high share of domestic inputs (housing construction and heat insulation are examples) should have the greatest impact on domestic employment, thereby stimulating further demand and economic activity.
Some multiplier effects are therefore likely, meaning an increase in GDP and employment greater than the initial investment. Longer term effects, after investment projects have been completed, may be considerably greater, but are very hard to estimate and even more dependent on the nature of the investment. Thus improved education is widely accepted to have contributed to past growth, but it is very difficult to separate its effects from that of other factors. Returns to education have been evaluated by its effects on personal incomes, which generally rise with the years spent in formal education, but that arguably ignores many further benefits of education to society. It also offers widely differing results between countries, reflecting partly different income levels and different degrees of inequality (OECD 2009). Moreover, as indicated above, investment in education is interpreted as investment in facilities and buildings and it is very difficult to separate out their contribution from that of current spending (European Investment Bank 2006: 26).

It should be added that the impact of investment in increasing GDP and employment will also depend on any geographical bias. Short-term multiplier effects should be greater where there are the most unemployed resources, meaning countries in the greatest difficulty. Conventions for measuring longer-term returns may lead to a bias towards higher-income countries where returns will often appear greater. On the other hand, investing in research or higher education facilities in lower-income countries could be judged very positively, bringing the potential for wider social benefits and development across economies. An aim of reducing divergences across the EU would therefore imply emphasising criteria that take account of the wider development potential following from investment projects.

2.3 Why is investment currently so low?

To explain why investment was not being undertaken without the investment plan, the Special Task Force (2014: 5) pointed to ‘a wide array of barriers and bottlenecks’. That explanation seems to serve as justification for policy responses that go beyond the investment plan and encompass structural reforms and fiscal consolidation. In fact, there is nothing in the Special Task Force report to demonstrate that fiscal consolidation, essentially meaning keeping to the rules of the
Stability and Growth Pact, would lead to higher levels of investment. Nor is there much reason to see structural reforms making a positive contribution. This term has frequently been used to mean policies to reduce employment protection, the scope of collective bargaining and ultimately wages and there is no basis in the Task Force’s analysis for expecting such measures to contribute to higher investment.

Indeed, the insistence on fiscal consolidation and structural reforms, and much of the accompanying emphasis on regulatory uncertainty and administrative burdens, do not follow from an analysis of what led to the fall in investment. They rather echo preoccupations present in past European Commission policies. There is some common ground here with the emphasis in the Business Europe contribution to the discussion on the investment plan which called for ‘a step change in efforts to tackle the obstacles hampering private investment in Europe (Business Europe 2014: 3). Some obstacles they refer to could be genuine problems, but they are not new and therefore cannot be seen as the cause of the low level of investment after 2008. No argument is presented to show how they could be.

In fact, the key constraints on investment are recognised at various points in the Task Force report. The report differentiates between the private and public sectors. The issue for private investment has been ‘low demand growth, low levels of capacity utilisation, heightened economic and policy uncertainty, and, in some countries, the bursting of construction/housing bubbles, corporate deleveraging and financing constraints (Special Task Force 2014: 8), leading to expectations of continued low demand in the future. There are frequent references to the issue of business confidence, as if it were an independent influence. However, any lack of confidence should be seen rather as following from an accurate perception of reality. Demand is low. Businesses are aware of this and therefore have every reason to hold back on investment. The importance of this factor in explaining low levels of business activity emerges clearly from the European Commission’s Business Surveys and from the European Business Cycle Indicators (European Commission 2013a).

In the years up to 2008 60% of managers in manufacturing firms reported no barriers limiting production. This fell to 40% in 2009 and only partially recovered in the following years. The main barrier was identified as
‘insufficient demand’ and this perception never returned to its pre-crisis levels, remaining at around 40% of respondents (European Commission 2013a: 9). Finance was far less of a problem, growing in importance somewhat in 2009 and remaining relevant to 7-8% of businesses. It was a particularly severe constraint on businesses in Greece, Spain, Italy and Cyprus, with the numbers affected reaching almost 50% of businesses in some years (European Commission 2013a: 10). It was relatively short-lived and unimportant in Germany and France.

Bank lending has also failed to recover in full from the low point in 2008. Wide divergences between countries were revealed by a European Central Bank (ECB) survey for the six months up to March 2013, showing that 85% of SMEs seeking credits in Germany encountered no obstacles, while only 25% in Greece had the same good fortune (European Central Bank 2013). Interest rates charged also varied widely, with businesses in periphery countries paying about twice as much as those in Germany. It can be added that effects on economies as a whole were compounded by the greater importance of smaller businesses in the countries worst affected, while larger firms are more important in France and Germany. These large firms are the ones most able to finance investment, should they feel it justified by demand levels.

Research based on a survey of borrowers and lenders across the EU showed a number of factors contributing to the decline in lending to SMEs (Bain et al. 2013), including banks’ need to be more cautious after the financial crisis, changes in the structure of banking that reduced competition between potential creditors and finally the disruption of long-established links between lenders and borrowers which made assessments of credit-worthiness more difficult.

However, the differences in lending between countries appear to be more a consequence than a cause of differences in economic conditions. Evidence from ECB surveys shows that banks’ risk perceptions about ‘overall economic activity as well as industry and firm-specific developments played an increased role in the tightening of credit standards’ (European Central Bank 2013: 45). Thus, reluctance to lend reflected banks’ fears that demand would remain depressed and credits would not be repaid (see the comment on Ireland in Bain et al. 2013: 28) – a logical fear in countries faced with the most severe austerity policies.
and a logical fear in relation to SMEs that tend to be domestically-oriented rather than export-oriented. A restoration of bank lending therefore depends to a great extent on increasing demand in those countries where it has been the most depressed.

The barriers to public sector investment can be deduced from the list of projects submitted to the Special Task Force. Of the almost 2000 projects in the main list, the report took a more in-depth look at an illustrative sample of 46 projects, including ‘purely’ public sector projects, some mixed and some that were to be run by private companies but with close links to public policy issues. Funding is strongly dependent on public provision or, at the minimum, implicit public guarantees. Finance appears explicitly as the key barrier in all but three. One of these was a complex cross-border project and the other two were airport extensions requiring difficult political decisions. As far as the others are concerned, for some the barrier was a lack of long-term finance, for others it was the effects of Eurozone budget rules and the cuts that had been imposed while for some others it was the unattractiveness of the projects to private lenders. Remarkably, regulatory issues appear very rarely, even in a secondary role, one of the few examples being a German off-shore windfarm development with private involvement where the issue was said to be uncertainty over future government support. Thus, it is not excessive regulation that constitutes a barrier, even if this is a frequent complaint from business, but rather possible changes in implicit subsidies at a time of potential energy price volatility.

So, despite Juncker’s references to three strands in his policy for increasing investment, including fiscal consolidation and structural reform alongside direct support for investment, the key issue for the post-2008 decline comes down to demand in the private sector, which could be increased by a public-sector stimulus, and to finance for the public sector. The next two sections therefore consider how the plan is to be financed and how credits could be repaid.
3. The investment plan in action: funding and repayments

3.1 How would the investment plan be financed?

A central argument behind the Juncker plan is that there is no shortage of long-term finance seeking safe outlets. There is indeed evidence to support this claim. It could even be argued that a considerably larger investment plan could be financed with little difficulty. That is indicated, for example, by the views of long-term investors, such as pension funds, expressed in response to a Green Paper on long-term financing issued in April 2013 (European Commission 2013b). The amount needed annually to meet the Juncker plan’s needs, the equivalent of 0.8% of EU GDP, is about 2.5% of what EU governments borrow annually, in several cases at interest rates around zero in real terms, and should therefore be comfortably manageable.

However, mobilising this private finance would depend on a public financial contribution to provide a guarantee against the possible failure of a borrower to repay a loan. One means to achieve this, in line with past practice, would be to use the EIB, the EU’s non-profit long-term lending institution. Its capital is contributed by Member States, roughly in proportion to their levels of GDP. Increased lending would normally require an increase in its capital and, to keep in line with past practices, all Member States would be expected to contribute and would come under strong pressure to do so. These capital requirements are not enormous when set against the likely returns from investment, but reluctance to contribute could be expected from some if not many Member States. Once capital is increased, the EIB can issue bonds on commercial markets. Interest rates have been low thanks to its cautious investment policy.

Armed with these financial resources, the bank lends to both commercial and public-sector projects, with each in the recent past representing about half of total lending. The latter are the responsibility of that country’s government. The former often require a government guarantee so that a significant body of EIB investment is already guaranteed by governments. The practice has been to seek co-financing, meaning that investments are also partly financed by a private bank or investment fund, although this is not a statutory requirement. This
gives the potential for a multiplier effect, with considerably more total investment than that promised from the EIB alone. Thus in June 2012 the European Council launched its Compact for Growth and Jobs and increased the EIB’s capital by €10 billion. This compact, it was claimed, would enable the EIB to borrow on financial markets at low interest rates and lend €60 billion which, with established co-financing practices, would lead to a total investment of €180 billion.

However, the Juncker plan assumes no addition to the EIB’s capital. Instead, it proposes the establishment of a new fund, the European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI), with a starting value of €21 billion, of which €5 billion will come from the EIB, €8 billion will be gradually transferred from other parts of the EU budget and the remainder will be a guarantee from the European Commission. This guarantee will then be used to insure credits from the EIB, and possibly also private-sector investors, reaching the value of €315 billion, fifteen times the original commitment. Thus the hope is for almost as large a multiplier effect as has been achieved from EIB credits to very low-risk projects. It is also hoped that the initial sum will be increased by contributions from Member State governments.

Thus the use of EFSI is conceived as playing a similar role to an increase in EIB capital. European Commission Vice President Jyrki Katainen has referred to the EIB using the €21 billion guarantee as a basis for issuing AAA-rated bonds, thereby strengthening its ability to lend and hence to set the direction for investment (Katainen 2015).

This alternative to an EIB capital increase has three obvious attractions for the European Commission. The first is that it avoids putting any demands on Member States, which would not be the case for an increase in the EIB’s share capital. The second is that there will be no need for extra finance, as it uses resources already available in the EU budget. The third is that it can be done fairly quickly, with hopes of getting the plan under way in 2015.

However, these advantages to policy makers come with considerable costs. The EU is committing only a small guarantee and counting on a high leverage rate. For reasons explained below, the total investment will therefore either be strongly focused on countries in the least difficulty, or which fall well below the target level. Moreover, the scale of the plan will
remain limited. There is no reason why Member States should commit extra resources to the EFSI. They are expected to do so out of a general desire to help EU economic recovery (European Commission 2015a) without any promise of return, with no guarantee that their projects would be financed and without any direct ability to influence investment decisions. A small number of governments (Spain, Finland, and Slovakia) came forward quickly to say that they would be willing to contribute. German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble was reported on 27 January insisting that his country would not contribute but should provide financial help for investment within Germany. That is not a surprising view and one likely to be followed by other governments. The initial funding of €21 billion is therefore unlikely to increase much, if at all.

3.2 Repaying the credits: conditions and timing

Where investment is commercially viable, repayment of credits should come from future returns. However, most public sector investment will provide returns in the form of social rather than private benefits and often quite far into the future. The obvious solution is to repay the credits out of the state budgets of the governments responsible for the investment, but that is bound to be difficult for countries constrained by Eurozone debt rules. The only solution proposed is ‘an increased adoption of the user-pays principle’ (Special Task Force 2014: 48), meaning higher charges for public services. Although not explicitly linked to privatisation, this could be expected to favour provision of such services as health and education from the private sector, thereby encouraging trends towards further privatisation.

For some important areas of investment there is no realistic basis for repaying out of user charges. This applies for urban transport and regeneration of urban neighbourhoods, for which the EIB has in the past judged financial viability by governments’ commitment to provide and continue subsidisation (European Investment Bank 2011), something which has become much less certain since 2010. The implication is that investment will be biased towards projects offering quick financial returns and towards countries free from the constraints of the Stability and Growth Pact or, if already covered by Eurozone rules, facing the smallest budget difficulties.
This bias is a highly unfortunate by-product of the Eurozone budget rules as it can easily be demonstrated that repayment should present no serious problem once growth resumes. Indeed, it may be because the calculations are so simple and the results so decisive that they are rarely considered or presented. The issue receives no comment in the Task Force report, but it is worth demonstrating that state budgets would not be threatened even by a considerably larger investment programme.

The ease of repaying credits can be demonstrated with an example related to the investment plan proposed by the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), referred to in section 5 below. This plan assumed an additional investment equivalent to 2% of GDP over a 10 year period (thus increasing slightly in absolute terms as GDP increases), financed by credits to be repaid over 10 years – a reasonable figure when set against EIB past practice – meaning that all repayments would be completed in 20 years. To simulate the effects, various growth and interest rates are assumed along with tax revenue equivalent to 40% of GDP, this being approximately the average tax burden in the EU in 2014. Table 2 shows the results of calculations.

Table 2  Simulations for repayment of credits out of higher taxes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Growth rate, %</th>
<th>Interest rate, %</th>
<th>Total to be repaid, % of GDP</th>
<th>Total interest payments, % of GDP</th>
<th>Extra tax revenue, % of GDP</th>
<th>Extra tax/repayment needs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>484</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author’s calculations.

Outcomes are calculated for a GDP growth rate (column 1) of 3.5%, near the top of the range in years prior to 2008, and for more modest rates of 2.5% and 1.2%, the latter being the level achieved in 2014. In each case, investment is increased by 2% of this growing GDP level. That
builds up the total to be repaid after 10 years, in all cases to somewhat more than 20% of the initial GDP level. Interest also needs to be paid on a total level of debt, which at first increases and then decreases and the effects of two different interest rates are included (column 2). The figure of 1% is comfortably above the level for 10-year government bond spreads in the better placed EU Member States in 2014. The figure of 2.5% is above the equivalent level for all but a very few countries. The fourth column of Table 2 shows the resulting total interest payments over the whole 20-year period. The fifth column shows the increase in tax revenue over the 20-year period thanks to the increasing level of GDP, assuming that 40% of GDP is taken as tax revenue. The final column relates this to the total debt-service needs, showing that the former is several times greater than the latter. In other words, debts can be repaid out of increased tax revenues leaving a substantial surplus that can finance other government activities.

Increasing the interest rate increases the amount that needs to be paid in interest, but it would need a very large increase to threaten the financial viability of the investment programme. Reducing the growth rate presents a bigger threat, because it reduces the additional tax revenue. However, even with a growth rate of 1.2% and an interest rate of 2.5%, the last column in Table 2 shows that the extra revenue is still almost five times the level needed to cover the total repayment needs over the 20-year period.

It should be noted that there is no assumption here about the sources of this growth. The aim is simply to show that plausible rates of growth lead to tax revenues that more than cover the needs of debt repayment. There is also no assumption about inflation. Adding in inflation makes debt repayment easier in the same way as does an increase in the GDP growth rate. Thus an inflation rate of 2.5% per annum alongside zero economic growth would have exactly the same implications for debt repayment as a GDP growth rate of 2.5% with zero inflation. The most likely scenario is a combination of GDP growth and some inflation, together ensuring the affordability of debt repayment. This scenario is in line with past international experiences. As demonstrated by case studies in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook of October 2012, repayment is most difficult in the context of lasting economic stagnation and falling price levels (IMF 2012: 101-126).
Finally, to repeat a point already made, this simulation assumes that all credits need to be repaid out of taxation. If up to half of credits were for commercial projects, then repayment needs out of tax revenues would be greatly reduced. Shifting to a more optimistic scenario, with a substantial share of commercial projects, some inflation and a reasonable real GDP growth rate, the needs for debt repayment appear quite trivial when set against the expected extra tax revenue.

4. Managing the investment plan: EU and domestic architecture

4.1 What kind of governance will be needed at EU level?

The Juncker plan is conceived with a minimal need for new institutions. Decisions are to be taken by an Investment Committee of the EFSI made up of ‘independent market experts’ (European Commission 2015a). The EFSI in turn will formally fall under the EIB but it will have its own distinct financial profile and decision-making procedures such that it does not affect the EIB’s overall credit rating. The general picture is that of a very simple organisational and governance structure with investment decisions well removed from direct political influence. Early discussion of the role of the EFSI left ambiguity over its precise relationship with the EIB. This was clarified in early 2015. The EFSI would play a role only in response to proposals submitted to the EIB, approving for guarantee those it considers acceptable subject to criteria it will formulate, but which, it was stated, would exclude reference to any geographical or sectoral priorities. The EIB will then be free to decide how to use that guarantee. It will be able to grant a credit for a project, take an equity stake in a company or give a guarantee for a private-sector investor. The emphasis is likely to be on credits, in line with past practice.

Despite early insistence that there would be no geographical bias, a central role for the EIB might give some hope for a small bias towards countries in the greatest difficulty. In the past, although the EIB did invest significantly in higher-income countries, it also directed investment towards those in greatest difficulty. Past lending practices show considerable variations between countries in per capita credit
levels, with Spain doing particularly well (Myant 2015, p.8). In 2013, the expectation was that four programme countries, representing 4.2% of EU GDP, would receive 5.6% of investment, up from 5.2% in 2012 (calculated from European Commission and European Investment Bank 2013: 9). Final results showed a figure of 5.3%, so there was some bias and some increase. It was small but, at the equivalent to almost 0.7% of those countries’ GDP, made some contribution to countering the negative effects of austerity policies imposed in recent years (Bouget et al. 2015) and halting the decline in investment levels and credits to businesses from banks.

However, the problem of the conflict between the volume of investment that can be undertaken and its risk profile remains. The Juncker plan is billed as enabling the financing of projects with a higher risk profile than those previously financed by the EIB, which has been determined to maintain its AAA rating. To achieve that rating, the EIB would need to accept a lower leverage ratio and would need to offer a larger guarantee to private investors. In short, the Juncker plan will either be biased towards the safest projects and safest countries, or will fall far short of the predicted investment volume.

4.2 What kind of governance at the national level?

An EU investment plan depends on proposals for projects coming from the Member States. There are financial barriers that affect some countries more than others. Where co-financing from public authorities is needed, it is obviously most difficult for countries with the most constrained budgets. However, even if that were overcome, various institutional barriers would remain for a project aimed at reducing divergences across the EU, notably the capacity of institutional infrastructures to produce plausible and viable project ideas. The experience of EU Structural and Cohesion Funds has revealed difficulties, with substantial variations between countries and regions in the speed of take-up of what is being offered. Wide variations are also revealed by the project proposals in the Task Force report. Some countries seemed able to produce very few proposals, notably Bulgaria, while some were ready with a large number of often expensive projects, notably Greece, Estonia and Belgium (Myant 2015: 9).
The report of the Special Task Force offers a step towards a solution, referring to the benefits of advising and sharing best practice and of countries developing their own coherent plans for future investment. The problem is deeper than these solutions suggest. Institutions that can formulate projects need to be developed. Part of the solution could be provided by national investment banks and bodies at the regional level that can coordinate and formulate plans for economic development.

4.3 What ‘accompanying measures’ are proposed?

The emphasis on accompanying measures implies a preference for deregulation wherever conceivable and a continuation of existing rules on budget deficits and public debt levels, albeit allowing for some (limited) flexibility in their interpretation. The continued focus on austerity makes the financing of public sector projects extremely difficult where co-funding is required. It makes repayment of credits potentially very difficult, especially in the early years before any sustained growth can be restored. The focus on austerity also raises questions over the usefulness of investment: there is, as already indicated, little point in building and equipping new schools and research facilities or constructing new transport networks if there is no funding to run or subsidise them once completed.

In two small concessions towards reducing the effects of austerity in the Juncker proposal, Member States that contribute to the EFSI will not be penalised for a resulting breach of the Stability and Growth Pact, provided that the breach is small and temporary, and some co-financing may also be viewed with benevolence in a country with negative growth or a GDP level judged to be ‘well below its potential’ (European Commission 2015b: 7-9). That is far short of allowing exemption from the Stability and Growth Pact for all activities linked to the investment plan, a step that should not, as indicated above, carry any risks of escalating public debt levels. On the contrary, by helping to restore growth it should work to reduce budget difficulties.
4.4 Why a ‘European’ plan?

A final remarkable feature of the Juncker plan is that it does not provide convincing arguments for such a programme to be managed at the European (rather than the national) level. There are some cross-border projects, but they are only one part of the total. For the most part, the same effect could be achieved by programmes run separately in individual countries. Countries and businesses will have no new access to finance beyond what could be financed from their own budgets with, in a few cases, a very slight relaxation in budgetary rules. Thus the programme will allow countries contributing to a fund to circumvent those rules without facing penalties, while using those resources directly to support projects of their own choice would not be allowed.

Juncker plan misses a unique benefit from a plan coordinated at the European level, which is that it can bring investment to countries that need it the most, raising finance from private investors who will be able to trust an EU-level institution. Thus the ‘South’ could benefit from the credit-worthiness of the EU as a whole. If investment is then biased towards countries in the greatest need, that need be no more than a temporary transfer between countries. Even if economically stronger regions contribute more to financing than weaker regions, loans will have to be repaid out of the resulting higher GDP levels, so that there would be no net transfers between countries.

The Juncker plan gives no such basis for ensuring support to investment in countries that need it the most. A reasonable forecast is that it will lead to some increase in investment in EU ‘core’ countries. Much the same result could have been achieved by those same Member State governments using their own resources directly to promote investment. It will have the least effect in Eurozone members that have experienced the greatest economic difficulties. Alternatives can be found that offer more investment, counter the geographical bias that would follow from leaving decisions to the financial markets, and that give a clearer role to institutions at the European level.
5. Developing an alternative investment plan

The Juncker plan can be read as a serious effort to move in a new economic policy direction. However, it suffers from serious weaknesses that will limit its effectiveness. These can be explained in terms of recent EU political realities. The plan has been developed essentially in the framework of policy continuity. No sacred cows of the immediate preceding years are to be challenged and no Member State governments are to be troubled. There is a pragmatic logic to this reasoning, but the result is a programme that lacks economic coherence.

A number of alternatives have been proposed in recent years that provide a basis for overcoming the weaknesses in the Juncker plan, albeit with the recognition that they would require some degree of political battle before they could be implemented. Such alternatives can be put into four groups.

The first set of options emphasise investment within one country only, avoiding all the political and other difficulties involved in creating a programme at European level. That also has the advantage of allowing a more balanced programme that includes both investment and current spending. However, the benefits across the EU as a whole are relatively small when, as is likely to be the case, investment is focused on activities with a high labour intensity. Thus, for example, a proposal from Swedish trade unions (LO Sverige 2013) for a boost in public spending equivalent to 2% of GDP foresaw a leakage into imports equivalent to only 0.25% of GDP. Spending was well targeted to increasing domestic demand with a forecast reduction in unemployment of 2 percentage points, but there was little impact on other EU Member States.

The second group focus on the EIB providing a relatively rapid stimulus to demand. This was proposed by Kollatz-Ahnen (2012) and Griffiths-Jones et al. (2012). They foresaw higher investment coming from the EU budget and from the EIB, with a possible capital increase for the latter, within an investment plan equivalent to 0.5% of GDP and running only for a few years. The focus was to be on projects that show immediate effects and bring commercial returns (Kollatz-Ahnen 2012: 14-15), making repayment appear much easier. Their predictions, using the Heimdal model (Economic Council of the Labour Movement, undated) were for an increase in GDP of slightly under 0.6% and employment...
creation of up to 1.2 million. Thus, in scale, this was a modest proposal and had much in common with the Juncker plan, seeking a means to provide a stimulus without breaching EU or national budget rules.

A third approach was adopted by the ETUC (2013), which proposed a more substantial investment plan, set to increase investment by the equivalent of 2% of GDP over a 10 year period. This does not assume unchanging budget rules, as that would rule out co-financing, debt repayments and utilisation of investment once completed, but it does start from investment as the central element in economic revival. The plan would require contributions from Member States to increase the EIB’s capital, a step certain to be politically difficult, but the greater scale means that the programme could be linked to more ambitious long-term objectives, including energy transformation and reducing the growing divergences across the EU. Using the HEIMDAL model it was possible to predict the effects of the investment stimulus as leading to an increase in GDP of almost 5% over 5 years, with an accompanying increase in employment of nearly 6 million. Longer term effects cannot be estimated with any serious degree of confidence.

The fourth type of approach, setting investment explicitly within a broader alternative policy, is embodied in the so-called ‘modest proposal’ from Varoufakis et al. (2013). These ideas include measures to overcome difficulties in banking systems and in relation to sovereign debt. Alongside this, the authors of the approach emphasise in general terms the need for investment, and propose to use the EIB and its subsidiaries as the investing agents. Financing issues are not dealt with in detail, but the authors have proposals for relaxing some existing rules and are confident that debts can be repaid by the recipients of credits so that no transfers between states will be required. Dealing as they are at a high level of generality, the authors also do not provide any precise forecasts of the results of their proposals, should these be put into practice.

In conclusion, moving on from the previous criticisms of the Juncker plan and from the alternatives that have been proposed, the basis for a coherent alternative can be summarised in the five points below.

— Clear objectives could be set: to provide an immediate stimulus, to satisfy identifiable needs for economic and social modernisation
and to start to reduce the divergences across the EU. This would point immediately to the logic of linking investment with other demand-enhancing measures and of finding an organisational structure to encourage an investment bias towards countries in the greatest difficulty.

— The scale could be tailored more to the needs of the above objectives. The volume of projects identified by Member State governments and included in the preliminary list is equivalent to approximately four times the volume initially proposed for the Juncker plan. This justifies a larger project running over a longer period. That in turn raises further questions about governance and the organisational forms that would be required for its implementation.

— Ensuring that investment is undertaken and biased towards the areas that need it the most requires criteria that reflect those aims. Commercial viability is adequate for many private-sector projects. Criteria that relate to wider development objectives, difficult to evaluate in precise financial returns and not providing revenue streams to the investor, should also be used. The EIB has used cost-benefit analysis where possible, but that too encounters difficulties for long-term projects with complex social consequences. Evaluation criteria that take full account of wider development effects should therefore be used. This does not need to be incompatible with past EIB insistence on maintaining its AAA rating provided governments are not unnecessarily hampered from repaying debts by the budget rules.

— An ambitious investment plan requires a strong and well-equipped organisation to coordinate and evaluate projects. The EIB has the most experience, but mostly in supporting relatively small numbers of projects. It will need to take on a larger role and there will need to be clear outside control over priorities and guidelines. Moreover, consideration would need to be given to the difficult task of creating organisational forms within Member States, to come forward with project proposals and monitor and evaluate implementation of past projects.

— Above all, the success of such an investment plan depends on relaxation of the rules underpinning austerity, low demand and
the prolonged stagnation in the EU. The limits set for the Eurozone are not related to any proven level at which debt is in danger of becoming unsustainable. Indeed, most EU members have exceeded the 60% debt quota and many of those below that level pay more to borrow than many above. Rules should be relaxed, to give, at least, clear support to the investment plan and economic recovery. Logically, that should include contributions into an investment fund or to an increase in EIB capital, public co-funding of projects, repayment of debts and of the current costs of running projects once they are in operation.

With these conditions met, an investment plan could play a central role in reviving economies across the European Union.

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The EU’s ambivalent involvement in education and training policies

Chiara Agostini and David Natali

Introduction

Since the Lisbon Strategy of 2000, the EU has increasingly focused on education and training (ET) policies. The latter have been proposed as a key component of the European knowledge-based economic model. In parallel to this emphasis by the EU, there has been broad consensus among scholarly experts and analysts. Supporters of the supply-side economic paradigm stress that education and training are investments in human capital, and are thus a productive factor that improves competitiveness and boosts economic progress (see Kolev and Matthes 2013). Advocates of the alternative demand-side perspective have supported ET by claiming that increased spending in the field reduces inequalities among citizens and boosts domestic demand through the public budget (Bsirske and Busch 2013). Education and training are also at the core of the social investment paradigm that relies on investments, such as in human capital, to support labour market participation and to confront new social risks (Hemerijck 2013; Vandenbroucke and Vanhercke 2014).

The key question we address in this chapter is: has this emphasis on education and training resulted in a coherent effort and investment in ET both at EU and national level?

This chapter argues that, despite the emphasis at European level and the broad agreement among experts, actual EU governance in socio-
economic matters and in the field of ET, not to mention the reforms introduced so far in the Member States, are ambivalent.

In the following sections, we refer to three different sources of this ambivalence. First, we look at the recent political-institutional events at the EU level: while some of these events have helped to prioritise ET (namely the new Juncker Commission and its internal re-organisation, the launch of the investment plan for the EU), there is a risk that others (limited EU resources to invest in ET; potential conflicts in the Commission and the political weakness of the new Commissioner for Education, Culture, Youth and Citizenship) will weaken any potential EU action on the theme. Second, we refer to the EU governance, both the coordination method on education and training and the broader European Semester. Here, as well, we see some trends indicating a strengthening of EU action in the area (e.g. stability of the coordination method in ET), together with other more problematic trends. In the last few years, the persistent call for fiscal consolidation and the economic interpretation of ET proposed by the Commission has held back investment in education and training. Third, and more crucially, we look at the recent evolution of ET policies in Member States. The overall trend in many countries has been cost-containment, with little evidence in national budgets of a new approach to investment.

These three sets of evidence confirm the pro-ET rhetoric: the focus on education is increasingly at the core of the EU’s policy agenda, while Member States are not far from reaching most of the targets set in the Europe 2020 Strategy. Yet, we will argue, the EU framework on ET is ambivalent and partly contradictory.

The chapter is organised as follows. Section 1 starts by shedding light on the key political events that have marked the year 2014 and how these have been reflected in education and training policies. Sections 2 and 3 provide a quick overview of the trends in EU governance in the field. We discuss the EU’s Education & Training 2020 (ET 2020) strategy as well as significant developments in the European Semester, with a focus on the key facts of 2014. Sections 4 and 5 focus on national trends in spending and the overall performance of education and training systems, through the analysis of national trends compared to the Europe 2020 targets. Section 6 concludes.
1. The new Commission, its strategic plan and re-organisation: good news for education and training?

Last year saw important innovations due to the new political context ushered in by the European elections of May 2014. Among these key steps, we focus in particular on the new Commission, its priorities and its structure. This information will show that while education and training are a priority of the new Commission, the division of tasks between the Directorates General (DGs), and the political conflicts surrounding the election of the new Commissioner for Education, Culture, Youth and Citizenship, are a source of potential weakness of EU action in the field.

1.1 The new political guidelines of the Juncker Commission

On 15 July 2014, the candidate for the European Commission Presidency presented to the European Parliament the ‘Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission’ (Juncker 2014a). In this document, Jean Claude Juncker presented his ‘agenda for jobs, growth, fairness and democratic change’ (see the introduction to the volume). This agenda is focused on ten policy priorities for areas where, in Junker’s vision, the EU is able to make a difference. Four of them are clearly connected to education and training (Juncker 2014b).

The first priority – A new boost for jobs, growth and investment – regards the reinforcement of European competitiveness and the stimulation of investments able to promote job creation. On this point, Junker highlighted that it is possible to make better use of the common EU budget and the lending potential of EU financial instruments (i.e. the European Investment Bank). This effort should mobilise up to €315 billion in additional public and private investments over the next three years. These investments should be focused on certain strategic sectors, education and training among them. This investment is then expected to be clearly focused on helping to get the younger generation
into work, adding to the set of measures that started with the Youth Guarantee.

The second priority – *A connected digital single market* – is also related to education and training. By creating a connected digital single market, the EU could be expected to generate about €250 billion of additional growth in Europe, hundreds of thousands of new jobs in the next five years. The Commission, in the words of Juncker, should thus take every initiative to promote digital skills and learning, and innovative start-ups (ibid.).

The third priority with a link to education and training is *A deeper and fairer internal market with a strengthened industrial base*. Its aim is to contribute to the industrial base of the EU economy and ensure that Europe maintains global leadership in strategic sectors with high-value jobs. To do that, there should be a coherent strategy for investment in new technologies, improvement of the business environment, and, among other things, efforts to ensure that workers will be better skilled for industry.

The fourth priority linked to ET is *A deeper and fairer Economic and Monetary Union*. This priority refers to activation of the full potential of the EMU with the aim of improving the convergence of Member States’ economic and labour market policies. It also includes the revision, after its mid-term review, of Europe 2020 (including ET 2020, the OMC on education and training; see section below). The modernisation of education systems is a key part of the structural reform strategy and is thus at the core of the renewed EMU.

Juncker’s political priorities were followed, in November 2014, by the Communication on ‘An Investment Plan for Europe’ (European Commission 2014a). The plan confirms the Commission’s ambition to mobilise about €315 billion. The proposed action is to be financed within the current Multi-Annual Financial Framework for the EU budget 2014-2020. The basic idea is to provide greater risk-bearing capacity

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2. Moreover, the mid-term review of the ‘Multiannual Financial Framework’ (end of 2016) should be used to gear EU budgets more effectively towards jobs, growth and competitiveness. In that respect, boosting innovation is stressed as a priority.
using public money to encourage project promoters and attract private finance to viable investment projects. On one hand, at the EU level, this action should be supported by the establishment of a European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) to provide risk support for long-term investments and ensure increased access to risk-financing for small and medium-sized enterprises and mid-cap companies. On the other hand, at the national level, it is important to make more strategic use of the European Structural Funds and Investment Funds. The fund supports strategic investments in infrastructure as well as strategic sectors such as education (Juncker 2014b: 4).

At first glance, EFSI is a key step towards a true growth strategy based, among other things, on education. Yet a more in-depth analysis reveals its weakness (see Myant in this volume). As far as education, training and research are concerned, the main constraint is the scarcity of resources. Much of the financing has in fact come from a shift of resources from other EU programmes. EFSI will be financed by €2.7 billion from the Europe research programme Horizon 2020. This shift has led to some criticism from stakeholders. The League of European Research Universities (LERU) regrets ‘that money from Horizon 2020 (...) will be diverted to the European Fund for Strategic Investment (...), for a vague and highly uncertain project’ (Fleming 2014).

1.2 The new structure of the Commission, political conflicts and their expected effect on ET

The establishment of the Juncker Commission has been accompanied by a re-allocation of portfolios and supporting services between the Directorates General (DGs) (European Commission 2014b). These are the main changes with an impact on education and training:

— The part of Unit COMM C2 (Citizens Programme) responsible for management of the Europe for Citizens Programme, as well as responsibility for the Preparatory Action ‘New Narrative on Europe’
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2015, moves from DG Communication (COMM) to DG Education and Culture (EAC).

- The parts of Unit EAC A3 (Skills and Qualification Strategies; Multilingualism Policy) dealing with Skills and Qualification, and of Unit EAC B2 (Vocational Training and Adult Education; Erasmus +) dealing with Vocational Training and Adult Education policy, move from DG EAC to DG Employment (EMPL).

- Unit EAC E3 (Creative Europe Programme - MEDIA) moves from DG EAC to the DG for Communication Networks, Content and Technology (CNECT).

A further major innovation is the introduction of six Vice-Presidents. The latter are in charge of project teams, which coordinate the work of a number of Commissioners. The composition of these teams may change according to need and as new projects develop over time. The teams reflect the political guidelines mentioned above. The new structure should ensure dynamic and coherent interaction of all members of the college, and should ensure that structures are less static. The Vice-Presidents will all act as real deputies to the President (European Network of Education Councils, EUNEC 2014). Among the project teams, the team responsible for A new boost for jobs, growth, investment and competitiveness will play a key role in education policy. Two further project teams have education and training policy in their portfolio: one on the Euro and social dialogue, and the other one on the Digital single market. The three are expected to further emphasise ET as a key part of the EU strategy for growth.

But the new structure of the Commission also seems to be a source of risk. The obvious goals of the restructured Commission are to provide more political leadership and to work more effectively on key topics that will help to lead the Union out of the crisis. However, the new structure runs the risk of over-complexity and partial overlap of tasks and functions. This complexity affects education and training. While once these were under the almost exclusive competence of DG EAC, responsibility for ET is now distributed between different Commissioners and Vice-Presidents. This state may be a source of duplication of responsibilities, lack of transparency in the policymaking process, and
Conflicts between Commissioners (De Marcilly 2014; see Barcevičius et al. 2014 for past experiences in the social policy domain).4

Contingent political issues have also weakened the EU position in the field. For example, the election of the Commissioner for EAC was particularly complex. President-elect Juncker presented his team and the allocation of portfolios on 10 September 2014. This first step was followed by individual hearings of the Commissioners-designate before the relevant European Parliament committees. The MEPs asked the Commissioner-designate for EAC, Tibor Navracsics, former foreign minister of the Hungarian government, for information about his own work plan. After a first round of written answers, the Committee for education and culture (CULT) of the European Parliament required more information in order to complete its evaluation. The Commissioner-designate was to answer the additional questions by 5 October 2014. At the end of the process, the CULT Committee voted against this portfolio being attributed to the designated Commissioner, while accepting him as a potential Commissioner. MEPs doubted his commitment to civil society in the light of the Hungarian government’s attitude to citizens’ rights and NGOs. This partial rejection led to a new round of discussions between the EP and the Commission and to a final compromise: the EP eventually accepted the candidate Commissioner but with a more limited set of responsibilities (EUCIS-LLL 2014a). While the new Commissioner survived the criticism from the Parliament, his political status has suffered and this may lead to a lower profile of ET in the future.

All in all, the evidence we have given in this section demonstrates the ambivalence of last year’s developments in this field: some of them may help to prioritise ET, while others may do the opposite. The new organisation of the Commission and the proposed Juncker Plan have helped to prioritise education and training as part of the strategy for investment and growth. However, there is a risk that the limited resources of the EFSI, the potential conflicts between Commissioners

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4. At the meeting of the Directors General for Vocational Training in Rome, 13-14 October 2014, the ETUC put forward concerns about coordination between education and training sectors; while the Belgian Delegation was worried about the transfer of European Qualifications Framework (EQF) to DG EMPL (European Commission 2014c).
with some responsibility for ET, and the weakness of the new Commissioner for EAC could weaken the emphasis on ET.

2. The evolution of EU governance in the field of education and training

A second source of ambivalence is the recent steps in the coordination of education and training through the ad hoc coordination method (Education & Training 2020 – ET 2020) and the broader European Semester. As we see below, there has been progress, but also obstacles.

2.1 ET 2020, the origin of the process and its stabilisation

The political and institutional events mentioned in Section 1 have set the scene for further developments in the well-established EU governance on education and training. As stressed elsewhere (Agostini and Capano 2013), the EU role in education goes a long way back. In many respects, education and training is one of the pillars of the integration process, as part of the EU’s endeavours to promote mobility of its citizens and to forge a common educational background and cultural references for European citizens. More recently, in the 1990s and then again with the launch of the Lisbon Strategy in 2000, education has gained new momentum. The first renewed impetus for a more active role of supranational organisations and a more intense cooperation between European governments was the Bologna process on higher education at the end of the 1990s, as well as the Copenhagen process on vocational education and training (VET). Under the umbrella of the Lisbon Strategy, the ‘Education & Training 2010’ (ET 2010) work programme established the first framework for European cooperation and introduced the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) into this field (Capano and Piattoni 2011).

The ‘Education & Training 2020’ (ET 2020) work programme was launched in 2009. This programme, which replaces the previous ET 2010, fixes strategic objectives for EU policy and benchmarks at the national level to evaluate national performances (Council of the EU 2009). Through the implementation of ET 2020, the EU provides advice and support for policy reforms as well as a forum for the exchange of best
practices, and the gathering and dissemination of information and statistics. Through the strategic framework of ET 2020, Member States share four common objectives to pursue in the period up to 2020:

— Making lifelong learning and mobility a reality;
— Improving the quality and efficiency of education and training;
— Promoting equity, social cohesion, and active citizenship;
— Enhancing creativity and innovation, including entrepreneurship, at all levels of education and training.

The progress of Member States is measured by the following EU benchmarks for 2020:

— At least 95% of children (from 4 to compulsory school age) should participate in early childhood education;
— fewer than 15% of 15-year-olds should be under-skilled in reading, mathematics and science;
— fewer than 10% of young people should drop out of education and training;
— at least 40% of people aged 30-34 should have completed some form of higher education; at least 15% of adults should participate in lifelong learning;
— at least 20% of higher education graduates and 6% of 18-34 year-olds with an initial vocational qualification should have spent some time studying or training abroad;
— the share of employed graduates (20-34 year-olds having successfully completed upper secondary or tertiary education) having left education 1-3 years ago should be at least 82%.

As stressed elsewhere, the coordination process in education and training has proved particularly stable over the years (Agostini and Natali 2013). Key priorities defined at the outset of the strategy have been maintained while the indicators and benchmarks have remained unchanged and largely accepted by all stakeholders.

5. In particular, the EU carries out a yearly country analysis of these benchmarks.
While the coordination process has been set up and then reinforced through the definition of targets and common indicators, its implementation also relies on the establishment of specific ‘Thematic Working Groups’ (TWGs) made up of experts and stakeholders.

These groups are set up by the Commission and/or its departments and aim at promoting the exchange of good practices and mutual learning. They provide advice and expertise for the preparation of legislative proposals and policy initiatives; the preparation of delegated acts; and the implementation of existing EU legislation, programmes and policies, including coordination and cooperation with member countries and stakeholders. TWGs are a forum for discussions, providing high-level input in the form of opinions, recommendations and reports (European Commission 2010a; 2014d). Between 2011 and 2013, eleven thematic working groups have been established. These groups concerned: 1) primary and secondary education; 2) higher education; 3) adult learning; 4) vocational education and training; 5) transversal key competencies. In January 2014, a new generation of working groups was launched, working on six topics: 1) school policy; 2) modernization of higher education; 3) adult learning; 4) vocational education training; 5) transversal skills; 6) digital and on-line learning. These new TWGs have replaced the eleven groups mentioned above. The composition of the new TWGs varies: they are open to social partners, third countries and international organisations like the OECD.

The rationalisation of thematic working groups is a further sign of the strengthening of the institutions responsible for coordination, with room for a more systematic interaction between the actors involved in the process (e.g. social partners, civil society organisations, international organisations, etc.). Yet, as demonstrated below, the debate between EU institutions and stakeholders reveals some weakness, and therefore ambiguity, in the coordination of ET.

2.2 The Mid-term stocktaking of ET 2020

ET 2020 is based on two main documents. Each year, the Commission publishes the Education and Training Monitor, which gives information on developments in Member States compared to the ET 2020 European benchmarks. Every three years, the Commission and the Council
publish the Joint Report on Education and Training, to assess the previous 3-year cycle of activity and prepare for the next one.

In 2014, the third edition of the Education and Training Monitor had a particular role. It was a key component of the overall mid-term stocktaking of ET 2020. One goal of the review was to make ET 2020 a more focused contributor to Europe 2020 through the preparation of the 2015 Joint Report⁶. Europe 2020 is currently subject to a review process itself, with the Spring European Council meetings of 2014 and 2015 as likely milestones. An alignment of the Europe 2020 and ET 2020 review processes was thus a key goal (European Commission 2014e).

Throughout the year, all stakeholders were involved in a broad reflection about the state of the coordination process in the fifth year of its implementation. This reflection was based on:

— Member States' National Reports (via a standard questionnaire);
— the consultation with Member States in the High Level Group on Education and Training, the meetings of Directors General for school policy, for vocational education and training and for higher education, the Advisory Committee for Vocational Training, and the Education Committee (Council Working Party);
— consultation of the European social partners;
— the input provided by the stakeholders (including civil society) at the Education, Training and Youth Forum preceded by a stakeholders’ survey (see sub-section below);
— an independent external mid-term evaluation of ET 2020 conducted by Ecorys. The final report was submitted on 3 November 2014;
— a specific analysis of progress in the area of VET for the period 2011-2014 carried out by Cedefop (the European Training Foundation, ETF, in the case of candidate countries). The report was published in March/April 2015 (ibid., 2; Eurydice 2013).

⁶. Europe 2020 fixed two headline targets on education: reducing school drop-out rates below 10 per cent; and at least 40% of 30-34 years old completing third level education.
We refer here to the independent external mid-term evaluation of ET 2020, to shed light on the state of the coordination method in the field and its weaknesses. The evaluation provided insights as to the progress made and the persistent shortcomings of the coordination started in 2009. As far as progress is concerned, ET 2020 was defined as an ‘accelerator’ of learning able to connect Member States and provide room for dialogue on reforms in education and training. It was also recognised as an important connection between ET 2020 and the broader EU strategy for economic and social policies via Europe 2020 and the European Semester. Yet some shortcomings were stressed. Firstly, the process has too many objectives. A streamlined set of priorities was judged necessary to make the whole process more effective. The limited use of benchmarks and indicators was also emphasised. More importantly here, the process has limited transparency and visibility, which in turn leads to limited participation, and undermines the effectiveness of processes and outputs. ET 2020 also lacks adequate levels of visibility and, apart from those directly involved, public awareness is low. The poor levels of involvement of Member States and their low take up of the priorities of ET 2020 was seen as a key problem limiting the outcome of EU coordination in the area (European Commission 2015).

2.3 Education and Training 2020: European Commission and stakeholders’ views

The consultation of European stakeholders was a milestone in the mid-term stocktaking exercise. This sub-section refers to the feedback from some leading stakeholders and their own evaluation of ET 2020. This feedback provides further evidence of the ambivalence of the process, with its strengths and weaknesses.

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7. The evaluation was conducted by Ecorys, an international company providing research, consultancy and management services. The methodology used for the evaluation involved desk research, stakeholder consultations and interviews, an online e-survey, and country-level research and consultations: 151 stakeholders were consulted and a further 420 people responded to the e-survey. The evaluation was submitted on 3 November 2014 and includes 23 concrete recommendations that form an input into the Joint Report (European Commission 2015).
Stakeholders were involved in the review process through different instruments. The third ‘European Education, Training and Youth Forum’ was one of these. It took place in Brussels in October 2014 at the end of the second cycle of implementation of Education and Training (ET) 2020. The Forum was focused on the ‘Future priorities of the ET 2020 strategic framework for European Cooperation in Education and Training and Synergies with Youth Policy’. So the aim of the meeting (which brought together more than 350 participants representing stakeholders and organisations active in education, training and youth) was to provide a review of the implementation of the OMC in the field and discuss key priority areas for the next work cycle of the ET 2020 strategic framework (European Commission 2014f).

Well before the forum, the Commission launched an on-line survey, to collect stakeholders’ views on the achievements of ET 2020 and on the outstanding challenges. The survey highlighted the positive practical impact of EU activities in the area, such as the development of new projects, initiatives and tools at the national level; the greater visibility of the ET 2020 topics; and the increasing collaboration between stakeholders regarding both policy initiatives and funding programmes. The areas most frequently cited are: ‘lifelong learning’, ‘quality and efficiency in education and training’, and ‘mobility’.

Regarding the challenges, stakeholders highlighted different topics, among them the limited focus on the social dimension of education and training and the level of and access to financial resources (ibid.).

The ETUC (European Trade Union Confederation) and ETUCE (European Trade Union Committee on Education) provided a joint critical reflection on the first years of implementation of the coordination process in a joint document (ETUC and ETUCE 2014). The two organisations stressed some major shortcomings in three main areas. The first point concerned the need to fully consider the impact of the economic crisis. The new cycle of ET 2020 should update and revise the overall objectives of the process, bearing in mind the changed economic context, and make the objectives more consistent with the broader targets set by Europe 2020. The second line of criticism had to do with the limited involvement of stakeholders in the process, and the need for a revision of the goals and benchmarks in line with a more social view of education and training policies. This statement was in line with the
conclusions of the informal High Level meeting on 16 October 2013, where the then European Commissioner Androulla Vassiliou, the leaders of the European cross-industry organisations, and the leaders of the social partners of the European Sectoral Social Dialogue for Education agreed to cooperate more closely on EU education and training policies. ETUC and ETUCE stressed that stakeholder involvement should have been increased in the different fields and activities (setting/implementation/monitoring) and at all levels (European Commission 2013c). The third main area of criticism concerned the need for a more in-depth description of the four key objectives of the process through the definition of more specific sub-goals and the addition of new benchmarks.

The European Civil Society Platform8 on Lifelong Learning (EUCIS-LLL), in its position paper on Europe 2020 and the ET 2020 mid-term review, clarified its critical reading of the way ET was framed by the EU: 'Today it seems that the more the EU gains influence in the sector, the more balance is lost among expected benefits of the modernisation of education and training systems. (...) Only comprehensive strategies can bring results in terms of employment, social inclusion and civic participation including important dimensions such as tolerance and intercultural dialogue' (EUCIS-LLL 2014b: 1).

At the occasion of the Education, Training and Youth (ETY) forum, the Commission provided its first feedback and some proposals for the third work cycle. It proposed a focus on the following priorities:

- a holistic approach linking education, training, youth work and employment, and increasing cross-sector cooperation between stakeholders;
- the social dimension of education and training by delivering on the strategic objective ‘Promote equity, social cohesion and active citizenship’ of ET 2020;
- additional support, especially from national authorities, to ensure the professionalization of teachers (e.g. pedagogical and digital skills);

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8. The European Civil Society Platform on Lifelong Learning (EUCIS-LLL) is an umbrella association that brings together 36 European organisations active in the field of education and training.
— the transnational mobility of learners and education;
— entrepreneurship education at all levels (starting at primary school level);
— learning outcomes relative to resources used (efficiency) (European Commission 2014f: 4).

3. The European Semester: largely failing to reconcile social and economic ambitions

As explained in the chapter by Zeitlin and Vanhercke (this volume), a ‘European Semester’ of policy coordination was established in 2010, through which the Commission, the Council, and the European Council set priorities for the Union in the Annual Growth Survey (AGS), review National Reform Programmes (NRPs), and issue Country-Specific Recommendations (CSRs) to Member States, backed up in some cases by the possibility of financial sanctions. The European Semester is an important instrument for pursuing the modernisation of education and training systems and for contributing to the key goals of ET 2020. As we show below, the parallel focus on fiscal consolidation and investment in ET is a further - and to some extent more crucial - source of ambivalence in the field.

3.1 The Annual Growth Survey (AGS)

Since 2010, the Commission has published each year the Annual Growth Survey (AGS). Every year, education has been described as strategic for growth and employment, while playing a key role in several other priority areas. The main focus of the first AGS (2011) was the need for fiscal consolidation and sound public finances (see the chapter by Zeitlin and Vanhercke in this volume). In this context, education was considered as one of the ‘growth friendly expenditure areas’ to be prioritised. This concept was re-proposed in the following AGSs and became central for EU coordination of education. In the AGS for 2012, 2013 and 2014, there were five priorities: 1) pursuing differentiated growth-friendly fiscal consolidation; 2) restoring normal lending to the economy; 3) promoting growth and competitiveness for today and tomorrow; 4) tackling unemployment and the social consequences of
the crisis; 5) modernising public administration (European Commission 2010b; 2011; 2012a; 2013a).

Under Priority 1, the AGSs emphasized the need to prioritise ‘growth-friendly’ expenditure. This phrase means that Member States should keep public expenditure growth below the projected medium-term GDP growth rate while prioritising expenditure in sectors such as education, research, innovation, and energy. Furthermore, in the framework of Priority 1, the AGSs emphasise the need to reinforce or maintain services and active labour market policies, such as training for the unemployed and (since the 2014 AGS) Youth Guarantee schemes. This is a crucial source of ambiguity and weakness for the entire ET area.

Education policy also underlies Priority 4, in which the Commission emphasises the need to promote youth employment. For the Commission, particular attention should be given to supporting actions for young people who are not in employment, education, or training; adapting education and training systems in order to reflect labour market conditions and skill demands; and ensuring the quality of university programmes and considering measures to support higher education (i.e. introduction of tuition fees for tertiary education, accompanied by student loan and scholarship schemes, or other sources of funding, such as using public funds in order to leverage private investments). In more general terms, the AGS for 2014 highlights the need for pursuing the modernisation of education and training systems, including lifelong learning, vocational training and dual learning schemes.

If the first four AGSs looked similar in content and structure, the AGS for 2015 (European Commission 2014g), published on November 2014, was radically different. The 2015 AGS reflects the contents of the agenda for ‘Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change’ proposed by the new European Commission through specific ‘Political Guidelines’ (Junker 2014b). The AGS recommends three main pillars for the EU’s economic and social policy for 2015:

- a coordinated boost to investment, related to the ‘Investment Plan for Europe’;
- a renewed commitment to structural reforms;
- pursuing fiscal responsibility.
The AGS for 2015 refers to education as a key component of the three pillars mentioned above. First of all, regarding the ‘Investment Plan for Europe’, the document refers to education as one of the areas which should receive resources. Under the second pillar, ‘a renewed commitment to structural reforms’, education plays a key role in improving the dynamics of the labour market and in tackling the high level of unemployment. Education can ensure the responsiveness of skills to labour market signals. In particular, vocational training systems should be modernised to provide young people with the necessary skill sets. Lifelong learning should become central and the systems should be able to ensure access at all ages and for those most in need, through the mobilisation of both public and private actors. Moreover, the 2015 AGS highlights the need to promote a better assessment of skills at the regional and sectoral levels. Finally, under the third pillar, the Commission draws attention to the importance of prioritising productive public investment and more growth-friendly items and, from that point of view, the Investment Plan for Europe will help to support these priorities. Education is a typical example of such growth-friendly items (European Commission 2014g).

To sum up, despite the progressive shift of the AGS towards a more growth-friendly approach, the parallel references to investment in ET and fiscal consolidation result in ambiguity and contradictory guidelines to Member States.

**The Country-Specific Recommendations**

If we look at the Country-Specific Recommendations (CSRs) that Member States have received in relation to education since the launch of the European Semester, we see increasing attention being given to this area. Since 2011, the number of countries receiving CSRs on education and training increased from sixteen in 2011 to eighteen in 2012, twenty-two in 2013, and twenty-five in 2014 (European Commission 2011; 2012b; 2013b; 2014h). If we exclude those countries committed to the EU/IMF financial assistance programmes and thus not covered by the recommendations, all Member States - with the exception of the Netherlands - received CSRs on education in 2013 and 2014 (Table 1).
### Table 1  EU Member States receiving CSRs on education and training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Estonia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Malta</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
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<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Countries under a memorandum of understanding and/or other forms of conditionality
Source: European Commission (2011; 2012b; 2013b; 2014h).
The 2014 CSRs contain two types of recommendations. The first type relates to the influence of education and training on other policies: namely, the labour market and social inclusion. The second type of recommendation is focused on education and training per se, looking at total spending, and/or more specific issues (such as reforms on quality assurance, qualifications, etc.).

With regard to the first type, some CSRs call for a strengthening of the link between the labour market and education and training systems. This means that education systems should become more sensitive to the demands of the labour market (i.e. Estonia and Malta), more able to reduce skill mismatches (i.e. Belgium and Portugal) and should promote employability (i.e. Latvia and Lithuania). Recommendations on the influence of education and training on social inclusion see the former policies as crucial to avoid any form of discrimination and social exclusion and to provide opportunities for all learners. On this point, ten countries received CSRs on disadvantaged learners. In particular, these CSRs called for an improvement in the services for disadvantaged young people, such as those with a migrant background (i.e. Denmark) and those belonging to a marginalised community including Roma (i.e. Slovakia) to ensure inclusive access to early childhood education.

In the case of CSRs focused on education and training per se, Member States were first asked to ensure efficient public expenditure on education and training (i.e. Portugal) or increase their investments in order to improve specific aspects of the education system, such as higher education and research (i.e. the Czech Republic and Italy). Among the recommendations on more specific issues, Bulgaria received a recommendation about the need to adopt the ‘School Education Act’ and pursue reforms of VET and higher education. Similarly, Croatia was encouraged to modernise its qualification systems and put in place quality assurance mechanisms, and (together with the Czech Republic and Italy) to implement a comprehensive evaluation framework.

The third source of ambivalence in ET consists of the recent trends in Member States. In the present section we trace the trends in expenditure on education policy between 2009 and 2012. In Section 5 we will look at the evolution of Member States’ performances in ET, in terms of: tertiary education attainment, early school leavers, and the capacity of education systems to provide high-quality skills.

The education expenditure per GDP ratio shows that Member States have different levels of public spending. In 2012, twelve Member States show figures of around the EU average of 5.3% of GDP. In seven countries (BG, DE, EL, ES, IT, RO and SK), education expenditure is much lower (around 4%), whereas in nine Member States (BE, DK, EE, FR, CY, SI, FI, SE, UK) it is 6% or more (European Commission 2014i: 16).

As for trends, at an aggregate level, education expenditure declined between 2009 and 2012, from 5.5% to 5.3% of GDP. In 2012, government expenditure remained at the same level as the previous year, 5.3% of GDP, in a year when GDP itself fell by 0.4%. Trends confirm the lack of convergence between EU countries (Table 2).

Table 2  Trends in total spending on education and training, % GDP, 2009-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall increase</th>
<th>Belgium, Luxembourg, Malta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall decline</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden, UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall stability</td>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own table from European Commission (2014i).

9. Indicators on Member States’ performance in ET refer to the period 2010-2013.
10. For 2012, the big spender was Denmark (8.8%) followed by the Netherlands (8%) and Cyprus (7.9%). On the contrary, Romania (3.1%) and Bulgaria (3.8%) had the lowest level (European Commission 2014i).
Finally, to evaluate trends in the wake of the economic and financial crisis, we consider the changes year by year (from 2009 to 2012) at constant prices. While the AGSs have called on Member States to pursue structural reforms and, at the same time, protect investments in growth-friendly policies such as education, many Member States cut public spending on education between 2009 and 2012. Recent data reveal a decrease in 2011 and in 2012 in real terms, both of the EU average and in the majority of Member States. In 2012, government expenditure on education dropped by 1.1% (Figure 1).

**Figure 1**  
*Public spending on education year by year (2011–2012)*

![Figure 1: Public spending on education year by year (2011–2012)](image)


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11. This is confirmed by the European Parliament’s (2015) recent publication on the impact of austerity on the fundamental rights of citizens in the EU.
2012 was the second consecutive year of decline, as expenditure had already fallen in 2011 by 1.3%. In 2012, nineteen Member States recorded a cut in real terms; in six of them (EL, ES, CY, HU, PL, RO), it was of more than 5%. It was the fourth consecutive year of decline in Italy and Slovenia, the third in Spain and the second consecutive year in IE, CY, HU, PL, SK, FI, SE and the UK (European Commission 2014i).

Evidence thus shows that there has been no overall increase in spending in education and training. The investment advocated by the Commission in line with its emphasis on growth-oriented spending has not been carried out in the majority of EU countries. The crisis has further aggravated spending trends. We see here the evidence of the ambivalence of the EU discourse: despite the emphasis on ET, the EU – as stressed in section 2 – did not set any financial benchmark which could, to a limited extent, have encouraged convergence between the Member States.\(^{12}\)

This conclusion is confirmed by recent analysis of the social investment strategies implemented by EU countries in the wake of the Social Investment Package (SIP)\(^{13}\) set up in 2013. As stressed by Bouget \textit{et al.} (2015), cost containment has hugely limited the prospects of real investment. Fiscal consolidation has led to cuts in public and social expenditure, including some existing investments in building human and social capital, resulting in reductions in availability and/or quality of programmes concerning active labour market policies and education, among others.

\(^{12}\) We thank Denis Bouget who proposed in his comments this critical reading of EU coordination in the field.

\(^{13}\) SIP was adopted by the Commission on 20th February 2013; plans for its implementation were discussed at a SIP conference in Leuven on 2/3 May 2013.
5. The performance of national education systems

The further source of ambivalence we consider is the performance of national education systems. This section refers to both EU and OECD indicators.

In the framework of the European Semester, the EU Commission prepares thematic summaries useful to compare Member State performance (European Commission 2014j; 2014k; 2014l). For education and training, the Commission prepares three summaries: two of these relate to the two headline targets of Europe 2020 (tertiary education attainment and early school leavers from education and training), the other concerns the capacity of national education systems to provide high-quality skills, which we discuss in turn.

In line with the Europe 2020 target on ‘tertiary education attainment’, the share of 30-34 year olds with tertiary educational attainment should be at least 40% by 2020. For 2013, the average rate of tertiary education attainment in the EU was 36.9%. Since 2010, this percentage has increased by 3.3 percentage points. If this trend continues, the EU target will be achieved by 2020. In 2013, sixteen Member States (BE, CY, DK, EE, FI, FR, IE, LV, LT, LU, NL, PL, SI, ES, SE UK) reached the headline target (Table 3 below).

In thirteen cases, Member States show a level of tertiary education attainment that was above the target even before the launch of Europe 2020. Only in Latvia, Poland, and Slovenia was the target achieved between 2010 and 2013. Furthermore, twenty-six countries improved their rates between 2010 and 2013. But many of the laggards did not show significant improvement and are still far from the EU target (European Commission 2014h).

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14. Between 2002 and 2013, the percentage of tertiary education attainment increased according to a linear long-term trend, from 23.6% in 2002 to 36.9 in 2013, i.e. an average of 1.2 percentage points per year. This means that the European target is rather modest. In line with that trend the target will be reached in 2016 (40.3%).
Table 3  
Tertiary education attainment in the EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tertiary education attainment (Europe 2020 target, 40%)</th>
<th>Early school leavers (Europe 2020 target, 10%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target not achieved</td>
<td>AT; BG; HR; CZ; DE; EL; HU; IT; LV; MT; PL; PT; RO; SK; SI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target achieved</td>
<td>BE; CY; DK; EE; FI; FR; IE; LT; LU; NL; ES; SE; UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AT; HR; CY; CZ; DK; EE; FI; FR; DE; IE; LV; LT; LU; NL; PL; SK; SI; SE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own table from European Commission figures (2014j; 2014k).

Regarding the number of ‘early school leavers’, the target is to have fewer than 10% of early leavers from education and training aged 18-24 by 2020. In 2013, the EU average rate was 12%, and it has been reduced by 1.9 percentage points since 2010.

If this downward trend continues, this target will also be achieved by 2020. In 2013, eighteen countries (AT; HR; CY; CZ; DK; EE; FI; FR; DE; IE; LV; LT; LU; NL; PL; SK; SI; SE) reached the headline target (Table 3 above).

Half of these Member States had fewer than 10% of early school leavers in 2010, the other half had more than 10% in the same year. Some of the countries that did not achieve the target in 2013 show a significant improvement, such as Portugal (with a decline in early school leavers of 9.4 percentage points), Greece (-3.4 percentage points), Spain (-4.6 percentage points) and Malta (-3 percentage points) (European Commission 2014k). Despite this improvement, some countries will

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15. Between 2002 and 2013, the percentage of early school leavers decreased according to a linear long-term trend, from 17% in 2002 to 12% in 2013, i.e. an average of 0.45 percentage points per year. This means that the European target is rather modest. In line with that trend the target will be reached by 2018, mainly because we note an accelerating process since 2011 (more than 0.5 percentage point per year).
have difficulties in reaching the 2020 target for two reasons: they are still far away from the target; and these countries are subject to heavy budgetary pressure so there will be little room to improve investment in the area.

The third dimension to analyse is the capacity of education systems to provide high-quality skills. The Commission assesses the Member States’ performance in the field by considering three indicators: 1) the share of pupils who are low-achieving in basic skills; 2) adult participation in lifelong learning; 3) the share of those who recently completed formal education and training who are in employment (European Commission 2014i). Data are provided by Eurostat (European Commission, 2014f) and OECD PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) on adult competencies (OECD 2014a). Moreover, evidence about the current skill levels of the working age population is provided by the OECD Survey of Adult Skills (Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies, PIAAC), which covers 17 Member States and a total of 83% of European working age population (OECD 2014b).

Starting with the first indicator, there are very high levels of ‘low achievers’ in basic skills in many Member States. In 2012, only the Netherlands, Estonia, Poland and Finland achieved the ET benchmark of reducing the share of school children with low achievements in mathematics below 15% by 2020\(^{16}\).

As for the ‘employability’ indicator, the EU target is that at least 82% of recent graduates (aged 20-34; graduated from at least upper secondary education in the last three years) should be in employment by 2020. In 2013, only 7 countries were above or in line with the target (MT, AT, DE, NL, SE, UK, DK). In Greece, Italy, Croatia, Spain, Cyprus, Romania, Bulgaria and Portugal, fewer than 70% of these workers were employed (European Commission 2014l).

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\(^{16}\) Many national education systems are far from promoting social equality. Socio-economic background remains a strong determinant of skills obtained in schools, which means that the skill gap between those with the highest and lowest socio-economic status continues to be very high, and persists among people within the same countries and across different countries (European Commission 2014l).
Concerning adult participation in lifelong learning, in 2013 six Member States (BG, RO, HR, EL, SK and HU) showed a level of participation below 4% (compared to the benchmark set at 15%). Poland, Lithuania, Italy, Latvia, Belgium, Cyprus, Ireland, Malta, Germany, Czech Republic and Portugal were also below the EU average. Only 6 countries (DK, SE, FI, FR, NL, UK) reached the EU target (ibid.: 3).

All in all, the indicators on education and training performances in the EU show mixed results. There are positive trends in the level of early school leavers and tertiary education attainment. Europe 2020 targets will probably be achieved. However, some observers have stressed that this likelihood is partly related to the low level of ambition of the targets set by the EU. In many countries, indicators showed higher performances even before the start of the strategy (Agostini and Capano 2013). Indicators on the Member States’ capacity to provide high skills give less encouraging results, with few Member States above the EU targets.

**Conclusions: the EU janus face on education and training**

The above evidence allows us to revisit the research question proposed in the introduction: has this emphasis on education and training led to consistent effort and investment in ET at both the EU and national levels?

This chapter argues that Europe’s approach to investment in education and training is ambivalent. In the sections above, we have provided an overview of three main sources of such ambivalence. The first relates to the recent political and institutional events of 2014. While the new Juncker Commission has emphasised the contribution that modernised education systems and skills formation may make to the European economy, there is a risk that the recent reorganisation of the Commission may result in more complex and differentiated policymaking. This complexity has affected education and training policies, which are now spread across different DGs, with the risk of an unclear division of tasks.

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17. The OECD PIAAC Survey confirms that many European adults have adequate or good skills, but few have very high skills (OECD 2014a; 2014b).
A second source of ambiguity concerns recent developments in relation to ET 2020 and the European Semester. The stability of ET 2020 guidelines and indicators and the reorganisation of the Commission's expert groups have helped to reinforce the process. Yet, as stressed by many stakeholders, the process has suffered from some shortcomings: in particular, the aim of contributing to equity, social cohesion and active citizenship seems underdeveloped. This limited interpretation tends to contribute to a purely economic perspective. What is more, the parallel focus of the European Semester on fiscal consolidation and investment in ET has been contradictory. This seems to be the major problem of EU action in the field.

The third source of ambivalence concerns national trends in ET. The targets set by Europe 2020 and pursued by the European Semester will probably be achieved before the end of the decade. By contrast, in the wake of the economic crisis, and in line with the fiscal consolidation promoted by the EU, many countries have seen a decline in investment in education, and gloomy prospects, therefore, for their future economic and social conditions. This is the negative outlook for countries more affected by the economic recession, and where there are therefore risks of increased divergence in education and training performances in the future.

EU action in the area has shown that ET has not been prioritised, while austerity has continued to be the driving force in the EU context in the wake of the crisis. Much has to be done to move to a more effective and balanced approach to education and training and to make the latter a key axis of the European economic and social model.

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Varieties of healthcare reform: understanding EU leverage

Furio Stamati and Rita Baeten

Introduction

In the wake of the financial crisis, EU Member States have enacted numerous cost-reducing healthcare reforms subject to varying degrees of supranational pressure. Cost-containment has been widespread: austerity measures have reduced access to care for the most vulnerable patients in many EU Member States (WHO 2014). However, a more nuanced examination reveals variation in the reform agendas of different country subgroups. At least three different approaches can be discerned. Countries such as the UK (England) and Sweden have used the recent crisis as an opportunity to tackle enduring structural problems. Reforms in countries like Greece or Ireland instead were mostly aimed at short-term savings. Immediate cost containment acquired priority over, or even prevented, the tackling of structural shortcomings. Most Continental countries stand somewhere in between, as they combined emergency and structural measures.

The explanation we suggest is that supranational advocacy is affecting domestic agendas through the filter of national policy legacies. Countries that had failed to enact efficiency-enhancing reforms before the crisis were more exposed to supranational influences, but countries with lower external constraints retained a greater ability to tailor past policy failures during the Great Recession. This chapter tackles the main events and debates that occurred in relation to this policy area, comparing reform trends in ten representative case studies. Finally, it evaluates prospects and challenges for further policy change over the short and medium term. We suggest that the current emphasis on long-

1. An earlier and more detailed version of this chapter was published as an ETUI Report (Stamati and Baeten 2015).
term economic sustainability risks depriving European health systems of what they need to do: to provide citizens with effective and timely access to high quality medical services.

The chapter is organised as follows. Section 1 describes the leverage of the EU’s economic surveillance system and its developments in 2014. Sections 2 and 3 present the reform agendas and paths followed in domestic healthcare systems across the EU. Section 4 endeavours to explain differences in national reform agendas. Section 5 offers concluding evaluations and discusses analytical steps needed to explain variation in reform agendas. Normatively, it suggests that supranational emphasis on fiscal concerns at the expense of substantive policy problems may threaten both access to and quality of care.

1. **EU economic and fiscal surveillance of health systems**

The economic crisis radically changed the way the EU engages in national health system reforms. The approach shifted from supporting voluntary cooperation between Member States to calling for curbs on spending and – sometimes major – spending cuts.

1.1 **New instruments, increasing powers for the EU**

In the wake of the crisis the EU institutions acquired unprecedented powers to supervise national healthcare policies.

The most comprehensive type of integrated EU surveillance applies to countries receiving financial assistance from the EU and the IMF. Financial assistance is linked to macroeconomic conditionality, which means that the countries involved have to commit to implementing the detailed policies included in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The Eurozone countries Greece, Ireland, Cyprus, Portugal and also other countries outside the Eurozone (Latvia, Hungary and Romania) receive(d) financial assistance from the EU and the IMF after agreeing to engage in adjustment programmes defined in a MoU. The countries are subject to post-programme surveillance until at least 75% of the financial assistance received has been repaid.
Member States not in receipt of financial assistance are also increasingly encouraged to undertake reforms to their healthcare systems. Under the European Semester for Economic Policy Coordination (2011), the EU acquired new powers to supervise national budgetary and economic policies. The Semester aims to ensure coordinated action on key policy priorities at the EU level. It integrates, synchronises and reinforces the previously existing procedures of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and Europe 2020 (the EU’s growth strategy). It furthermore incorporates a new procedure, the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP). Since 2011, health system reform has been addressed under the Semester.

Country-Specific Recommendations (CSRs), adopted by the Council of the EU upon a proposal from the Commission, have a crucial role within the Semester cycle. CSRs provide tailored advice on structural reforms, which Member States have to consider in their national plans. To ensure CSRs implementation, stricter procedures for economic and fiscal surveillance were established between 2011 and 2013 by the Six Pack and the Two Pack of EU legislation (see Stamati and Baeten 2015). As a result, the CSRs concerning fiscal policy and macroeconomic imbalances became increasingly binding on Eurozone members. By contrast, CSRs based on the Europe 2020 strategy, which includes social objectives such as access to care, are not binding.

Furthermore, for the period 2014-20, funding from the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) for several domains, including healthcare, is subject to the submission of a strategic plan for approval by the Commission. Implementation of the CSRs must be sufficiently reflected in the plan. Moreover, the Council, acting upon a proposal from the Commission, can suspend payments for the programme concerned if a Member State does not comply with past agreements and economic governance procedures (Council of the European Union, CEU 2013a).
1.2 Health system reform under EU economic and fiscal surveillance

The MoUs for Greece, Ireland, Cyprus, Portugal and Romania contain very detailed instructions for reforming the healthcare sector.

Each of the programmes focuses on a reduction in pharmaceutical spending, to be achieved through price reductions and wider generic drug usage. Other structural reforms include: the centralisation of procurement (Greece and Portugal); changes in supplier reimbursement rules (Greece and Portugal); e-health solutions and implementation of patient electronic medical records (all); the restructuring of hospitals and hospital payment systems (all); insurance fund mergers (Greece); streamlining of coverage (Greece and Portugal); and stronger budget control mechanisms (all). The establishment of a system for health-technology assessment is proposed in Cyprus and Romania. Most countries had to reduce the number of hospitals, hospital beds and publicly funded healthcare professionals (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Romania).

The MoUs also include pure short-term cost reductions, such as higher user charges (all countries) or reductions in free access to care (Cyprus), reductions in hospital care (Ireland), and reductions in the scope of benefit packages (Greece, Cyprus, Romania). Greece and Ireland were asked to revise the payment system for physicians, cut wages, reduce staff, and extend working hours. Most likely to exacerbate financial barriers to health services are requests to cap public healthcare spending over GDP at levels below EU standards (Greece) during an economic recession. Measures to expand healthcare access were occasionally included, such as taking steps towards universal coverage (Cyprus) or a Health Voucher Programme for access to primary care for uninsured citizens (Greece).

The prescribed reforms are geared almost exclusively towards fiscal consolidation. Some of them may increase the long-term cost-effectiveness of the healthcare sector, but others risk jeopardising it. Shifting resources from inpatient to outpatient care can enhance efficiency if appropriate alternatives are made available. However, the MoUs either do not require the strengthening of primary care or fail to

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provide the necessary resources (Petmesidou et al. 2014). Most short-term savings result from shifting costs to the private purse.

For the period a country receives funding under a financial assistance mechanism, it does not participate in the European Semester process, unlike other Member States.

The number of Member States receiving CSRs to reform their health and/or long-term care (LTC) systems has steadily increased from three in 2011 to twenty in 2014. Only Lithuania, Hungary, Sweden, Denmark and the UK have so far escaped EU guidance on health and LTC reforms. Strikingly, three out of these five have deliberately stayed outside the Eurozone. This suggests that the Commission pushes the countries it can most easily influence. In terms of substance, most health-related CSRs remain generic and mainly interested in fiscal consolidation and cost-effectiveness. Whenever they are more specific, they urge reductions in pharmaceutical spending and institutional care costs through stronger outpatient and primary care and better coordinated care delivery. In 2013 and 2014, only three countries received CSRs mentioning care access and/or quality. Two of them are Romania and Spain, currently subject to strong austerity programmes in the healthcare sector. Notably, the recommendation for Romania to improve access to care is not reflected in its MoU, making its enforceability much weaker than its MoU commitments.

The 2014 round of CSRs presents some striking new features. For the first time there is a very detailed healthcare CSR (Ireland), which must be meticulously carried out, since the country in question is under reinforced post-programme surveillance. Explicit references to deadlines (France and Slovenia), spending reductions (France and Slovenia) or ‘significant’ improvements (France and the Czech Republic) increased pressure on some countries. The increased pressure on France and Slovenia is the result of the strengthened Excessive Deficit Procedure for Eurozone countries to which they are subject (SPC 2015). Finally, whereas the 2013 CSRs asked for the promotion of prevention, home care provision, rehabilitation and independent living, this did not happen in 2014. In particular in long-term care, the focus was directly on cost-effectiveness and sustainability.
Whereas no clear criteria were used to select the countries for the 2011 and 2012 CSRs a more systematic approach appears to have been implemented since 2013. This approach went public at the end of 2014, in a DG ECFIN document (European Commission 2014b). The process entails two stages. First, DG ECFIN identifies countries where there is a serious challenge to long-term fiscal sustainability, to which healthcare expenditure contributes to an important degree. This analysis is based on the projections provided in the Ageing Report (European Commission and EPC 2012) and the Fiscal Sustainability Report (European Commission 2012). In this way, twelve countries were flagged for a healthcare CSR in 2014, and out of these twelve, eleven effectively received such a CSR.

In the second stage of the selection process, the nature of the challenge is identified, which then feeds into the content of the CSRs. To this end, composite indicators covering the main dimensions of public expenditure on health have been created, i.e. on hospital care, ambulatory care, pharmaceuticals and administrative spending. An additional health status indicator is added which is supposed to capture the potential need for healthcare. If a country selected in the first stage performs below the median on one of these composite indicators, a particular challenge in the policy area is identified. As well as this quantitative comparative analysis, there is a country-specific analysis, which can lead to more specific or additional recommendations. The challenges are reflected in the CSRs and in the accompanying Staff Working Documents (SWD, since 2015 Country Reports), which have become increasingly detailed and are crucial to understanding the scope of the CSRs.

Pressure to implement the CSRs also increased as a result of the conditionality linked to ESIF funding. Commission services urge the less economically developed Member States to use ESIF funding to

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2. Private conversation with Commission officials.
fulfil the recommendations they received.\textsuperscript{4} Funding in the health sector is for many countries directed towards de-institutionalisation of care.\textsuperscript{5}

1.3 The actors involved

Since the CSRs are to a large extent based on the Treaty articles governing the Stability and Growth Pact, the European Semester process is driven by the finance departments. The process of drafting the CSRs is coordinated by the European Commission’s Secretariat General (SEC GEN), whilst the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) holds the pen. Other DGs provide input. For healthcare-related CSRs, input comes in particular from the DGs for Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion (EMPL), the Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety (SANTE) and the DG for Regional Policy (REGIO).

Before the CSRs are finally adopted by the finance ministers in the Council, Member States can propose amendments to the Commission proposals. Amendments to health and LTC CSRs are presented and discussed in the Social Protection Committee (SPC). Since 2014, the members of the Working Party on Public Health at Senior Level (WPPHSL) – a body which reports directly to the Health Council – are invited to the SPC when healthcare-related CSRs are discussed. The threshold for amending a CSR is very high and not a single substantial amendment has so far been adopted by the ECOFIN Council for health or LTC CSRs.\textsuperscript{6} This contrasts with other policy domains, such as pensions, where proposed CSRs are regularly and substantively amended (Zeitlin and Vanhercke 2014).

Strikingly, health ministers remain largely absent from the European Semester debates and remain extremely reluctant to discuss national

\textsuperscript{4} Interviews with Commission officials and Member State officials carried out in September/October 2014.
\textsuperscript{5} Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/contracts_grants/agreements/index_en.htm (consulted on 19/02/2015).
\textsuperscript{6} The time frame for proposing and agreeing on amendments is extremely tight: only two days in 2014. Amendments also face the reluctance of the Commission and reverse qualified majority voting in the Council.
reforms at the EU level. In June 2014, the Health Council invited Member States and the Commission to reinforce and improve cooperation between the Social Protection Committee and the WPPHSL so that Ministries of Health can actively contribute within the framework of the European Semester (CEU 2014a). Nonetheless, the addition of a specific headline target related to health in the EU 2020 strategy was not supported in the December 2014 Health Council meeting. Arguing in favour of an exclusive national competence, the Health Council proposed instead to exchange information and best practices (CEU 2014c).

To counterbalance the dominant position of the finance actors, health and social actors have striven to provide an objective and quantified approach to national challenges in access to and quality of care. Two developments are worth mentioning in this respect.

First, at the request of the Council, the Commission set up an expert group on health systems performance assessment (HSPA) in 2014, in which Member States participate on a voluntary basis. While Member States insist on the national level importance of this network, its voluntary nature and the exclusion of cross-country comparisons (CEU 2014b), Commission President Juncker stressed the importance of HSPA ‘to inform policies at national and European level and to inform the work of the European Semester’ (Juncker 2014).

Second, the SPC is developing a tool to apply the methodology of the Joint Assessment Framework (JAF) to healthcare systems. This framework provides country profiles that give a detailed picture of the key challenges as well as particular good outcomes in each Member State, with a particular focus on health outcomes and access to and equity of healthcare.

Health authorities appear, however, to embrace such tools only reluctantly when they are meant to be used as part of the EU level surveillance mechanism of the Semester.
2. Domestic healthcare reform agenda(s)

According to the European Commission (2014a), European healthcare systems share a deep core of ‘European Social Model’ goals and values, and experienced similar transnational challenges due to the Great Recession. Accordingly, their reform agendas should be broadly similar or at least indicative of some degree of convergence. The question, then, is: do we really see EU Member States flocking together? And what does this tell us about the factors determining their reform agendas?

European health systems indisputably face common structural challenges. Over the last few decades, they have struggled to keep up with ever-changing needs and demands, while their basic principles have been put to the test by technological and socio-political transformations. The Great Recession and the ensuing politics of austerity have further restricted the room available to accommodate their multiple conflicting goals. National trends somehow shared a neo-liberal emphasis on decentralised decision-making, private provision, and patient choice. But the more complex systems that have resulted from this focus show little sign of convergence.

2.1 Scholarly debates and international advocacy

Health policies are complex and multifaceted, with different subfields addressed by various research streams. Recent studies cannot predict where healthcare is heading, but they offer telling snapshots of the international debate. The scholarship relevant to our topic comes in two main strands: classificatory studies of health system models and public health analyses interested in health regulation and management. Over the last five years, contributions have poured into both strands, occasionally proposing a more comprehensive approach (Pavolini and Guillén 2013).

Classificatory studies (see the discussion in Stamati and Baeten 2015) have long testified to the existence of profoundly different regimes and have ruled out even the latent existence of a ‘single’ healthcare model in Europe. There was a boom in ‘health regime’ literature in the early 2010s. Drawing on pioneering taxonomic studies such as Field (1973), Rothgang, Wendt and their co-authors advanced the so-called ‘RW-
typology’ of health systems and health system change (Rothgang et al. 2010). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) attempted to combine this with the ‘regime’ approach, producing a much more complex taxonomy, with ambiguous and counter-intuitive results (Paris et al. 2010).

Sustained typological efforts only moderately influenced the international policy debate. Recent publications from the OECD (2010a) and the EU Commission (European Commission 2014a) explicitly acknowledge the significance of health system variation, but merely as a nuance in the formulation and implementation of generally applicable best practices. Since its 2000 World Health Report, the World Health Organisation (WHO) is much more inclined to take national diversity seriously. Yet this has not prompted regime-specific policy prescriptions.

Public health studies have had a greater impact. Here we focus on policy advocacy documents from international organisations. Over the last decade, OECD research has identified issues with health system performance, looking for best practices able to avert the incoming structural challenges. The original focus was on overuse of care (hospital utilisation), payment and recruiting systems, patient satisfaction, and the role of private insurance. EU documents addressed two topics. The first was how to strengthen primary and outpatient care and increase productivity and co-ordination (European Commission 2007). The second was a re-thinking of social and health services in the EU legal framework for services of general interest, recognising their specific goals and regulatory needs (European Commission 2003; Huber et al. 2006).

The global crisis stimulated sharper policy prescriptions, with a strong economic undertone (according to Walshe et al. 2013, only 4% of the Commission’s funds for health research were spent on policy studies in 2011). The OECD and the EU jointly recognised the ‘need for better value for money in health systems’ (OECD 2009). The OECD (2009; 2010a; 2010b) suggested a focus on health market supply and demand dynamics, with an eye on long-term sustainability and the need for upfront investments. Care coordination, pharmaceutical pricing, and ICT could increase supply efficiency, while user charges could restrain the demand for care. ‘Evidence-based medicine’ and ‘health technology assessment’ would ensure constant policy updating. Overall estimates of efficiency gains were close to 2% of the OECD area’s 2017 GDP.
The EU Joint Report on Health Systems (EPC and European Commission 2010) aimed to explain country differences by looking at national spending drivers. In order to enforce cost-effectiveness, the report recommended ensuring adequate funds, staff skills, and incentives, promoting primary over specialist care and a cost-effective use of medicines, improving governance and information flows, and strengthening health-technology assessment and prevention.

The WHO developed a genuine scepticism for prescriptions based on large international comparisons. It instead preferred to perform more detailed analyses of national political contexts, and to accompany these with more generic policy recommendations (WHO 2013a). Its reports have discussed the methodological and technical limitations of data collection and health indicator design (WHO 2012). Analysing the recent impact of crisis and austerity on health systems, the WHO (2013b; 2014) was much more critical of austerity than the OECD or the EU. Analytically, it is more attentive to the impact of the crisis in different countries and the responses taken to address it. It laments disinvestments in the health sector and limited progress in true efficiency-enhancing reforms. Normatively, the WHO has presented its Health 2020 strategy, which is much more sensitive to the solidarity side of healthcare.

The 2014 WHO report highlighted country variations in health reform trends, traceable to differences in both contexts and policy choices (even in austerity). In this respect, the report lamented the potential long-term costs of arbitrary cuts and rushed implementation. Hidden costs do not only threaten access and quality levels, but may even jeopardise the policy consistency of some national systems. The study emphasised the concept of health system resilience in the face of various shocks, which comprises both economic and adequacy considerations. Recommendations supported the shift to a universalistic system of entitlement on the basis of residence.

Some of the WHO’s perplexities filtered into the most recent publications by the OECD and the Commission. The OECD (2014) now explicitly relates geographical differences to health performance, focusing on ‘unwarranted variation’, which cannot be explained by demographic factors and patient preferences. The Commission documents Investing in health (European Commission 2013) and Communication on effective,
accessible and resilient health systems (European Commission 2014a) openly spoke of ‘system resilience’. Explicitly referenced was the need to ensure equality of access, corporate responsibility in the pharmaceutical field, and adequate financial resources for capital and technological investments. Caveats on direct comparisons of different systems and data reliability were also spelled out (SPC 2015). These analyses exemplify a savvier approach to health system assessment and policy advice.

2.2 Three reform agendas in the European Union?

The analysis presented in this chapter focuses on ten representative Member States within and outside the Eurozone: five National Health Services (NHS: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Sweden and UK-England) and five Social Health Insurance systems (SHI: France, Germany, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Romania). Looking at the most recent statistics and narrative accounts (Analytical Support on the Socio-Economic Impact of Social Protection Reforms - ASISP reports, waves: 2009-20137 and the most recent Health Systems in Transition (HiT) reports8), historical reconstructions cover the period until late 2012, when the recommendations of the OECD and the EU were mostly directed towards cost containment, market efficiency, and cross-nationally applicable best practices. Our approach combines insights from the health regime and RW-typology literatures. In regard to the former, we acknowledge the importance of institutions and policy legacies; as for the latter, we assess policy changes against three healthcare dimensions (regulation, financing and provision) and three modes of governance (state control, societal self-administration, and market mechanisms).

Building on the analysis put forward in Stamati and Baeten (2015) we acknowledge the emergence across these countries of three broad agendas for healthcare reform during the Great Recession. The first agenda, ‘cost-containment and service privatisation’, was identified in the three countries subject to EU-IMF financial assistance: Greece,
Ireland, and Romania. These countries achieved large health budget savings, shifting a substantial share of healthcare costs onto patients.

The second agenda, ‘changing the healthcare mix’, was identified in the four Continental Eurozone countries in our sample: France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. Overall, these systems tried to continue with their pre-crisis reform agenda, consistent with nation-based problem solving and with international prescriptions.

The third agenda, ‘systemic reorganisation’, occurred in Lithuania, Sweden, and the UK: three countries that do not belong to the Eurozone and were not involved in financial assistance programmes. These countries focused on their own long-standing structural challenges, with little common ground in terms of timing and content.

2.3 Research questions and hypotheses

Initially, we expected that the overall degree of change would be limited and that different health system regimes (NHS, SHI and their variants) would produce broadly similar reform agendas. With the partial exception of Greece, change in these countries was far from revolutionary. Reform agendas, however, did not match regime differences. We therefore ask the following research questions:

— Why did this variation in reform agendas occur in the first place? And why does it not follow traditional health regime divisions?
— Which factors, at the national and the supranational level, help explain these divergent reform agendas?

We formulate four working hypotheses, which are not mutually exclusive. The first two address our first question:

H1: Cross-national variation in reform agendas was made possible by the external shock of the crisis, which weakened the constraining power of policy legacies (‘Aftershock’ hypothesis);
H2: Cross-national variation in reform agendas was a result of supranational pressures for cost-containment, in particular those coming from the EU (‘EU Leverage’ hypothesis);

The last two hypotheses address the second question:

H3: The timing and content of national reform agendas was determined by domestic political factors, such as majority changes in government (‘Domestic politics’ hypothesis);

H4: The timing and content of national reform agendas was determined by the enactment of efficiency enhancing reforms in the years before the crisis (‘Domestic vulnerability’ hypothesis);

In the following section we offer supporting evidence for the emergence of the three agendas.

3. Comparing healthcare reform trajectories

This section examines recent reform trends in our ten cases, grouped according to their health system family (NHS or SHI).

3.1 Reform patterns in National Health Services

All five countries with an NHS system – Greece, Ireland, Italy, Sweden and the UK-England – faced problems before the crisis and some were far from being success stories. We discuss them in turn.

3.1.1 Policy legacies and the impact of the crisis

Fragmentation of coverage and provision raised doubts on the very existence of a NHS in Ireland and Greece. Regional inequalities were traditionally strong in the other three countries, including the locally managed Swedish system. High (sometimes informal) user charges, inefficiencies and malpractices had delegitimised the Greek, Irish, Italian, and English systems. Health spending skyrocketed in Ireland
and increased everywhere but in Sweden, where cost containment had been successfully pursued in the 1990s.

Before the crisis, all countries had tried to reform their public/private healthcare mix and some of their regulatory mechanisms, including the allocation of competences between levels of governments. Faulty implementation (Greece, Italy), inconsistent choices or reform reversal (Ireland, Italy, and Sweden), and reform fatigue during the 2000s (Italy) prevented successful outcomes in most cases. Italian and Greek policymakers aimed to rationalise gatekeeping; English and Swedish ones to increase patient choice.

The fiscal impact of the crisis was highly diverse. Greece and Ireland had to apply for international financial assistance and commit to detailed reform programmes. Greece was asked to rationalise hospital services and governance (procurement and accounting rules), to adopt new norms for health professionals and pharmacists, and to promote the use of e-health tools and generic medicines. User charges were set to increase. Public health spending was capped. The entire plan was worth €2.7 billion savings. Initially, Ireland was asked to lift restrictions on GPs and pharmacists. Healthcare reforms were explicitly requested beginning in 2013. Italy and the UK were considerably affected as well. Italy entered a recession bordering on a sovereign debt crisis. Real spending trends in the healthcare sector turned negative on average between 2009 and 2012. The UK suffered a wide and costly banking crisis. No substantial response affecting the NHS was taken until the Conservatives won the 2010 elections, reviving long announced reform plans. Sweden was barely affected by the crisis. Its NHS did not experience major reform pressures, other than a revamped debate on regional health inequalities.

3.1.2 Reforms of health regulation

Recent regulatory reforms in NHS countries consisted of institutional reforms transferring powers to a different sphere or level of government, the adoption of stronger budgetary controls, the introduction of market or market-resembling mechanisms, and investments in access to and quality of care or e-health tools.
The agenda of institutional reforms varied, leading to nationally specific mixtures of decentralisation and re-centralisation. Greece and Ireland introduced new integrated care units with stronger gatekeeping functions at the local level. The Irish government pursued care coordination at the local level but re-centralised administrative and support services. Italy pursued a mix of centralisation and decentralisation, as the regions accepted more stringent budget rules in exchange for greater monitoring powers. ‘Recovery plans’ for insolvent regions introduced automatic increases in tax and charges, expanding central agenda-setting and sanctioning authority. ‘Health homes’ hosting several general practitioners were envisioned, but never financed. Sweden moved from a county-based to a regionalised system of health administration (with mixed results) and hospital management (with greater success). The English NHS was overhauled in 2012. Consortiuoms of general practitioners, subject to strong monitoring from the centre, replaced local health bodies and authorities.

(Potential) system-changing reforms were legislated only in Greece, Ireland and, to a lesser extent, Italy. Widespread mergers and consolidation of insurance funds, health and social welfare authorities, and even municipalities took place in Greece. Medical associations were authorised to issue licences, while EU-co-financed mental care NGOs expanded their service provision. Ireland announced a gradual shift towards universalism, financed through a mix of taxes, contributions and by applying a strict purchaser-provider split. Hospitals would be transformed into no-profit trusts, licensed by a new safety authority. Premium increases in private insurance plans would be subject to a ‘scheme of risk equalisation’. Italy expanded the role of complementary health insurance funds, covering dental care, rehabilitation, and long term-care (LTC). Membership of the funds increased in the 2010s, thanks to sustained government efforts.

Various market-based or market-like mechanisms were adopted in all countries. Greece, Ireland and Sweden lifted restrictions on pharmacies. Ireland also liberalised rules on general practitioners and medical advertising and created ‘hubs’ connecting hospitals and pharmaceutical firms. Italy re-regulated private practice in public facilities. England enacted the transformation of all hospitals into foundations, with lighter rules on private funding but increased transparency requirements. The choice of family doctors was partially liberalised. The ‘Any
Qualified Provider’ approach was gradually adopted for medical procurement and contracts. Greece started introducing pay for performance criteria in the remuneration of medical professionals. Similar initiatives were also discussed in the UK.

**Stronger cost and drug price controls played a large part** in the Greek reform agenda. Greece centralised hospital procurement, mandated periodic reporting on drug spending and procurement, and repriced fees and reimbursements. Positive drug lists, generic prescribing targets, accounting based on diagnosis-related-groups, as well as clawback mechanisms and ‘international reference pricing’ for pharmaceuticals were all adopted. Ireland also promoted generic drug substitution and ‘reference pricing’ mechanisms. Italy introduced new monitoring tools for LTC as well as new guidelines on drug purchasing and prescribing, meant to increase competition. It also embarked on a reorganization of hospital care and pharmaceutical spending. New national standard costs were imposed through a ‘benchmark mechanism’, supported by a ‘redistribution fund’. Finally, some Swedish counties called into question and occasionally re-regulated their systems of purchaser-provider split.

**New investments in healthcare mainly addressed e-health developments.** Greece and Ireland expanded their e-health facilities as a means for cost control. International e-auctions, e-prescribing (intended to eradicate non-compliance with new prescription rules) and e-referrals became mandatory in Greece. As requested by its creditors, Ireland developed a new e-health strategy in 2013. Health identifiers for patients and professionals would prompt an e-prescription system based on a ‘Money Follows the Patient’ funding model.

**Improving access to and quality of care** was also featured in the Irish and, prominently, UK (English) agenda. Ireland redirected some of its health savings to the establishment of home-based nursing services. In 2012, waiting times were set to be reduced except for specialist visits, where the longest queues existed. In England, NHS prescription charges were frozen for 2010-2011. After a number of misconduct scandals, the British government pledged to reduce inequalities and improve LTC standards across the four nations. LTC reforms ensued between 2012 and 2014. Regulatory and surveillance authorities were
strengthened, but not without major implementation problems. Prevention initiatives were also revamped all over the UK.

3.1.3 Reforms of financing and provision
Financing reforms mainly dealt with general spending and hospital budget cuts, increases in taxes and user charges. Changes in service provision resulted from measures taken in financing and regulation.

Spending cuts were particularly severe in Greece, Ireland and Italy. Public health spending in Greece (about 10% of GDP in 2009) has fallen by about €5 billion. The government mandated a 20% haircut of the social funds’ debt with medical providers. On drugs, the haircut was 8% plus the clawback tax. The cost per patient in public hospitals fell from €3,500 in 2009 to €2,500 in 2011. Drug spending was reduced by about €2 billion in 2011-2012. The Irish health budget was cut by about 20% (€3 billion) between 2010 and 2012, thanks to major reductions in health sector wages and employment. The Irish budget for 2012 included a planned reduction of hospital beds and wards and a 4-5% cut in inpatient services. Italy cut NHS state subsidies by about €8 billion in 2012-14 and planned a further 0.4% GDP cut by 2017. Almost 10,000 hospital beds have been lost since 2009. Small hospitals and facilities were closed or clustered. Funding for disability assistance was discontinued between 2009 and 2013. Reductions in medical wages and hiring were scheduled in 2011-2018. Figure 1 provides a visual illustration of the main public spending trends up to 2011.

Tax financing of healthcare grew in Ireland and Sweden. Ireland levied a special health levy (2% on earnings up to €100,000 a year, 2.5% above that sum, with exemptions for the lowest incomes) in 2008. In 2012 it was increased to 4% (€75,000/year) and 5% above that sum. As a response to rising health costs, Swedish county councils and municipalities raised taxes in 2012-13. Stronger-than-expected recovery provided local health budgets with extra tax money.
Greece, Ireland, and Italy increased user charges. Greece increased user charges and reduced exceptions for drugs and clinical care. Hospitals issued a €5 ‘entrance ticket’ for outpatient care as well as an afternoon shift with extra and partly non-reimbursable fees. A €25 fee on admission and an extra €1 fee (on top of a 25% co-payment) on prescriptions were imposed in 2014. Reimbursements for general practitioners were limited to 150-200 visits per month, which implied extra fees for patients in excess of this. Extra co-payments and a ceiling on consumables were introduced in 2012. The Irish budget for 2010 imposed a 50% charge on drug use (up to a family maximum of €10/month), increased from €100 to €120 the monthly threshold for drug reimbursements and raised by 21% the price of private beds in public hospitals. Out of pocket payments increased from €120 to €132 for 60% of the population in 2012. The Italian State and regions agreed to increase user charges by more than €2.5 billion overall. Further increases were announced but not legislated.
The scope for private service provision increased in Greece, Ireland, and Sweden. Hospital reorganisations reduced the number of publicly provided beds in Greece by more than 10%. About 25% of intensive care beds suffered from staff shortages. Greece’s reformed partnership regime expanded for-profit financing for the hospital infrastructure. In Ireland, contracting of out-of-home care expanded during the 2000s due to greater state financing and declining informal care. However, career benefits and allowances were cut from 12.6 million hours in 2008 to 9.8 in 2012. In Sweden, recent liberalisations increased the volume of private provision. About €4 million were spent in 2012-2014 on initiatives to increase patient choice, with mixed effects on access to care.

Policymakers in all countries strived to preserve current access levels, but succeeded in varying degrees. The reform of the Greek health insurance funds left unemployed workers and some professionals with no or reduced coverage. In response, €46 million worth of vouchers were introduced in 2013-2014 to restore baseline access to primary care for some of these groups. Litigations between providers and insurance funds over arrears repayments occasionally disrupted hospital services. Waiting lists began to increase again in 2012, due to decreased hospital capacity. In April 2009, Greece agreed to a progressive de-institutionalisation of mentally ill patients. Confronting similar problems, Ireland granted the long-term ill free access to general practitioners. In 2009, Italy earmarked €1.4 billion, partly coming from EU funds, for a new round of regional projects on primary and long-term care. In Sweden, about €110 million have been paid since 2009 to reward county councils meeting national waiting time standards. In the UK, waiting times – reduced by the large investments of the 2000s – have started to increase again since 2010. Delayed referrals for routine surgery were reported in England.

3.2 Reform patterns in Social Health Insurance systems

Five countries in our sample have a Social Health Insurance system: France, Germany, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Romania.
3.2.1 Policy legacies and the impact of the crisis

France, Germany and the Netherlands all combine public insurance with voluntary supplementary schemes. Comparatively generous, their health and long-term care are effective and demand low user charges, but face risks of insufficient care coordination and polarization between social and private actors. The Netherlands, and more recently France, also saw health spending soar during the 2000s. Lithuania and Romania had a difficult transition out of the soviet Semashko system. Lithuania adopted new framework legislation in the mid-1990s but failed to fully develop a modern health system. Romania never managed to properly complete the transition, confronting endless financial, public health and corruption problems. High tax-financed subsidies remained unavoidable.

From the 1980s and until the crisis, France continued with the decentralisation and managerialisation of its health system. A major reform in 2004 adopted the so-called Tarification à l’Activité (a sort of Diagnosis-Related-Group mechanism), increased patient choice of primary care, incentivised hospital performance and allowed higher charges for unreferred patients. In 2006 and 2007 the Netherlands and Germany adopted two similar reforms, seeking convergence between social and private health insurance. Both reforms increased coverage and reduced costs, but required further consolidation in the years of the crisis. Lithuania harmonized standards and recentralised regulatory competences in the 2000s, but remained dependent on hospitalisation and on a mix of subsidies and high user charges. Romanian reforms envisaged sounder financing and more coordination between government levels, but remained inconclusive. The system increasingly privatised financing, provision, and risks.

Germany and, to a lesser extent, France fared comparatively well through the crisis, while Dutch growth and employment trends were badly influenced. Their health budgets were not affected, keeping the reform debate focused on pre-crisis priorities. After years of sustained growth, the crisis drew Lithuania into a heavy recession. Existing health budget reserves were able to absorb the financial shortage. The health agenda remained in line with pre-crisis priorities: empowering equality in access and patient choice while combating corruption. Romania entered a deep recession in 2009-2010 and had to apply for a Balance-of-Payments Assistance Programme. Shrinking contributions turned a
surplus in 2006 into spiralling deficits. Huge arrears (€1.3 billion in March 2013) led to frequent service disruptions.

3.2.2 Reforms of health regulation

As in NHS countries, in SHI systems regulatory reforms addressed institutional settings, cost controls, marketisation and investments.

National trajectories of institutional reform varied within our selection of SHI countries. France reorganised health planning, empowering the regional level. Germany and the Netherlands adopted a mix of centralisation and decentralisation. From 2009, the German federal level acquired the authority to set health contribution rates (15.5% in 2013). A reform in 2012 then reinforced or further decentralised state competences. In the Netherlands, LTC tariffs have been centrally determined since 2010. Lithuania opted for recentralisation. County councils were abolished and authority over regional hospitals shifted to other government levels. Three strategic objectives were set in 2010: reorganising the health funds and the hospital network, reforming the pharmaceutical market, and maintaining pre-crisis access levels. Conversely, Romania decentralised hospital administration, licensing excluded. Local authorities would appoint managers and finance administration in a rather unregulated environment. The reclassification of hospitals, however, was hard to implement and produced fewer savings than expected. A new bill was enacted in 2013, aiming at a reallocation of administrative competences towards regional – but centrally supervised – companies and structures.

All countries, especially Romania, adopted new cost control measures. In France, the scope of Tarification à l’Activité in public hospitals was extended to more medical expenses. Stricter yearly growth norms were scheduled for the Dutch health budget over the period 2012-2017. Lithuania implemented Diagnosis-Related-Group funding beginning in 2012. In Romania, basic benefit packages of medical services and products were redesigned, consistent with the MoU’s calls for more transparent rules on reimbursement. The Memorandum also subjected hospital budgeting to the surveillance of the Ministry of Finance. Since 2012, high income earners were asked to pay extra contributions for their dependants. Medical services were offered in different packages:
minimum, basic, and with private supplements. Romania also introduced a centralised procurement system for pharmaceuticals and medical devices for hospitals. A 2010 ordinance tackled medical certification fraud; tighter rules and penalties resulted in €34 million savings and €400,000 worth of fines.

**Germany, Lithuania and Romania re-regulated their pharmaceutical markets.** The German market was reformed in 2010, increasing mandatory discounts on certain drugs and introducing a stricter formula for price updates. In 2009, Lithuania resolutely acted to stop medical price inflation, ruling a price freeze and higher VAT taxes on drugs. The pharmaceutical sector was entirely re-regulated in 2010, expanding generic use and cutting their prices. Romania introduced a clawback tax on pharmaceuticals in 2009, but design flaws inflated the tax rate so much, so that a new formula was needed as early as 2013.

**Liberalisations were documented in all countries except France.** German social funds were allowed to merge and enter into ‘selective contracts’ with health providers in a trend towards increasing liberalisation. The Netherlands expanded the scope of free pricing in the hospital sector, reduced risk pooling among health funds, announced a partial lifting of the traditional ban on for-profit hospital care, and reduced the limits put on referrals to medical specialists. Lithuanian health centres were given more autonomy in planning and utilization, albeit still in a heavily state-regulated environment. In Romania, the 2012 reform also envisioned the transformation of hospitals into autonomous non-budgetary institutions and free patient choice between public and private insurers.

**France and Germany reformed doctors’ remuneration rules.** Germany adopted a daily lump sum regime, mandatory since 2015, to remunerate psychiatric treatment. In 2009, France introduced more flexibility in medical remuneration and incentives to provide services in disadvantaged areas. The Workers’ Sickness Fund also established a successful ‘pay for performance’ scheme: general practitioners can receive up to €7 extra per patient if they comply with national targets and demands. A reform in 2012 restated some of the rights and prerogatives of professionals in health centres. In October 2012, the social partners agreed to a new voluntary contract that contains incentives to limit the amount of over-billing for specialist visits.
Also in SHI countries, new investments addressed access to care and e-health tools. The assisted use of social media for LTC therapies has been enacted in Germany (2013) and the Netherlands (2012). Lithuania’s efforts to improve national public health records continued with success after the crisis. Disease-specific programmes and e-health records were activated to improve the general effectiveness and coordination of health and LTC services. Romania implemented IT-based patient recording in 2010. Millions of erroneous registrations with family doctors were erased, resulting in €39 million savings. Romania also adopted higher standards in disability care facilities. Staff shortages prevented similar improvements in mental health centres.

3.2.3 Reforms of financing and provision
Reforms combined cuts and refinancing with higher user charges. There was an expansion in private provision of specialist care in Romania.

Some countries, especially Germany, had fiscal leeway to refinance short-term deficits with extra subsidies. The German social funds remained solvent with about €28 billion worth of reserves. Healthcare contribution rates decreased to 7.0% (employers) and 7.9% (employees) in 2009, before rising to 7.3% (in 2010) and 8.2% (in 2011). LTC contributions increased to 1.95% in 2008 and 2.05% in 2013. The federal subsidy to the health budget was increased by €7.2 billion for 2009 and €15.7 billion for 2010. In 2009, an interest free loan equal to 50% of the costs of the recession was made available to strengthen the new national health fund, which eventually experienced a €4.4 billion surplus at repayment time (2011). The surplus was used to correct some design flaws in the 2007 reform of health funds, to reduce doctor shortages in rural areas, and to bring the federal health subsidy below 20%. In 2011, France allocated an extra €1.9 billion to its health budget. Lithuania adopted a major reform of healthcare financing in 2009. 75% of the insurance system was to be financed through mandatory social contributions, with wider coverage, stricter controls and fines, and higher state-financed premiums. The Romanian health budget was spared from the cuts and, in 2009, even received advanced funding from the 2010 budget. Nonetheless it fell by 12% between 2008 and 2011. In 2011, Romanian pensioners were required to pay health contributions (5.5%) up to a minimum income floor, in order to increase revenues.
Spending cuts featured prominently in the Netherlands and Lithuania. In the Netherlands, healthcare spending was expected to grow by €6 billion by 2016 as stagnation persisted. €5.4 billion cuts were scheduled for 2013-17: €1.4 in healthcare and €4 in LTC, which meant reducing residential and inpatient care and slashing health insurance benefit packages. In 2009, Lithuania froze the health budget at its 2008 nominal level, revoking a 6.7% planned increase and 6.2% of the ‘point cost’ of most treatments. A wide range of minor measures achieved an extra 8.7% savings in 2010. In Germany, social insurance administrative costs were temporarily frozen at their 2010 level. Liquidity constraints caused major disruptions in the activity of Romanian hospitals and pharmacies. In April 2013, the entire cost of stomatology care services was shifted onto patients. Public reimbursements to private providers were capped at 5% of total county allocations in 2013 and 2014.

Germany and Lithuania invested in hospital equipment and staff. Romania invested in a more decentralised hospital structure before austerity kicked in. German hospitals were entitled to €1.3 billion of investments over the period 2009-11. In 2009, representatives of hospitals and insurers signed an agreement on wage increases. As a result, hospitals received an extra €1.1 billion funding and a further €1.1 billion in 2013-14. Lithuania spared most outpatient and short-term inpatient services from the cuts. Spending increased on municipal nursing and long-term care. Geriatric services were expanded and more effectively coordinated from 2010. Revised working schedules kept waiting times for consultations under control, while access levels to most outpatient services increased. Inpatient services were reorganised and liberalised. Savings were used, together with EU funds, to strengthen local outpatient units in both primary and secondary care (+30% since 2005). EU funds were prominently and increasingly used to decentralise residential services, which led to the elimination of 9,200 beds, reducing hospitalization costs.

User charges were increased in France, Romania and the Netherlands. France raised hospital and consultation fees and lowered reimbursements on medicines for less severe illnesses and medical devices. In the Netherlands, user charges increased from 4% to 8% for wealthier than average patients. Germany managed to reduce co-payments on outpatient services. In 2009, Romania, as prescribed by the MoU, introduced a new ‘health ticket’ that increased user charges on the basis
of income and service type. Further co-payments on medical services took effect in 2012. Instead of being means-tested as agreed in the MoU, the new charges were progressive and did not apply to emergency care and family doctors. This resulted in lower savings than expected. Additional charges made up for revisions in the clawback tax, with an estimated gain of more than €80 million.

_Private provision substantially increased in Romania._ Romania agreed to leave a share of service provision to the private sector. Private clinics, which apply EU15 clinical and wage standards, rapidly expanded in the dental and maternity sector, stimulated by access granted by private insurance plans. Preference for private clinics is growing rapidly, especially among young, highly educated and well-off citizens, and in major cities.

4. **Explaining differences in national reform agendas**

4.1 Reforms in a nutshell: path breaking or regime breaking?

The examination of country trajectories revealed great within-regime variation in the reform agenda. The clearest difference that maps on regime boundaries is the larger room for external refinancing available in SHI systems, which are contribution-based. Potentially path-breaking reforms in the post-crisis period were limited to the Memorandum countries, which also saw a greater expansion of private provision. (De)centralisation trends revealed a will to experiment and ‘refresh’ policy networks rather than convergence towards a new model of governance. Other interventions are broadly consistent with the recommendations of the international debate reviewed in Section 2.1. Measures for liberalisation and marketisation were highly context-dependent. Pharmaceutical market reforms were enacted everywhere, but with comparable variation in technical details. E-health tools were mostly adopted as a means to strengthen monitoring and enforcement.

It can be concluded that while reforms have not been path-breaking, they have resulted from a complex adaptive process. And if they have not been regime-breaking, they have shown how similar legacies can be pushed in different directions. The crisis has indeed weakened their constraining power. The role of austerity, however, is difficult to
disentangle. In some countries, reforms actually accelerated after a change in government (Romania, the Netherlands and more particularly Lithuania, Sweden, and the UK), especially when the political right came to power. In others, most notably France and Italy, changes in government did not imply major alterations in the ongoing policy direction. Our final hypothesis – domestic vulnerability – can help to explain the reform content in countries that did not suffer from strong structural or external pressures (Germany, Sweden, and the UK-England).

4.2 The role of ‘EU leverage’

What is still missing from the picture is a clearer understanding of how the EU has influenced national trajectories, beyond the Memorandums (MoUs) and the use of EU funds for local-level initiatives. As a first step in this direction, we developed a simple indicator of ‘EU leverage’ (see Stamati and Baeten 2015 for the methodology), which is intended to indicate the extent to which national and supranational decision-making have been entwined in the 2008-2013 period. We classified leverage as strong in MoU countries (Greece, Ireland, and Romania), moderate in France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, and weak in Lithuania, Sweden, and the UK (England).

Greece, Ireland, and Romania followed the ‘cost-containment and service privatisation’ agenda, which implied large health budget savings and a shifting of risk towards patients. Regulation was reorganised, reinforcing the role of the state in Romania and that of social insurance funds in Greece. Financing was rationalised in Greece, with a greater role for insurance contributions vis-à-vis the state and market actors, and was privatised in Ireland. Evidence of privatisation of inpatient service provision started to appear in Ireland and Romania. In this case, domestic systems that had lost credibility were particularly vulnerable to the strong supranational pressures coming with EU-IMF assistance.

France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands followed the ‘changing healthcare mix’ agenda, combining nation-based problem solving with supranational indications. Engaged in ambitious liberalisations of their public/private mix since at least the mid-2000s, these systems received
allegations of reform-sluggishness. This clearly holds for Italy and, to a lesser extent, France. Regulatory reforms mainly shifted control powers from insurance funds towards the state (France, Germany) or the market (Italy and the Netherlands). Some indications of privatisation were evident in service provisions, with a small share of publicly provided hospital beds being taken up by private (France and Germany) or non-profit (Italy) actors. Their overall strategy is consistent with the intermediate level of EU leverage they experienced.

Lithuania, Sweden, and the UK followed a ‘systemic reorganisation’ agenda. Sweden and England both shifted a great deal of state authority on competition, gatekeeping, provider remuneration, and contracting out rules to market mechanisms. Lithuania took a similar policy direction back in the late 1990s and then focused on raising its standards. State prerogatives increased in healthcare financing, while provision remained largely unchanged. These countries experienced lower domestic and supranational pressures for cost containment, which reflects their non-membership of the Eurozone. Domestic politics and partisan policy agendas had a greater influence on reform outputs.

Concluding remarks

In this chapter we have provided evidence of the emergence of three European health reform agendas that do not follow traditional lines of demarcation between health regimes. We have also shown that recent reforms in a representative group of EU Member States have been influenced by international health research and supranational advocacy, leaving some degree of policymaking autonomy. In order to make sense of this varying degree of autonomy, we devised a straightforward indicator of EU leverage on domestic reform processes. The indicator is not able to fully explain variations within and between country groups, but does fit well with broad distinctions in their health agendas.

Looking at the broader picture and ignoring the persistence of national specificities, the clearest trend is that reforms largely reflecting the neo-liberal paradigm were legislated in rather different scenarios. In no country was the government free enough from external pressures and
sceptical enough of neo-liberal receipts to counter the general tendency towards marketisation and austerity.

Going back to our hypotheses in Section 2, we may conclude that the ‘EU leverage hypothesis’ is that which best fits our empirical observations, clearly ahead of its rival ‘Aftershock hypothesis’. The utility of the ‘Domestic politics’ and ‘Domestic vulnerability’ hypotheses is dubious, as their causal leverage is mixed. A way to reconcile these findings is to assume that EU leverage tends, in fact, to be greater in reform-sluggish countries, reacting to an accumulation of pressure from domestic (fiscal) problems. When levels of EU leverage are high, however, the role of domestic politics is much more restricted. Conversely, national political dynamics enjoy more leeway – and a greater ability to address short-term challenges – when EU leverage is low, even in countries that lack a recent record of reforms.

Neither the impact of the crisis (which varied according to national legacies), nor supranational pressures (which varied with the degree of national economic vulnerability) are alone able to account for this general neo-liberal trend. And yet, our analysis of recent developments in international debates and advocacy showed that neo-liberal ideas were indeed dominant, but also far from being universally accepted or settled once and for all. Finally, the importance of domestic politics alone cannot explain the timing of the reforms, which suggests that short term factors played at least some role. The contingent but varying success of neo-liberal solutions is more a result of the overall configuration of these factors than of their isolated effect.

The causal linkages we suggested can and should be spelled out more clearly. Strengthening the quantitative framework of our analysis would also help us to be fairer when comparing the EU leverage hypotheses with its alternatives. Domestic dynamics and the (changing) preferences of national governments need to be observed much more closely, before a general argument can be advanced on the impact of partisanship and ideology on healthcare reforms. A closer focus of our qualitative reconstruction on high-interest cases such as Greece, Germany and the UK-England, would surely strengthen our causal account.
Our findings, however, already allow us to make a point on the evolution of the EU health agenda. The economic and fiscal orientation of EU leverage means that countries unable to undertake the necessary healthcare reforms receive supranational pressures to do so only if they fall short on economic, rather than social, goals and indicators. This trend introduces a major bias in policymaking, which does not serve the public health ambitions of the European Social Model well. An apparent contradiction in the current EU agenda is that while fiscal consolidation policies focus on stronger public controls, EU internal market rules have a creeping deregulatory effect on health systems. What is needed is more consistency and more transparency in the way health policymaking and European governance are entwined, taking greater account, for instance, of the WHO’s criticisms and observations.

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Introduction

Since the early 2000s, the United States and the European Union, in order to highlight the key role that regulatory cooperation can play in building a strong transatlantic relationship, have stressed the need to promote better regulation, minimize regulatory divergence and facilitate transatlantic commerce. These tenets are now becoming reality through the TTIP (Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership), designated by EU Commission President Juncker as one of the Commission’s ten key priorities. According to the EC website, the ‘TTIP could create jobs and growth at home, give global trade a shot in the arm, and boost our influence outside Europe too’\(^1\).

The TTIP, a subject of major concerns in Europe, has already been written about at length on both sides of the Atlantic, and has provoked much controversy, which has unsettled the negotiators. Following eight rounds of negotiations, TTIP is facing fierce opposition from tens of thousands of US and European citizens, NGOs, trade unions and civil society organisations, all alarmed by the potential dangers of such a far-reaching trade agreement. They all fear that TTIP will result in a race to the bottom and in the erosion of their social, trade union and environmental rights. They fear that these rights will be sacrificed on the altar of free trade for the benefit of the multinationals.

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Following a brief reminder of the context (section 1), objectives and content of the TTIP (section 2) and a progress report on negotiations at the end of the eighth round (section 3), we shall return to certain issues which have been the focus of debate in 2014 (section 4): the lack of transparency surrounding the negotiations, the questioned potential benefits of the TTIP, its impact on labour standards, the controversial issue of the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism (ISDS), and regulatory cooperation already deemed to be anti-democratic.

1. Context of the launch of the TTIP negotiations

The idea of a large transatlantic market is not a new one. In 1998, leaders of certain major North American and European multinationals set up the ‘Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue’ (TABD), a powerful lobby group. Politicians responded positively by signing up for a transatlantic economic partnership with the intention to intensify economic relations between the two powers.

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 led to a cooling of transatlantic relations, but the ambitious aim of one great market resurfaced in 2005 in the form of the EU-US economic initiative.

In 2011, following the work of the 2007 Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC), US and European leaders formed the High-Level Working Group on Employment and Growth, the task of which was to identify policies and measures to implement in order to expand trade and investments. It recommends ‘to launch negotiations on a comprehensive trade and investment agreement’. The final report from this group describes everything from the joint approach taken by the parties to the main parameters of these negotiations, and lists those areas in which the EU and the US have found common ground, describing how they intend to address the many areas, which will be included in the

2. This list is not at all exhaustive. Environmental issues, food safety, privacy, and the impact of public services are all points which are giving rise to animated discussions and arousing strong feelings.

agreement (HLWG 2013). The next step was the joint declaration made by Barack Obama, José Manuel Barroso and Herman Van Rompuy in February 2013\(^4\) relaunching the transatlantic partnership.

In Europe, large industrial groups, particularly in the automotive sector, were on the lookout for new markets and cheaper production sites. The economic and financial crises of 2008 resulted in a drop in wages in the United States, which thus became more competitive. In the US, also, multinationals encouraged the creation of a transatlantic free trade area. They reportedly made a deal with the Obama administration: they will pay more taxes, but will benefit in return from the opening up of a vast transatlantic market, something which is of great interest to new US cutting-edge companies such as Amazon, Google and Microsoft (Quatrepoint 2014).

In 2013, the 28 national governments gave the European Commission the mandate to negotiate the TTIP. The negotiation stage is now fully under way and, by the end of 2014, seven negotiating rounds had taken place between EU and US negotiators. The process is expected to reach its conclusion by the end of 2015.

## 2. Objectives and content of TTIP

According to the negotiating mandate of the EU Council (made public rather late in the day on 9 October 2014), the agreement will only contain provisions relating to trade and trade-related issues between the United States and the EU. The agreement will be ambitious, comprehensive, well-balanced and fully consistent with World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules and obligations (Council 2013).

The aim of the TTIP is to develop trade and investment by tapping into the unused potential of a true transatlantic market, generating new economic potential for employment and growth thanks to increased market access and greater regulatory compatibility, paving the way for

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global standards which could also be adopted by third countries. Its aims are:

— the abolition of most customs duties on bilateral trade on the entry into force of the agreement, followed shortly afterwards by a phasing out of all customs duties, except for the most sensitive;

— access to new markets by the dismantling of long-standing obstacles, while acknowledging the sensitive nature of certain sectors (services, agriculture, etc.). The EU intends to secure access to maritime transport and to US airline services, which is a controversial measure in the United States (EP 2014). Audiovisual services have been excluded;

— continued liberalisation of public procurement: the EU wishes to counter the US rules on national preference, such as the Berry Amendment and the Buy American Act, and to obtain access to the US at inter-federal level, bearing in mind that federal commitments on public procurement contained in external trade agreements are optional for the federal states. The United States, on the other hand, is seeking to obtain ‘fair, transparent and predictable’ rules and non-discriminatory treatment in the EU and its Member States (United States Trade Representative, USTR 2013);

— the dismantling of regulatory non-tariff barriers to trade by attaining an ambitious level of regulatory coherence for goods and services through mutual recognition, harmonisation and enhanced cooperation between regulators. This is the hard core of the TTIP, which involves the most complicated issues to address. The regulatory differences between the EU and the United States reflect differences in preferences and values between their populations, as well as differing approaches to risk management;

— the protection of investments, as part of an investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism, guaranteeing the transparency, independence of arbitrators and the predictability of the agreement, and offering investors a broad range of arbitration structures.

5. The Berry Amendment (1941) obliges the US Defense Department to use local suppliers for all of its public procurement needs. It was codified in 2002, and now applies mainly to textiles and foodstuffs.

6. A federal law (1933) requiring the US government to directly purchase only goods produced on US territory.
The final TTIP agreement will contain 24 chapters, divided into three sections: market access, regulatory cooperation and rules.

The section concerning market access focuses on achieving the EU's objective to gain easier access to the American market, in particular in trading goods, services (including financial services) and public procurement. The second section aims at cutting 'red tape and costs' and includes regulatory coherence, technical barriers to trade (TBT), food safety and animal and plant health, chemicals, cosmetics, engineering, medical devices, pesticides, information and communication technologies, pharmaceuticals, textiles, and vehicles. The last section on rules will lead to the adoption of new rules to make it easier and fairer to export, import and invest. It will contain rules on trade and sustainable development including labour rights, energy and raw materials, customs and trade facilitation, SMEs, investment protection and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), competition, intellectual property and geographical indications, and government-government dispute settlement.

3. State of play: what progress after eight negotiating rounds?

The first three negotiating rounds took place in 2013, and gave negotiators a better understanding of their respective approaches to the areas covered by the agreement. The fourth round, therefore, was when the real negotiations began.

By the end of seven negotiating rounds, clear differences of view had emerged between the EU and the United States:

— on the abolition of customs duties: proposals for possible tariffs were exchanged in February 2014, but the Commission criticised the US offer as being less ambitious than its own, and publicly asked for a substantial improvement;

— there are clear areas of disagreement on financial services: the EU wishes to include cooperation on financial regulation in TTIP as well as market access, but the United States fears that this would affect the restrictions contained in the *Dodd-Frank Act*, and believe that the issue can be dealt within existing structures (the G20 and the Financial Stability Council). The European Commission therefore withdrew financial services from the negotiations during the sixth round, and informed Member States that it would address this issue once again if the US changed its views on greater regulatory coherence;

— in relation to intellectual property rights, the European geographical indications (GI) are a potential obstacle, since many people in the US are unhappy with the idea of European GIs receiving protection under TTIP;

— agriculture has emerged as a key issue: the United States has condemned EU policies and measures relating to GMOs and certain chemical treatments. It wishes to see the lifting of EU health and phytosanitary barriers to US meat exports, but Karel de Gucht, the European Commissioner for trade, has promised that the TTIP would not affect EU legislation on GMOs or hormones in beef, and has ruled out any form of mutual recognition of chemical products;

— on issues relating to the regulation of e-commerce and flows of cross-border data, European concerns in relation to US data protection legislation and practice were heightened following the revelations of spying activity carried out by the American National Security Agency (NSA) (EP 2014).

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8. The *Dodd-Frank Act* (2010) aims to enhance financial stability in the United States, to limit the moral hazard inherent to the ‘too big to fail’ character of certain financial institutions and to protect tax payers and users of financial products.


The last round covered by this chapter (February 2015) clarified issues concerning market access, industrial tariffs, access to the agricultural market, trade in services and public procurement. A main focus of this round was the horizontal regulatory pillar: technical barriers to trade and issues relating to food safety and animal and plant health. While the latter issues are close to consolidation, there are still differences of view on TBTs. The EU has put forward its proposals on horizontal regulatory cooperation. Significant progress has been made on government-government dispute settlement, customs, trade facilitation and on problems concerning SMEs. Discussions on intellectual property rights are continuing, in order to further fine-tune the list of points to be covered by the agreement.

The next negotiating rounds are planned for April 2015 in Washington and July in Brussels. Two more rounds should follow by the end of the year. According to the December 2014 conclusions of the European Council, ‘the EU and the US should make all efforts to conclude negotiations on an ambitious, comprehensive and mutually beneficial TTIP by the end of 2015’ 12.

4. Some critical issues discussed in 2014

4.1 Lack of transparency of the negotiations

There has been on-going criticism from various NGOs, trade unions, civil society representatives and MEPs about the lack of transparency of the EU-US negotiations on TTIP. Opponents of the draft agreement point to the confidentiality of the negotiating mandate as a typical example of the lack of transparency and unwillingness of the Commission and Council to involve the public in this affair.

In a letter sent to his US counterpart in July 2013, the Chief EU negotiator, Ignacio Garcia Bercero, confirmed that the Commission would oppose public access to all documents relating to the negotiation or development of TTIP, and that the public would be denied access to these documents for a period of 30 years (European Commission 12. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/146411.pdf.)
The EU Commissioner for Trade, Karel de Gucht, had also stated to the European Parliament that the Commission would apply an equivalent level of confidentiality to TTIP to that applied to previous trade agreements. He called upon all MEPs to defend the confidentiality of the negotiations.\(^\text{13}\)

However, following the revelations made by Edward Snowden in June 2013 on espionage involving the National Security Agency (NSA), the European public and NGOs became concerned and began to demand greater transparency.\(^\text{14}\) The European Commission tried to rectify matters by setting up an official website that presents the issues in an excessively simplistic fashion, using videos and so-called ‘factsheets’. In July 2014, the European Ombudsman, Emily O’Reilly, opened parallel inquiries in the EU Council and Commission to respond to the concerns expressed.\(^\text{15}\) However, it was ultimately a judgment handed down by the Court of Justice of the European Union on 3 July 2014 that would pave the way for the publication of documents relating to the TTIP negotiations. According to the European judges, texts relating to international issues should not systematically be kept confidential. The Council should provide specific reasons justifying any refusal to publish individual documents.

On 9 October 2014, the European Council of Ministers responsible for international trade authorised the European Commission to publish the negotiating mandate (Council 2014). This act was an important decision of principle, since it would be the first time such a publication had occurred since the European Union began negotiating trade agreements.

In November, the Commission undertook the task of making public more European documents linked to the negotiations, while underlining that

\(^{13}\) Transcription of a debate on the EU negotiations on trade and investment with the United States, European Parliament Strasbourg, 22 May 2013.


\(^{16}\) CJEU, judgment of 3 July 2014, Council of the European Union v In ’t Veld, C-350/12, not yet published.
'there should be no intention to publish' US or joint documents without the explicit authorisation of the United States'. The Commission also undertook the task of publishing the names of the individuals met by its political officers and senior officials (European Commission 2014d).

On 7 January 2015, the European Commission published several of its proposals for legal texts on competition, food safety, animal and plant health, customs issues, technical barriers to trade, small and medium-sized enterprises, and government-government dispute settlement. Other documents were to be published, except for those relating to market access and quotas and customs duties, which were deemed to be too sensitive17.

This apparent openness has not really met all expectations: none of the documents have been published together with their annexes, and the records of the negotiating rounds were found to be still too cursory. Nevertheless, at least they have been published, which is not the case on the other side of the Atlantic, where secrecy continues to reign.

4.2 Promised, but questionable, benefits

Relations between the EU and the US are considered to be the most significant relations globally in terms of trade and investment. In 2012, these two economies made up almost half of global GDP, and represented 30% of world trade (EP 2014). Nevertheless, there is said to still be unused potential in terms of economic growth.

Most of the quantitative arguments in favour of TTIP come from four econometric studies, which are often cited: from Ecorys (2009), CEPR18 (2013), CEPII19 (2013) and the Bertelsmann Stiftung (2013), the first two of which were directly commissioned by the European Commission. All of these foresee benefits in terms of trade and increased GDP for the EU and the United States. Only the Bertelsmann Stiftung study (2013)
speaks of possible consequences for employment. In the long term, it says, the TTIP could create around a million jobs in the US and 1.3 million in the EU.

Although it does not predict any impact on employment, the CEPR study has been particularly influential. The European Commission has used it as its main source of information on the economic effects of TTIP (European Commission 2013a and 2014a). This study presents a number of possible scenarios and indicates that a comprehensive and ambitious TTIP would result in an increase in total annual GDP of 0.5% for the EU (i.e. 119 billion EUR), and of 0.4% for the United States (95 billion EUR), once it was fully implemented in 2027. European households would see an average increase in their disposable annual income of 545 EUR thanks to the agreement, which would also result in an increase in the GDP of our trading partners of around 100 billion EUR (CEPR 2013). In its declarations on the TTIP, the Commission only refers to the most ambitious scenario (Myant and O’Brien 2015).

There is far from total agreement on these studies. Raza et al. (2014), in a critical assessment of the results and methodologies underlying these analyses, note that their very attractive results are based on unrealistic hypotheses, methods which are seen as inadequate (computable general equilibrium models, except for Bertelsmann), and the same data base to assess the repercussions of trade reforms. It is not surprising, therefore, that they come up with converging results, and this convergence should not be understood as an unbiased confirmation of their forecasts.

To obtain a more realistic scenario, Capaldo (2014) uses the United Nations Global Policy Model (GPM), a global econometric model focused on demand. He performs a simulation that takes account of the context of prolonged austerity and of the low growth rates in the European Union and the United States. His results are radically different from, and far less optimistic than, those produced by other evaluations. For Europe, he sees the TTIP resulting in:

- net losses in exports after 10 years, compared to the baseline ‘without TTIP’ scenario, of around 1.9% for France, 1.14% for Germany and 0.95% for the United Kingdom;
- a fall in GDP of -0.50% in Northern Europe, -0.48% in France and -0.29% in Germany;
a drop in earned income of around 5,500 EUR per worker in France and 3,400 EUR in Germany;
- the loss of around 600,000 jobs in the European Union, including 223,000 in Northern European countries;
- a transfer from earned income to capital of around 7% in the United Kingdom, 8% in France and 4% in Germany;
- a reduction in government revenues and greater financial instability.

Although job creation is presented as an absolute priority for the European development model, there is absolutely no guarantee that TTIP will meet these expectations. Capaldo’s study indicates that there is a likelihood, rather, of massive job losses in the EU (600,000) rather than the gains predicted by Bertelsmann.

In such a context, it is useful to refer to other trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which promised to create 170,000 new jobs in the United States. Twenty years down the line, its results have been disappointing. The US trade balance with Mexico deteriorated by around 98.8 billion dollars between 1994 and 2010, following mass company relocations from the US to Mexico. These relocations caused the loss of 682,000 jobs in the United States, of which 61% were in manufacturing. Two thirds of relocated workers lost more than 20% of their wages. As for Mexico, the real income of workers fell by almost 40% compared to before the agreement. Agriculture has been crippled by competition from US agribusinesses, and the increased competition has obliged the government to privatise some public companies and part of the social security system. In Canada, increased competition has led to a fall in public expenditure, taxes and social security (Scott 2011; Public Citizen 2014).

With reference to the job losses, which generally result from free trade agreements, the European Commission has confirmed that TTIP could provoke a sustainable and substantial disruption of the European labour market (European Commission 2013a). It acknowledges the ‘legitimate’ concerns as to the future of workers who would lose their jobs as a result of

20. The NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), signed in 1992 by Mexico, Canada and the United States, and which entered into force in 1994, is a global agreement covering the same areas as TTIP. It was intended to provide economic growth and job creation by reducing tariff barriers.
TTIP, and advises EU Member States to have recourse to structural assistance funds such as the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund and the European Social Fund to help those who are expected to lose their jobs (Hilary 2015).

4.3 The impact on labour standards

Trade unions and civil society organisations are also extremely concerned as to the real implications of TTIP for workers on both sides of the Atlantic.

4.3.1 The potential risks of the TTIP

In theory, a free trade agreement between two developed economies with sound industrial relations systems should produce few concerns as to labour standards and social rights. In this case, however, major challenges clearly exist as to social and labour standards.

Two fundamentally different concepts of labour standards

The United States and the EU have fundamentally different conceptions of the employment relationship. The US model is based on the primacy of market forces (Block et al. 2004). Government regulation and, to some extent, the scope of collective labour conventions are therefore kept to a minimum. The European approach, on the other hand, is based on the principle that non-regulated markets create an imbalance in negotiating power between employers and workers. Governmental regulation and trade unions are necessary to provide a counter-balance and to defend employees in the labour market. These fundamental differences of approach may have very serious implications in the context of the TTIP negotiations.

Different conceptions of social security and labour law

Compa (2014) warns against the deregulation existing on the US labour market, which would destroy the European social safety net protecting the most vulnerable21. He underlines the crucial differences in the rules on dismissals. The US doctrine is one of do as you please, whereby any employer can fire staff, cut wages or do away with perks for whatever

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21. The Agricultural Act of 2014, voted through by the Republicans in the House of Representatives, abolished the food aid which had been provided to millions of impoverished Americans.
reason, as long as this is not forbidden in law. There is no law in the US which requires the payment of redundancy pay dependent on seniority. There is no limit on the overtime a worker may be obliged to work by his or her employer. There is no law on mandatory leave or rest times. This lack of regulation could act as a magnet to attract European investors under a new trade agreement.

An imbalance in workers’ trade union rights
All 28 members of the EU have ratified fundamental ILO (International Labour Organisation) Convention 87 on the Freedom of Association and the Protection of the Right to Organise, and Convention 98 on the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining. By contrast, the United States is one of just 36 countries, which have not ratified either or both ILO Conventions 87 and 98. This has been widely criticized in the past and has raised serious and justified concern among European citizens and civil society.

According to the U.S. Department of Labour, the United States will not ratify any ILO convention unless or until US law and practice, at both the federal and state levels, is in full conformity with its provisions. McIntyre and Bodah (2006) explain the three main arguments given by the US government for not ratifying fundamental ILO conventions: ‘First, national labour policy is well established in the US, ensures a delicate balance between the interests of business and labour, and should not be upset to accommodate the interest of an international agency’. Second, the United States, being a member of ILO, has to uphold the spirit of ILO conventions 87 and 98. Third, ratification is impossible as the Conventions would affect state and other employees who are not covered by federal labour laws.

For many years now, there have been worries as to the gradual importation of the US ‘union-buster’ model to the EU (particularly in the UK) to undermine the traditional respect of union rights. The TTIP

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22. So far the US has ratified only two of the eight conventions (Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention). A third convention on discrimination has been submitted to the Senate for consent in 1998, but has not yet been considered.

is reigniting these concerns, and raising questions as to the EU’s ability to defend the respect of union rights and collective bargaining, as enshrined in the treaties (Richards 2014). These fears are even greater since the economic crisis has already resulted in a clear erosion of union and social rights in several European countries (Schömann 2014).

A risk of social dumping?
These fundamental differences in the area of union rights raise the question of social dumping. The relatively weak employment standards currently applied in the 25 US states which have adopted anti-union legislation concerning the so-called ‘Right to Work’ could have broader implications. Since labour costs in these states are lower, many US companies have already deliberately transferred their production sites to these states. European companies, however, could use the system to relocate their activities in the future, investing and building factories in the US states which apply this famous ‘right to work’, thus avoiding the need to respect European labour standards. Moreover, according to the investor protection provisions proposed in TTIP, any improvement in employment arrangements or conditions would entitle these EU or US companies to claim for compensation. The fear of being party to legal cases such as Veolia v Egypt by virtue of TTIP could dissuade states from improving social benefits (Richards 2014).

4.3.2 EU and US Positions
In its initial position paper of 16 July 2013, the European Commission states that, in addition to recognition of sustainable development as a horizontal and environmental aspect that should inform the TTIP in all areas, an integrated chapter is envisaged on labour and environmental aspects as well as their inter-linkages (European Commission 2013c). There should be cross-references to labour rights in other chapters (investment chapter, services and public procurement).

24 A ‘right-to-work’ law is a statute in the United States that prohibits union security agreements, or agreements between labour unions and employers, that govern the extent to which an established union can require employees’ membership, payment of union dues, or fees as a condition of employment, either before or after hiring.

25 Since 2012, under a bilateral investment agreement between France and Egypt, Veolia has been involved in a court case with Egypt, which it took to court for the alleged breaking of a waste disposal contract for the city of Alexandria. The city had refused to amend the contract as demanded by Veolia, which had to deal with increased costs, partly due to the establishment of a minimum wage (Kyriaki 2012).
Its issue paper sets out a promotional approach on labour provisions for the TTIP negotiations in order to prepare the negotiations on the text. It focuses on commitments to promote ‘the mutual supportiveness between trade and labour policies and to ensure that increased trade does not come at the expenses of worker protection, but rather supports it’. It refers to the ILO Decent Work Agenda, the ILO core labour standards and other ILO labour standards protecting working conditions in additional areas (such as health and safety at work). To further evolve an effective commitment to labour provisions, the EU proposes to include thematic core labour standards for each of the four areas of fundamental rights and principles as defined in the ILO declaration of 1998, describing in more detail the commitments made by each partner, including concrete actions planned for implementation.

The proposal also promotes the uptake of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) on labour matters, in accordance with internationally recognized principles and guidelines, in order to foster the contribution of trade and investment to sustainable development.

To solve any conflict concerning the implementation of labour provisions, the EU has a dedicated dispute settlement mechanism which establishes a clear, mandatory and time-bound procedure for the resolution of any concerns, not providing for sanctioning but for dialogue and follow-up actions (European Commission 2014b).

In its position paper, the Office of the United States Trade Representative underlines the fact that the labour provisions of this agreement may become a model, given the shared commitment by both partners, which already maintain a high level of protection for their workers. The US stresses the need for commitment to internationally recognised labour rights in the agreement and the wish to establish procedures for consultations and cooperation to promote their respect (USTR 2013).

Previous bilateral agreements signed by the US do not refer to the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda, nor to its eight fundamental conventions. Since it is unlikely that the US will ratify these fundamental conventions, the

26. It sets out 4 pillars: promoting employment, social protection, promoting social dialogue, fundamental principles and rights to work.
most we can hope for is that the TTIP will contain general non-binding provisions urging ratification of the fundamental conventions, combined with a process for follow-up and dialogue. There is a risk, then, that the TTIP will end up applying to workers enjoying differing levels of protection and rights within one single market, with all the dangers this could imply, particularly in terms of social dumping.

4.3.3 European and US trade unions form a common front

The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) is lobbying for the inclusion of a social clause and implementation mechanisms in the agreement in the hope of creating a ‘gold standard’ agreement, which will help to improve living and working conditions on both sides of the Atlantic, and to guard against any attempt to use the agreement to lower standards (ETUC 2013).

The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organisations (AFL-CIO) agrees with the ETUC that the TTIP objectives should include full employment, decent work and better living conditions for all, and that in no case should it permit deregulation.

In the view of the US federation, an agreement with Europe is a real opportunity for the United States government to move beyond the approach based on the lowest common denominator in the field of labour rights, and, instead, to create trade standards which will benefit individuals. The labour rights provisions in TTIP must therefore be strong, and must go beyond those contained in the US-Peru free trade agreement of 2007\(^{27}\). The latter represented a considerable step forward, but do not contain all the elements, which are essential to a binding chapter on ‘Labour’. The AFL-CIO also warns against the risk that the negotiating process might be used to attack measures relating to worker and consumer protection and food safety, such as those in

\(^{27}\) They require parties to adopt and maintain labour laws that comply with ILO core standards and provide acceptable wages, hours and health and safety conditions, and to effectively enforce such laws. They further subject labour obligations to the same dispute settlement procedures as commercial obligations, with both fines and trade sanctions available as remedies.
REACH\textsuperscript{28} for chemical products, or labelling requirements for genetically modified foodstuffs (AFL-CIO 2014).

In their \textit{Declaration of Joint Principles} of 21 May 2014, the ETUC and AFL-CIO highlight the points which must be dealt with in TTIP, emphasising a key element: it must work. According to both organisations, labour rights should be built into the architecture of the TTIP, should apply at all levels of government of both parties, and should not be limited to the chapter on sustainable development. The parties should commit themselves to the ratification and effective enforcement of ILO fundamental labour standards (ETUC and AFL-CIO 2014).

The trade unions support the Commission concerning the inclusion of the ILO’s ‘Decent Work Agenda’ in the chapter, but regret that it takes a promotional approach, although the basic problem is that the United States has not ratified the eight ILO fundamental conventions. ILO conventions 155 (occupational safety and health), 122 (employment policy), 81 and 129 (labour inspection) and 144 (tripartite consultation) should also be included (Jenkins 2014).

\subsection*{4.3.4 Lessons to be learned from the past: the impact of NAFTA on workers’ rights}

To better understand the potential consequences of the TTIP, it is worth looking at some aspects of its not-so-distant ‘cousin’ initiative, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

The North American Free Trade Agreement was signed together with the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) and the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC). NAALC was the first agreement signed by the US that focused on labour standards and was added on to an international trade agreement.

\textsuperscript{28} REACH is an EU regulation under which all chemical substances of which more than one tonne is produced or imported per year per manufacturer or importer, including those already in circulation, must be the subject of a risk analysis and must be tested by their manufacturer or importer over the next eleven years.
Its stated objective was to improve working conditions and living standards in the United States, Mexico, and Canada, taking into account the increase in trade between the three countries. It contained 11 core labour principles, and each Party committed itself to ensuring that its labour regulation would provide high labour standards and promote compliance (in a similar way, the TTIP aims at promoting high levels of protection of EU standards). However, the chosen approach was cooperation, supplemented by some oversight mechanisms designed to guarantee adequate enforcement of labour laws, with violations being potentially punishable by trade sanctions as a last resort. Unfortunately, these commitments have turned out to be rather general and vague and the principles have not been interpreted in a similar manner by the three parties.

Thirty-eight submissions have been made under NAALC by non-governmental groups or unions, referring to serious alleged violations (issues of freedom of association, health and safety, employment discrimination, minimum employment standards; the outcome of the resolution process has almost systematically been disappointing, often limited to an exchange of information or the organization of public fora or seminars29).

NAALC has been relatively weak in its ability to improve working conditions and living standards, or promote compliance with national labour regulations. It does not have a formal mechanism to include workers or their representatives in the process beyond presenting the initial submission. Several of the submitted cases were not solved due to limitations in the agreement, governmental weakness and a lack of political will to truly resolve problems, as well as the refusal to involve workers in initiatives destined to improve workplace conditions (Delp et al. 2004).

Serious doubts have been raised as to the access to labour courts in Mexico and the United States, as well as to their fairness. Settlements are often rather weak and unenforceable for workers. Ministerial agreements suggesting the provision of better information to victims cannot be considered as genuine solutions to the serious labour violations denounced in many of the cases (Human Rights Watch 2001).

This situation raises serious doubts as to the usefulness of such mechanisms and their ability to protect workers. Clearly, such an approach has to be avoided at all costs in the TTIP process.

4.4 Investor-state dispute settlement

No sooner had TTIP negotiations begun than it emerged in public discussions that the inclusion of an investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism was a potential obstacle to ratification of the agreement.

This mechanism allows a foreign investor to lodge a direct complaint to a State, to be examined not in national courts, but rather in an international court of arbitration. The investor may bring an action if he considers that the State has infringed the rules of the investment treaty, which protect his rights. The purpose of the ISDS is to ensure a safe and predictable context for foreign investors, as well as a dispute settlement system, which is apolitical and facilitates both decisions and investments (Fabri and Garbasso 2015).

The large number of investment agreements signed in recent years\(^{30}\) (UNCTAD 2014) and the steep increase in the number of disputes between investors and States have generated criticism as to restrictions on a State’s sovereign power to legislate and to apply the law\(^{31}\).

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\(^{30}\) The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) listed, in 2013, almost 3,200 bilateral investment treaties and investment chapters contained in free trade agreements.

\(^{31}\) Veolia v Egypt is one of the cases most frequently referred to, see note 23.
Civil society and NGO representatives condemn the ISDS as unlawful. If the arbitration court finds in favour of the investor, it can only demand financial compensation, and cannot, in principle, ask a State to withdraw or amend a law which is not compatible with the agreements signed. Nevertheless, given the risk that it might have to pay considerable financial compensation, a government may decide to withdraw a law, decision or regulation, or make it more flexible. Indirectly, then, foreign investors would be able to influence legislation. New Zealand, for example, suspended its decision to amend its legislation on cigarette packets, pending the outcome of the complaint lodged by Philip Morris against the Australian government concerning a similar legislative change (Skovgaard Poulsen et al. 2013).

Whilst there are risks of politicisation of the cases brought in certain developing countries, the risk is far lower in US and European democracies. Many States have already adopted national laws offering protection against direct and indirect expropriation\(^{32}\), including the United States, so why resort to international arbitration? Using these arguments, Australia convinced the United States not to include the ISDS in their 2004 trade agreement, since both countries have a sound and well-developed system for settling disputes between investors and States (Fabry and Garbaso 2015). In the same line of thought, the European Parliament voted unanimously in favour of an explicit clarification mentioning that future investment agreements would only include an ISDS mechanism in cases where this could be justified (EP 2013).

Recourse to the ISDS could result in reverse discrimination: US investors would have the privilege of being able to call upon an international arbitration court, whereas European investors would not and would have to go through national courts, and vice-versa (Krajewski 2014).

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\(^{32}\) Direct expropriation occurs when an investment is nationalised or when it is directly expropriated by means of an official transfer of the legal title or through the physical seizure of that investment. Indirect expropriation occurs when a State intervenes in the use of the asset or the benefits provided by this asset without it being seized or the legal title to the property being affected.
Civil society and NGO representatives opposed to the ISDS denounce the lack of transparency of this arbitration process, which takes place behind closed doors. The documents tend to be kept confidential and the public is not allowed into the hearings, and in some cases is not even informed of certain disputes. The European Commission undertook actions to enhance the transparency of its ISDS model during the negotiations with Singapore and Canada by introducing a clause on total transparency. Questions have also arisen as to the independence and impartiality of the arbitration judges (Speak 2014).

From a trade union perspective, Krajewski (2014) lists the elements missing from the Commission’s approach in relation to the protection of labour rights and social interests, e.g. investor obligations and the link between the protection of investments and the promotion of social and labour standards; adherence to corporate social responsibility principles or non-binding guidelines (ban on child and forced labour, etc) addressed to multinationals.

The European Commission, on the other hand, sees the need to set out a template for a European bilateral investment treaty and underlines that ‘(…) the system needs improvements’ (European Commission 2013b). On 27 March 2014, it opened an on-line consultation on investor protection in TTIP. It published its report in January 2015, presenting an analysis of around 150,000 contributions received (European Commission 2015a): 97% of the responses were opposed to the inclusion of an ISDS mechanism in TTIP. The Commission maintains, nevertheless, that this consultation was not a referendum, and has identified four areas for further work: the right to regulate, the monitoring and operation of the ISDS tribunals, the relationship between domestic judicial systems and ISDS, and the review of ISDS decisions for legal correctness through an appellate mechanism (European Commission 2015b).

The consultation did not reassure public opinion; indeed, the Commission’s attitude triggered a wave of indignation. In the view of the Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) (2015b), ‘in a blatant mockery of democracy, it is brushing off thousands who have spoken out against excessive rights for foreign investors in TTIP, pushing ahead with its pre-consultation agenda of ‘reforming’ an un-reformable system. But if
this is not what people in Europe want, who then is the Commission listening to?’. The EU’s final decision on the ISDS, which will have to be ratified by the Council of the EU and the Parliament, will only be taken with the approval of the Commission’s First Vice-President. Although some national governments (particularly Germany) have spoken out against this clause, none of them has yet asked for the mandate to be amended to take out the ISDS.

On the other side of the Atlantic, more than forty organisations (trade unions, public health bodies, environmental and consumer groups) made an appeal to the Office of the US Trade Representative asking it to launch a similar public consultation (Speak 2014). The discussion took off following the publication in the ‘Washington Post’ of an opinion-piece by Senator Elizabeth Warren, a Democrat, calling for the removal of this mechanism from the future Trans-Pacific Partnership currently being negotiated by the United States33. The Senator is well-known for her views on trade negotiations, and media coverage of her article forced the White House to publish a response on its blog. ‘ISDS does not undermine U.S. sovereignty’, claims Jeffrey Zients in this blog, ‘The reality is that ISDS cannot require countries to change any law or regulation.’ Obama’s economic advisor develops a defensive line of argument similar to that of the European Commission, explaining that serious mishaps due to the system will be prevented by the demanding ‘safeguards’ negotiated by the United States34.


4.5 Regulatory cooperation: an open door to lobby groups and a danger to democracy?

The highly controversial proposal for regulatory cooperation between the two continents is aimed at ensuring increasing compatibility of the existing rules in both Parties. It would mean that forthcoming legislation would be examined in the light of the constraints set up by the agreement. The TTIP would, in this way, be a ‘living agreement’, allowing for rules to be set even after it has been signed.

NGOs and social organisations fear that this regulatory cooperation could give pressure groups representing big business vast scope to influence the decision-making process, weakening the rights of citizens to have a say on the decisions taken.

The Commission’s proposed text on this chapter, made public on 10 February 2015, was discussed with the US negotiators during the 8th negotiating round and is strangely reminiscent of the points highlighted in a joint document from BusinessEurope and the US Chamber of Commerce, dating back to October 2012.

The main criticisms formulated by civil society against the Commission’s proposal may be summarised as follows:

— early warning: as soon as a new regulation is in the pipeline, the parties will receive a notification. Even during the preparation stage of a regulation, the regulatory authorities must give stakeholders, i.e. business lobby groups potentially affected by the law or regulations, the chance to comment. In this way, companies would be able to exert strong pressure, at a very early stage in the legislative process, to block regulations protecting consumers;

— impact studies: any relevant new draft regulation will first have to be studied in terms of its impact on trade. A report on this will be drawn up to ensure that legislators do not adopt measures harmful

to the interests of major companies. This could have significant consequences on the capacity of the States and of the EU to adopt regulations in the general interest;

— exchanges on regulation: if one of the parties is unhappy about the effects of a planned legal act, or of regulations under revision, a dialogue must take place, and the party whose rules are under attack will have to cooperate and be ready to answer any questions on the matter;

— the Regulatory Cooperation Body (RCO), which would be in charge of supervising and developing regulatory cooperation, would be made up of a handful of senior officials from the European Commission’s Secretariat-General, from the US and EU trade authorities, and from the US Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). Since there is already good cooperation between the lobby groups and regulatory agencies in the EU and the United States, this body could strengthen the influence of multinationals on public policies, whereas groups working for the general interest and with fewer financial resources would be put at a disadvantage. Although it does not have the power to adopt regulatory acts itself, the RCO is set to become an important institution (CEO et al. 2014; CEO 2015a);

— consultation and transparency, an open door to transatlantic lobbying: in the United States, the business world would be frustrated not to have the same access to EU decision-makers as its European counterparts. The Commission proposal therefore highlights the transparency of consultations, which could consolidate and increase the privileged access of companies to European decision-makers by including more US companies in the Commission expert groups (Bureau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs - BEUC 2015).

In February 2015, 150 civil society organisations issued a joint statement denouncing regulatory cooperation as the ultimate tool to prevent or weaken future general interest rules in favour of citizens, workers, consumers and the environment, and called upon the negotiators to withdraw this chapter from the TTIP negotiations37.

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Conclusion

Clearly, the whole TTIP design and building process, from the very beginning, has been conceptually flawed, and the underlying principles questionable. Paradoxically, the process is moving forward and yet the level of uncertainty about what the TTIP will really be remains very high.

Looking at the costs, the TTIP will fundamentally impact social rights, the level of social protection in Europe and the life of all EU citizens. Already now, the Commission is pushing forward the need to simplify EU legislation, which is affecting the high level of protection in many areas. The so-called ‘Better regulation’ package, i.e. the process of ‘simplifying’, ‘reducing administrative burden’ and ‘cutting red tape’ is the tool the Commission is using to transform the law-making process and, in a way, organise a trade-off of social protection for trade.

The ambition of those who promote TTIP is to radically alter important aspects of our legal system, public services (including education and health), housing, energy, water and transport sectors, as well as working and living conditions. The whole idea of the TTIP should be abandoned. Negotiations should be stopped. Instead, the Commission should focus on the necessity to promote the EU’s social and economic development.

Will the TTIP nevertheless be signed in 2015? It is far from certain. The TTIP is still unpopular in a number of European Member States, where civil society and the trade unions are actively opposing it, but the European Commission seems determined to reach an agreement.

Another obstacle to the conclusion of TTIP is the attitude of Washington. The Americans seem more interested in finalising the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). In his state of the Union address, Barack Obama repeated his resolve to see both agreements concluded, and expressed his intention to ask Congress to grant him ‘fast-track trade authority’. This provision facilitates US trade negotiations, since its partners can be sure that an agreement will be adopted by Congress quickly and without amendments. Congress nevertheless still retains the power, acting on a simple majority, to adopt (or otherwise) the negotiated agreement. Obama has pleaded its cause, recalling the need to
harmonise ground rules ‘to protect American workers with strong new trade deals that aren’t just free, but fair’ [38]. Although many in his camp are against this procedure, the situation has changed since the mid-mandate elections, lost by the Democrats. The Republican majority seem more inclined to go along with the TTIP negotiations.

In Europe, Syriza has already indicated its hostility to TTIP. The Tsipras government, when it came to power in January 2015, confirmed that it would exercise its right of veto to prevent signing of the agreement in Council.

There are also questions as to the nature of the TTIP. If the agreement is classified as a mixed agreement (including provisions other than specifically trade provisions), it will also have to be ratified by national parliaments. This, however, is very uncertain. Two weeks after the conclusion of the free trade agreement between the European Union and Singapore, the European Commission stirred up the situation by announcing its intention to request an opinion from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on the issue of who is competent to sign and ratify such a trade agreement. In this way, the Commission is hoping to clarify which provisions of the free trade agreement concluded with Singapore fall within the exclusive or shared competence of the EU, and which fall within the exclusive competence of the Member States (European Commission 2014c).

The European judges may then decide that the provisions on the highly controversial arbitration clause (ISDS) should be ratified by national parliaments. In that case, such a decision would not just concern ratification of the agreement between the EU and Singapore, but also ratification of the TTIP.

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The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): converging interests and diverging opinions

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Future prospects
The EU political dilemma, Europe's democratic challenge and the role of trade unions in solving these

David Natali

Introduction

As shown by the chapters in this volume, only very limited progress has been made by the EU in addressing the social legacy of the crisis. The little success of the last few months in improving economic prospects, employment growth and social standards has resulted in increased dissatisfaction with the European Union. We have thus seen evidence of increased political tensions between Member States, EU institutions and public opinions: the results of the 2014 EP elections, the increased support for anti-Europe movements in national elections and the Greek crisis in summer 2015. If the EU is not able to address the crisis soon, anti-Europe sentiments will grow further and put the whole integration project at risk.

The following pages shed light on these risks. They start by identifying the policy problems the EU should address to exit the crisis. Echoing the past editions of this publication, section one reviews the mounting criticism against the strategy pursued by the EU in order to stop the deterioration of the economic and social context. Many analysts agree on the need for a complete new set of policy measures to help economic recovery while fighting against social inequalities and divergences between Member States.

While we see a broad consensus among experts on what to do to exit the crisis, it is clear that the more political problems are still to be addressed. Section two outlines these major problems. In some respects
we see that a ‘EU political dilemma’ has emerged. European institutions, and the incremental approach they have taken to the crisis, are not seen as legitimate. The mix of intergovernmentalism and supranational technocratic decisions at the EU level is neither effective nor legitimate. Many have thus argued for a new move towards more politicised integration, stronger political institutions at the supranational level and more opportunities for citizens and their political representatives to participate in European governance. But, in the current political circumstances, repoliticisation could lead to further ideological conflicts, the strengthening of anti-Europe forces, and thus more danger for the EU.

This political dilemma then reflects a more general ‘democratic challenge’. European integration has destabilised the balance between national and supranational institutions and, in many respects, has undermined their democratic nature. This ‘democratic challenge’ concerns policymakers at both the national and supranational levels, but, as stressed in section three, it also concerns trade unions. The latter are a key element of national and supranational policymaking and contribute to the legitimacy of political institutions. They can thus help to resolve the EU political dilemma in particular, and the democratic problems mentioned above in more general terms. Trade unions, in fact, are at a crossroads: while they still retain decisive organizational and political resources, they seem to be under siege. They are increasingly isolated from the reform process and, at the same time, new social and political movements are attacking them. A few months before the 13th Congress of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), these issues need to be investigated to make the future of the EU less of a gloomy prospect.

1. Broad agreement among experts on the policy change we need

Aside from the optimism and pessimism present in the EU and described in the introductory chapter, many observers agree that the impact of the institutional and policy innovations of the last months (e.g. the Juncker Plan and Quantitative easing) has been limited. Europe’s problems, such as high unemployment, timid economic recovery, not to mention migration flows, are still to be adequately
addressed, while the new political challenges for the EU have become massive.

As for the policy package needed to address the crisis, there is a growing consensus among experts on what has to be done (see recent editions of *Social developments in the European Union*). We refer here to some of the most widely-debated measures for EMU (Schmidt in this volume for a more detailed overview of the measures to take):  

First, many have talked of the need to rebalance the EMU architecture, by adding a Banking and Fiscal Union to the Monetary Union. The former helps to avoid the vicious circle between sovereign debts and banks, which increases the cost of credit to business and households in the Southern Member States, leading to less investment (Geeroms and Karboknik 2014). There is also increasing support for the idea of a Fiscal Union. In the wake of the crisis, the Eurozone has proved unable to manage its macro-economic imbalances. Without enhanced EU-level fiscal capacity (based on pooled revenue collection and expenditure), the euro will always be vulnerable to asymmetric shocks. Recent declarations from German and French leaders have revamped the debate and voiced support for the work of the EU working group, headed by former EU Commissioner Mario Monti, on a Eurozone fiscal capacity.

Second, the EMU needs a more ambitious strategy to address asymmetric shocks and create an integrated monetary union, with more effective tools at its disposal than simple budgetary and economic coordination. Growth-oriented investments should help those states that suffer a sovereign debt crisis and consequently have to implement austerity measures. Full activation of the European Structural and Investment Funds has been proposed, to spread more efficient employment and social policies. More flexible implementation of the Fiscal Compact for those Member States with lower debts and deficit levels is another possible strategy. This should be allowed to stimulate

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1. Some of the measures listed below are proposed for the EU and/or the EMU.
2. The creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), a joint resolution authority, provides the basis for further financial integration in Europe.
internal demand and help the recovery of all Member States, especially those trapped in devaluation (De Grauwe 2013).

Third, the EMU needs automatic stabilisers and new forms of redistribution to boost internal demand while improving solidarity between Member States. This may lead to – as one of various proposals – a binding European framework on minimum income protection. Minimum income protection gives substance to the idea of social rights in a more solidaristic Europe. It would also oblige all Member States to have a national minimum income. Others have proposed the activation of a Social Solidarity Fund, to provide food assistance where it is most needed. Another proposal has been the launch of a European unemployment insurance scheme: this would consist of a basic safety-net to protect workers, by shifting a minor part of national payroll taxes to the European fund, in order to redistribute resources (Natali 2014).

While many agree on these and other measures, the problem is how to change the EU policy agenda in the direction mentioned above. The new priorities – economic growth, solidarity between Member States and some form of redistribution - would need new political institutions and a new political approach to the integration process.

2. The EU political dilemma and the broader democratic challenge in Europe

As well as proposals to tackle the social legacy of the crisis, the Eurozone also requires different governance procedures to help the EU be seen as legitimate in the eyes of European citizens. Here we will analyse the major political risks to be addressed.

The political effects of the lingering economic and social crisis are already visible. In the short term, it has led to unrest in the form of strikes and unpredictable electoral outcomes, the latter occurring most

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3. Right now, Italy, for example, has an inadequate minimum income and Greece doesn't have one at all.
4. Another issue under debate is the setting up of some form of coordination of minimum wages in the EU. Such a common framework would ensure that cross-border mobility could be encouraged without jeopardizing national social arrangements.
apparently in Greece but also in France, Denmark, and Sweden. In the medium term, it will lead to unsustainable divergence between EU Member States. The gap between the North and the South will widen in terms of employment rates, levels of education (Agostini and Natali in this volume), healthcare (Stamati and Baeten in this volume) and more. In the long term, this increasing social divergence and the presence of a large group of unemployed youth (the ‘Lost Generation’) will result in the EU losing political credibility with huge groups of Europeans. The risk is that the result of the EP elections, with the growing support for anti-Europe political forces, could be the first sign of a more dramatic change in EU politics in the coming years.

As stressed above, these political developments have led to a new political dilemma for the EU. On the one hand, the ‘integration by stealth’ pursued by EU policymakers in the last few years has proven ineffective. The more frequent references to intergovernmentalism and supranational technocratic decision-making have not increased effectiveness and legitimacy. On the other hand, there is a risk that the repoliticisation of the EU advocated by many analysts in order to improve the legitimacy of the EU could, in fact, heighten conflicts and provide more power to those political movements that want to go back to purely national policymaking.

2.1 Merkel’s Union method is not a solution

One aspect of the dilemma is the fact that technocratic and intergovernmental policymaking is, by itself, no longer sufficient to address the threats mentioned above. It has proved to lack both input and output legitimacy; it is not subject to direct democratic control, and is not effective in solving problems. This shortcoming is true for the ECB and its increased role in monetary and economic policy. As stressed by Majone (2010), while many define the ECB as a truly federal institution that offers rapid solutions whenever EU political institutions are weak and unable to take decisions, it is in fact a perpetuation of the misguided

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institutional assumptions of the past. The bank's role as a fully independent body is the result of a lack of mechanisms for economic governance. Until these failings are fully addressed, the ECB, by default, will continue to exercise authority over the entire domain of monetary policy. But as stressed above, without a true fiscal union and a direct assumption of responsibility by the political government of the EU, such a strategy will not be effective (Natali 2014).

The rise of intergovernmentalism is generating further tensions. Key decisions taken since the crisis have been based on intergovernmental agreements and are perceived as an imposition by Germany. As a consequence, input legitimacy is weak and open to contestation. The combination of technocratic supranationalism and intergovernmental agreements underpins the so-called Union method (Chopin 2014). Merkel's idea of the 'Union method' implies a new division of labour between EU institutions (supranational where possible) and national governments (intergovernmental where needed) (Behr and Helvig 2012). The latter consists in fact of a new German pre-eminence – sometimes expressed through a formal Franco-German leadership – at the new decision-making centre. The process focuses on narrow, short-term goals, while the long-term vision is weak. In the words of Amato et al. (2013: 179), 'choices appear to be dictated by political appraisals leading to a preference for any formula on which it is easier for national leaders to reach an immediate agreement. (... ) It has no prospects, is indistinct and poses problems that are difficult to solve, given the competition and conflict between Community sources and intergovernmental sources'. What is more, this exacerbates legitimacy problems and reduces the common trust between Member States. As stressed by Behr and Helvig (ibid.: 11), 'by failing to embed this new approach within a comprehensive vision for Europe's future, German actions inevitably appear threatening and domineering to the rest of Europe'.

The Union method has been used to promote austerity and the rigid implementation of what is called the 'Brussels-Frankfurt' consensus: a
sort of European declination of the ‘Washington consensus’ of the 1980s (Fitoussi and Saraceno 2012). In line with the ‘Brussels-Frankfurt’ consensus, the EU is anchored to three main principles:

— Inflation and debt are seen as the major problems for the European economies. As a consequence, fiscal consolidation and strict monetary policies are the cornerstones of balanced economic growth, so economic actors have confidence and may invest;
— internal devaluation is based on labour market flexibility and a gradual reduction of social rights and wage levels. Such a reduction should boost competitiveness and thus economic growth;
— it is then assumed that these problems can be addressed by the institutional design agreed on at Maastricht: unitary monetary policy and a coordinated but still nation-based budgetary policy. The ECB is the main actor, if not the only actor, which can stabilise the economic context through monetary policy decisions and there is thus no need for a EU budget to address asymmetric shocks (Beetsma and Giuliodori 2010).

Both the political and economic assumptions underlying the EU approach to the crisis are questionable and, after all, the measures introduced so far have not proved effective. Even if the last round of negotiations on the Greek crisis in the summer of 2015 seems to confirm the validity of the ‘Union method’, the efficacy of this approach is far from certain.

2.2 Repoliticisation of the EU: an urgent but risky remedy

The other side of the EU political dilemma concerns the risks of repoliticisation. In line with the ‘EU democratic deficit thesis’, some analysts have stressed that the European Union needs a more democratic design to improve its legitimacy. Greater political competition is desirable for many reasons: European citizens would be able to choose between alternative political leaders and agendas, and form preferences; competition would also provide policymakers with a stronger political mandate; and it might lead to the formation of a European demos (Follesdal and Hicks 2005 quoted in Korfer 2014). The recent politico-institutional steps mentioned in the introductory chapter show that the EU has moved towards the politicisation of EU
politics through the reinforced role of the EP. In particular, the designation of leading candidates for the presidency of the Commission and the more explicit role of the EP have been regarded as an appropriate means to address the democratic deficit (Korfer 2014).

Repoliticisation would also provide more channels for challenging the austerity paradigm that has dominated the last few years of integration. The last EP elections, as well as a number of recent national and subnational elections, have shown the emergence of new political movements, which are against this paradigm. Repoliticisation would give more political leverage to the opponents of austerity, thus facilitating the adoption of those reforms we have listed above, including the setting up of a truly EU fiscal capacity and a more politics-driven monetary and macro-economic policy.

So the question remains: do we need a political earthquake at EU and national levels, in order to see this major revision of the EU plan come true? This debate seems to be the key challenge facing political leaders and the trade union movement alike. While all that we have seen above leads us to think that such an earthquake is precisely what we need, this thinking could in fact lead to further problems for the EU and its future survival. As stressed by Diamond et al. (2015), the rise of radical and populist forces poses a profound challenge to Europe’s traditional political parties, national and EU political institutions. And while citizens in the north are increasingly attracted to the Eurosceptic, anti-immigrant parties of the right, the turn to the left by citizens in the south appears to be based on scepticism concerning supranational institutions. Both trends are challenging the hegemony of traditional parties, and of social democrats in particular. In the words of Koole (2015): social democrats ‘are faced with the challenge of keeping alive the possibility of redistributive politics without losing out on efficiency (...) The trend towards the growing importance of non-majoritarian institutions should therefore be critically scrutinized in order to avoid being dragged into a technocratic logic that reinforces the neoliberal agenda’. If social democratic parties are not able to distance themselves

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7. This seems to be the case in the Southern periphery, where political movements from the right and the left are increasingly opposing austerity measures promoted by the EU.
8. Non-majoritarian institutions, such as the ECB, are those insulated from direct political control.
from austerity, they will be the first victims of anti-Europe movements. In such a political context, repoliticisation of the EU can be seen as a solution but it might also intensify conflicts and make agreements to reform the EU extremely difficult to achieve.

What is more, the rise of radical anti-Europe leaders could force countries to withdraw from the Eurozone. A new populist leadership in EU members could further destabilise the political context. This could also be the effect of a round of referenda such as the recent Scottish vote (Matthijs and Blyth 2015).

2.3 The democratic challenge at supra-national and national level

The EU political dilemma mentioned above is in fact related to a much broader democratic challenge to Europe. This is a problem for the EU: the previous section has provided evidence of the weak input and output legitimacy of the Union, which is part of the ‘policy without politics’ syndrome. But it is also a challenge for national democratic institutions.

Nation States and their institutions have been destabilised by many events in recent years. All this is very much related to what Vivien Schmidt (2006 and 2010) calls the ‘politics without policy’ syndrome: increasing numbers of policies are transferred from the national political arena to the EU, leaving national citizens with little direct input into key policies that affect them. National policymakers thus have full political legitimacy but little power to decide on policies. The recent Greek referendum of 2015 is just the most recent example of such a clash. In the past, the Irish referendum of 2007 and the announced but then cancelled referendum in Greece in 2011 provided evidence of the limited room to manoeuvre for national decision makers in shaping their policy agenda. Still in the Southern periphery we saw the emergence of technocratic governments that, with the support of the EU, replaced political governments to solve the debt crisis.

All in all, domestic policymakers are increasingly constrained by decisions taken by supranational institutions and/or international organisations with much weaker democratic legitimacy (such as the IMF in the
context of the so-called Troika) (Reho 2014). As stressed by Armingeon and Guthmann (2014), with reference to the Great Recession, support for national democracy declined dramatically during the crisis. Philippe Schmitter (2014) has recently listed some of the key symptoms of the democratic malaise: increased abstention from voting, lack of identification with political parties, trade unions or professional associations, citizens’ mistrust towards their elected officials.

3. The potential role of trade unions in addressing dilemmas and challenges

The democratic challenge evident at both EU and national level is largely intertwined with the present and future of the trade union movement. The latter is part of the actual problems, but can be part of the solution to both challenges and dilemmas. Unions do contribute to the functioning of the legitimizing mechanisms at the core of democracy. We refer here to mechanisms that reinforce input, output and throughput legitimacy (Schmidt 2010: 7).

Trade unions help to express social demands, through their membership, campaigns and demonstrations (input legitimacy). Labour unions also help increase output legitimacy through effective policymaking procedures improving policy performance. Finally, trade unions may contribute to throughput legitimacy, via open policymaking, where citizens organized in interest-based organizations have an influence on the decision-making process. The three-fold role of the labour movement applies at national and EU level at the same time and can be crucial in a context characterised by the crisis and mounting popular disillusionment.

As stressed by Hyman (this volume), the key challenge for the union movement is to organize the discontent with austerity measures and to react to the decline in their organisational and political resources. The 2015 ETUC congress in Paris may represent a starting point, where trade unions try to envisage a new strategy to shape EU integration in the coming years and react to their perceived weakness. European trade unions and the ETUC will discuss their future, and the strategy to pursue in the next few years to represent workers’ interests. Here we propose a few issues to start off a broader reflection.
The new political context may be seen as an opportunity to go beyond austerity and poorly implemented neo-liberal strategies, while regaining a central political and social role. Yet there is also a risk that the new social and political movements will result in further attacks on the trade union movement, perceived as part of the status quo.

3.1 Trade unions under siege both at EU and national level

Trade unions are under siege and contribute in some respects to the democratic challenge in Europe (Serrano et al. 2011). The first challenge is the decline of social dialogue and concertation as we knew them. Political institutions at both the EU and national levels seem to disregard the role of social partners and their potential contribution to solving the crisis (output and throughput legitimacy). While social pacts at country level have experienced a decline, European social dialogue has weakened (Degryse 2011). The latter was launched by the then European Commission President Jacques Delors in Val Duchesse as a way to involve social partners in the Single Market process. 30 years later, the machinery seems to be stuck and unable to produce results (Vincenti 2015). Some point to enlargement, the financial and economic crisis, and the vetoing role of employers as the main determinants of such a stalemate (Degryse and Clauwaert 2012). Trade unions have also experienced a decline in social concertation at the national level. In the view of some authors, this has been the effect of a number of factors undermining the trade union movement: the decline in membership, the changing values in European societies, globalisation, the changing structure of the production systems and labour markets (Schnabel 2013). For others this is the consequence of the inability of trade unions to provide effective policy proposals for exiting the crisis, and of the increased mistrust between social partners themselves, with a certain cooling of employer attitudes (Culpepper and Regan 2014).

The second challenge comes from the new political forces and social movements. This is a new phenomenon especially in Southern Europe. Here we see the main problems facing trade unions in their attempts to contribute to input legitimacy. New social movements are quite suspicious of traditional social forces. Movements such as the Spanish Indignados and the Italian movements for the safeguard of common goods (e.g. water) perceive themselves as critical and opposed to trade
union confederations. As stressed by Pochet (2015), the newly emerging parties, such as Syriza in Greece or Podemos in Spain, lack the kind of historic relations with the trade unions that characterised traditional social-democratic parties. Yet the situation could evolve towards a new reinforced dialogue between far-left and trade unions. This is a possibility in Greece, where Syriza has promised to restore the institutional collective bargaining machinery.

3.2 A four-fold strategy for trade unions

Analysts have already proposed strategies for the trade union movement to pursue, to avoid marginalisation and be in a position to address the democratic challenge (see Hyman in this volume for a detailed overview). Four points are usually referred to: new organisational strategies to attract further members; an alliance with new political and social movements that are against austerity; providing new benefits and resources to their membership; and – at EU level – a new impulse for the European social dialogue. While these factors concern the reinvigoration of trade unions, we think they could also help to address the EU dilemma mentioned above. Stronger unions may help improve the legitimacy and effectiveness of EU socio-economic governance and address the democratic challenge at both EU and national level. These strategies to reinvigorate trade unions may also contribute to improving the democratic quality of policymaking in the three dimensions mentioned above: input, output and throughput legitimacy.

Innovative union strategies for ‘organizing’ new groups of workers outside the union itself, seeking alliances with other civil society organizations, not only for political and strategic reasons but also in order to reach out to the not-yet-unionized social groups which are most likely to become union members, are some of the strategies to relaunch trade unions (Bryson et al. 2011; Connolly et al. 2014). As stressed by Hyman in this volume, there have been recent attempts to forge new alliances between social movements and trade unions in Southern Europe. This informal alliance exists in Spain, where the Indignados recently called for ‘inclusive’ strikes in which the unemployed, students, and precarious workers could participate, while other social movements became involved in the strikes launched by trade unions. In the past, union action was quite closed to other movements.
These alliances have also been analysed by Ebbinghaus et al. (2011). Through a multilevel analysis, the authors have tested a number of hypotheses about the key determinants of trade union membership. Among others, the authors stressed the role of coalition-building. In the words of Ebbinghaus et al. (ibid.: 121), ‘there is a need for coalition-building with other social movement organizations which pursue similar goals. This can also serve a recruitment aim of unions, given (the) findings that those employees involved in other organizations are more likely to also join a trade union’. These strategies for new alliances and coalitions may also contribute to input legitimacy whenever these largely new demands and pressures find a place in the more institutional debate and agenda.

Other analysts have talked about the option of setting up new forms of welfare provision for their members, through, for instance, occupational schemes providing benefits and services (Natali and Pavolini 2014). Welfare benefits and services provide selective incentives for workers and may enhance their own social rights. In the past, such schemes have allowed trade unions to address new social risks well before state and public institutions in general were ready to set up institutions to protect workers. Especially in those countries where policies to address new social risks (such as skills obsolescence and family-work reconciliation) are insufficient, trade unions could consider occupational schemes as a means to protect their own rank and file. This option may help improve social policymaking and policy performances (output legitimacy) while integrating stakeholders in the decision making process (throughput legitimacy).

The fourth strategy concerns the EU level. European social dialogue (ESD) has re-entered the EU agenda. This could also help to put trade unions centre stage, with positive impact on both input, output and throughput legitimacy in the EU. But two major questions are unresolved: do employers really want to negotiate? And then, do trade unions agree amongst themselves (Degryse and Clauwaert 2012)? In the past both the Commission and employers proved to be at odds with the spirit of shared trust and common goals that is at the basis of any cooperation. This deficit is true for ESD and the involvement of trade unions in the European Semester (ETUC 2014; ETUI 2015).
But there are signs of a change. As outlined by Welz (2015), the social partners were consulted prior to the publication of the Annual Growth Survey (AGS), and the dialogue with the Employment Committee (EMCO) and the Social Protection Committee (SPC) has further improved. Starting with the Italian Presidency, the partners participate directly in discussions at the informal meetings of EPSCO ministers.

What is more, Commission President Juncker recently tried to relaunch this programme. The high-level conference in Brussels on 5 March was the first signal (Welz 2015). This conference of EU leaders discussed how to strengthen social dialogue with EU cross-industry social partners and their national affiliates. This first step was followed by the meeting of the Ministers for Employment and Social Affairs in Riga in April 2015. EU policymakers discussed informally ways to re-launch a true social dialogue, with a view to achieving inclusive growth, fostering employment and attaining economic, social and territorial cohesion. The third signal was the recent agreement between EU social partners on the fifth work programme ‘Partnership for inclusive growth and employment’ presented on 14 July 2015. The social partners agreed on a list of issues to address: an autonomous framework agreement on active ageing and an inter-generational approach; efforts to implement autonomous framework agreements; highlighting the importance of more public and private investment; preparation of joint conclusions promoting better reconciliation of work and family life and gender equality; improvement of skills-development and active labour market policies; contributing to the efforts of the EU institutions to develop a mobility package, addressing loopholes and enforcement issues on worker mobility and promoting mobility of apprenticeships (ETUC 2015). It is still to be seen whether this new phase means full support of open dialogue or just a formal involvement of trade unions with no real weight in the economic and social decisions to be taken.

While it is clear that these complementary strategies are not an easy and fast solution to the main challenges facing the trade union movement, they can bolster its role and thus contribute to a fairer, more legitimate and social Europe.

July 2015
References


Chronology 2014
Key events in European policy

Cécile Barbier

January

1st January: Greece takes over from Lithuania in the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU). Latvia adopts the European single currency. 18 of the 28 European Union Member States now belong to the Eurozone.

1st January: the final restrictions on the free movement of Bulgarian and Romanian workers are lifted. Bulgarian and Romanian nationals will now be able to move freely throughout the territory of the European Union, without having to apply for a work permit. Bulgarian and Romanian nationals could already move freely in the 19 (out of 28) Member States which had not imposed transitional measures, following the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the Union in 2007. More than three million Bulgarian and Romanian nationals now live in other Member States – a figure which, according to the European Commission, should not change as a result of the lifting of these restrictions, MEMO/14/1 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-1_en.htm).

7 January: according to Eurostat, the European statistical office, the annual inflation rate in the Eurozone was estimated at 0.8% in December 2013, down from 0.9% in the month of November. This drop in the inflation rate in December renewed fears of deflation in the Eurozone, STAT/15/3000 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STAT-15-3000_en.htm).

8 January: official launch of the Greek presidency of the Council of the EU. In the view of the Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras, ‘the Greek Presidency is an opportunity to show that the future will not be defined by the crisis, but by the lessons learnt from the crisis’.
9 January: confirmation of the monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB). The ECB announces that the interest rate for the principal refinancing operations, the marginal lending facility and the deposit facility will remain unchanged, at, respectively, 0.25%, 0.75% and 0%. The ECB is expecting higher growth in 2014, and a drop in inflation. At the press conference, its President, Mario Draghi, stated that: ‘We remain determined to maintain the high degree of monetary accommodation and to take further decisive action if required’, Doc.is140109 (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2014/html/is140109.en.html).

13-15 January: in order to assess the efficacy of the Troika (European Community, IMF and European Commission), the European Parliament’s committee on economic and monetary affairs organised a hearing of the European Commissioner Olli Rehn, the former ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet, and the Managing Director of the European Stability Mechanism (MES), Klaus Regling.

14 January: Greece will achieve a primary budget surplus (apart from debt-servicing) ‘of at least 800 million euros’ in 2013 given the outcome of the State budget over 12 months, according to deputy Finance minister, Christos Staikouras. Over the twelve months of 2013, the State budget was in surplus by 691 million euros, according to the documents presented by the Minister to the press. This, having taken account of, in particular, local government budgets, should result in the final primary surplus referred to by the Minister. Such a surplus was one of Greece’s main macroeconomic objectives for 2013, and the condition set by its creditors for future debt-relief (http://www.ekathimerini.com/4d cgi/_w_articles_wsite2_1_14/01/2014_535797).

21 January: employment and social situation. The European Commission publishes the 2013 edition of the ‘Employment and Social Developments in Europe Review’. This report shows that a quarter of Europeans are at risk of poverty or social exclusion, that there is an ongoing rise in long-term unemployment, as well as an increase in the number of precarious jobs. When presenting the report, László Andor, the European Commissioner for employment, social affairs and inclusion, insisted that: ‘We need to pay attention not only to job creation, but also to the quality of jobs, in order to achieve a sustainable recovery that will not only reduce unemployment but also poverty’, IP/14/43 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-43_en.htm).

22 January: according to Eurostat, public debt in the Eurozone was falling, and amounted to 92.7% of gross domestic product (GDP) in the third quarter of 2013, compared to 93.4% in the second quarter. It is the first time that Eurozone debt has been seen to fall since the fourth quarter of 2007. In the European Union as a whole, public debt was rising, and stood at 86.8% of GDP in the third quarter of 2013, compared to 86.7% in the previous quarter, STAT/15/3600 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STAT-15-3600_en.htm).

29 January: Visegrad group. The Prime Ministers of the Visegrad group (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic) met in Budapest to discuss the Ukrainian crisis. In their final statement, they express their concern as to the situation in Kiev and call for an immediate end to the violence. They call on the political forces in the government, the opposition and the demonstrators to preserve a ‘stable, democratic and prosperous Ukraine’. They express their intention to finance projects supporting the development of civil society in Ukraine from the International Visegrad Fund. Finally, they ask for an increase in the Erasmus+ budget, to enable Ukrainian students to study in EU Member States (https://www.premier.gov.pl/files/files/oswiadczenie_v4.pdf).

30 January: the President of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Dean Spielmann, gives his annual press conference to present the annual activity report of the Court for 2013. He highlights the ECHR’s very good results, especially in terms of efficiency: in 2013, the number of pending applications dropped below the ‘symbolic 100,000 mark’ (99,900 for 2013), whereas in September 2011 the figure stood at 160,000. The President also listed those countries from which most applications came: Russia, Italy and Ukraine. Turkey has moved from second to fifth position. The 800 million inhabitants of the 47 member countries of the Council of Europe may apply to the ECHR in cases involving suspected infringements of the European Convention on Human Rights (http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Annual_report_2013_prov_FRA.pdf).
31 January: according to Eurostat, inflation in the Eurozone fell slightly in January 2014, at 0.7%, compared to 0.8% in the previous month. The main products accounting for inflation are food, alcoholic beverages and tobacco, with an annual rate of 1.7%, services at 1.1%, industrial non-energy goods at 0.2%, and energy at -1.2%, STAT 14/18.

February


6 February: no deflation. The European Central Bank (ECB) announces that its principal rates are remaining unchanged. The interest rates for the main financing operations, the marginal lending facility and the deposit facility will remain at, respectively, 0.25%, 0.75% and 0%. The ECB is expecting stronger growth in 2014 and a drop in inflation. In the words of its President, Mario Draghi, ‘There is no deflation in the Eurozone’, Doc.is140206.

7 February: the German Constitutional Court announces that it is referring to the Court of Justice of the European Union a complaint against the European Central Bank (ECB), concerning its ‘unlimited’ compulsory bond-buying Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) scheme, Press release No.9/2014.

9 February: Switzerland against the free movement of persons. Switzerland agrees to hold a referendum against mass immigration. The turn-out is 55.8%. The motion is carried, with 50.3% voting ‘yes’ (http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/fr/index/themen/17/03/blank/key/2014/01.html).

12 February: at the conference held to celebrate 20 years of the European Monetary Institute, the President of the ECB, Mario Draghi, declares that banking union will contribute to more sustainable financial integration in the Eurozone, since it can reduce the risk of financial

**12 February:** the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announces its approval of a transfer of 910 million euros to Portugal. This brings the total amount of loans granted to Portugal, since it first received financial assistance in May 2011, to 25.1 billion euros. The Troika will return to Lisbon on 20 February 2014 to begin its 11th quarterly evaluation mission. This will be the penultimate review before Portugal’s completion of its aid programme, planned for May 2014, Press Release No.14/55 (http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2014/pr1455.htm).

**14 February:** resignation of the Italian President of the Council, Enrico Letta. The decision was announced following the vote, on 13 February, held by the national leadership of his party, the Democratic Party, calling for a change of government. The motion, proposed by the head of the party, Matteo Renzi, was adopted by 136 out of 150 votes. The Italian President accepted Enrico Letta’s decision and began consultations with the political groups with a view to appointing a new government.

**16 February:** according to the Greek Prime Minister, Antonis Samaras, Greece, in 2013, achieved a primary budgetary surplus of more than 1.5 billion euros, exceeding the demands of lenders with respect to debt reduction (http://www.tovima.gr/en/article/?aid=568261).

**18 February:** fiscal consolidation. In the view of the Ecofin Council, ‘fiscal consolidation and restoring lending to the economy need to go hand-in-hand with well-designed structural reforms aimed at promoting sustainable growth and jobs, competitiveness and a sustained correction of macroeconomic imbalances, through productivity increases and strengthening the adjustment capacity of Member States’ economies’.

**21 February:** further structural reforms. In its report ‘Economic Policy Reforms 2013. Going for Growth’, the OECD recommends that its Member States implement ambitious structural reforms, in order to bring about renewed stable and strong growth. The report analyses the economic policies followed by OECD Member States, and highlights
measures which could still be taken to relaunch productivity, improve efficiency in the public sector and educational outcomes, while strengthening the labour market.

**26 February:** German constitutional court/European elections. The Court in Karlsruhe declares, by 5 votes to 3, that the 3% threshold which, until now, parties had to reach in order to obtain a seat in the European Parliament, is unconstitutional. Henceforth, a party will only have to poll around 1% of votes in order to obtain a seat in the EP, while the threshold will be 5% for elections to the Federal parliament. The verdict issued by these judges has implications not just for Germany. This decision paves the way for representation of the neo-Nazi party (National Democratic Party of Germany - NPD) in the EP. 2 BvE 2/13 [https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2014/bvg14-014.html](https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2014/bvg14-014.html).

March

**4 March:** resignation of the Estonian Prime Minister, Andrus Ansip.

**5 March:** Europe 2020. The Commission launches a consultation on the European Union growth strategy, and publishes a communication on the Europe 2020 Strategy. This communication indicates that progress towards the objectives of the Strategy has been mixed, [MEMO/14/149](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-149_en.htm).

**5 March:** European Semester. The European Commission publishes conclusions from the in-depth reviews of the economies of 17 Member States identified as showing signs of ‘macroeconomic imbalance’. These are the 16 Member States identified in November 2013, plus Ireland, since it completed its economic adjustment programme, [IP/14/216](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-216_en.htm).

**6 March:** European citizenship devalued in Portugal. According to the office of Deputy Prime Minister Paulo Portas, 471 ‘golden visas’ were granted in 2013, of which 440 were linked to the purchase of real-estate (for a total value of 306.7 million euros, including 80% for property purchases and 20% for transfers). No visas were issued for job creation. Paulo Portas explains that account should be taken of the revival of the
real-estate sector, in which transactions increased by 40% in 2013. While government forecasts for 2014 expected investment of 500 million euros, 208 ‘golden visas’ have already been issued in the first two months of the year, implying 108 million euros investment, of which 79% is coming from China.

6-7 March: the electoral congress of the European People’s Party (EPP) was attended by the former Ukrainian Prime Minister, Ioulia Timochenko, and the Mayor of Kiev, Vitali Klitschko, whose party has links with the EPP. Following a vote on the EPP candidate for the post of President of the European Commission, at the end of the congress, the former Luxembourg Prime Minister, Jean-Claude Juncker, received 382 votes, against 245 for his co-runner Michel Barnier, the European Commissioner responsible for the single market. Around 100 delegates refused to take part in the vote, not daring to go against the voting advice of the German Chancellor. (http://www.euractiv.com/elections/left-accuses-juncker-cover-candi-news-534090).

10 March: the conclusions of the EPSCO (Employment, Social policy, Health and Consumer affairs) Council describe the consequences of the crisis: ‘fragile growth, too little and often low quality jobs and more people exposed to poverty and social exclusion’. Although economic indicators seem to suggest a timid recovery, the social situation is still precarious, to say the least. The EPSCO Council conclusions state that ‘the social situation in the European Union is not improving’ and that ‘in some countries the situation is even worsening’, Doc.7388/14 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/fr/lsa/141465.pdf).

11 March: 70 Portuguese public figures, from the left and right of the political spectrum, sign a manifesto calling for ‘responsible restructuring’ of the country’s public debt, with losses for creditors, within the European institutional framework. This initiative is strongly criticised by the Prime Minister and the economic press, who feel that the timing was particularly poor, Público, 11/03.

16 March: Self-determination referendum in Crimea (Ukraine). Results: 96.6% ‘yes’ votes in favour of joining Russia.

18 March: confirmation of the legality of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in Germany. The judges of the Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe rule on the legal challenges to the ESM. As many as 37,000 Germans had challenged this mechanism: MPs, lawyers, but also many citizens coming together in an association ‘More democracy’. These complaints are deemed ‘partially inadmissible and, moreover, unfounded’. ‘Despite the commitments entered into, the budgetary autonomy of the Bundestag has been sufficiently preserved’, finds the Court. 2 BvR 1390/12 (https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2014/bvg14-023.html).

19 March: the Commission accepts the first ever successful European Citizens’ Initiative. According to the Commission, the organisers of the Right2Water European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) are asking it ‘to ensure that all EU citizens enjoy the right to water and sanitation, to exclude water supply and management of water resources from internal market rules and liberalisation, and to increase its efforts to achieve universal access to water and sanitation around the world’, IP-14-277 (https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/141749.pdf).


24 March: traineeships: The EPSCO Council adopts a recommendation on a quality framework for traineeships. The recommendation is intended to provide guidelines and tools to the Member States, trainees, traineeship providers and all other stakeholders, in order to ensure that...
traineeships become an efficient means of easing transitions from training or unemployment to employment, OJ C 88, 27 March 2014.

April

4 April: Euro-demonstration. Social dumping was one of the main issues behind the Euro-demonstration, attended by 40,000 people in Brussels, in response to an appeal put out in early December 2013 by the Executive Committee of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC).

6 April: legislative elections in Hungary. Once again, victory in these elections went to the Fidesz party, under the Prime Minister, Viktor Orban. The number of seats in Parliament had been severely cut compared to 2010, from 386 to 199. Turn-out was 61.7%.

10 April: Russia’s voting rights suspended in the Council of Europe. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe declares the ‘annexation’ of Crimea by Russia to be contrary to its Statute, and votes for the suspension until the end of 2014 of the voting rights of the 18 Russian members. However, the Assembly also states that: ‘political dialogue should remain the preferred way to find a compromise, and there should be no return to the pattern of the Cold War’, Resolution 1990 (2014), (http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-EN.asp?fileid=20882&lang=en).

14 April: International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s World Economic Outlook. According to this IMF report, there is still a relatively high risk of deflation in the Eurozone, where it is still at around 20%, but the risk remains more or less negligible in the other countries. In view of this risk, the chief economist of the IMF calls on the ECB to take further action; a request taken up by the Managing Director Christine Lagarde, who calls upon the ECB to move from words to deeds. ‘World Economic Outlook, Recovery Strengthens, Remains Uneven’ (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/pdf/text.pdf).
May


5 May: The European Commission’s spring forecast. According to the Commission, there is ‘a continuing economic recovery in the European Union following its emergence from recession one year ago’. In the view of the Commission, the ‘gradual nature of this upturn is in line with previous recoveries following deep financial crises. While financing conditions remain benign on average, substantial differences persist across Member States and across firms of different size’. Inflation should remain low, both in the EU as a whole (1% in 2014, 1.5% in 2015) and in the Eurozone (0.8% and 1.2%), IP/14/513 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-513_en.htm).

5-6 May: Meeting of the Eurogroup. At this meeting of the Eurozone Finance Ministers, the budgetary programmes of the Member States are examined with reference to the conclusions of the European Commission, in order to detect macroeconomic imbalances and to assess the effectiveness of fiscal consolidation in the Eurozone Member States. This is a result of implementation of the Two Pack, setting out common provisions for the monitoring and assessment of draft budgetary plans and for the correction of excessive deficits in the Eurozone Member States. In the context of the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP), introduced by the Six Pack, the Commission found 14 Member States to be suffering from imbalances, i.e. Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Hungary, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. It found the imbalances in Croatia, Italy and Slovenia to be excessive, IP/14/216 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-216_en.htm).

6 May: OECD economic outlook. Following on from the IMF, the OECD expresses its view that the ECB should ‘take new policy actions to move inflation more decisively toward target’, i.e. just below 2%, and ‘to be ready for additional non-conventional stimulus’ (http://www.
oecd.org/newsroom/global-economy-strengthening-but-significant-risks-remain.htm).

**11-25 May:** presidential elections in Lithuania. The former Finance Minister, Dalia Grybauskaitė, an independent candidate, is re-elected.

**22-25 May:** elections to renew the European Parliament of the European Union. The abstention rate is again striking. It has increased in the Union as a whole: 57.46% of the electorate has not voted (compared to 57% in 2009, 54.53% in 2004, and 50.49% in 1999). The nomination by the European political parties of candidates for Commission President has not helped to stem the reduction in turn-out. (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/election-results-2014.html).

**30 May:** the Portuguese Constitutional Court declares three of the four austerity measures in the 2014 budget to be unconstitutional. This issue had been referred to the court by the left-wing opposition. The measures were intended to allow the centre-right government to pursue its austerity programme two weeks after completing its assistance programme.

**June**

**2 June:** in the context of the 2014 European Semester and of budgetary surveillance, the Commission recommends closing the excessive debt procedures for Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Slovakia and the Netherlands. 11 Member States (compared to as many as 24 in 2011) with a deficit of greater than 3% of GDP, will still be subject to this procedure, MEMO/14/388 (europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-388_en.pdf).

**18 June:** smart regulation. As part of the ‘Refit’ (Regulatory Fitness and Performance) programme, the European Commission intends to help the EU to make further progress towards ‘smart regulation’. In this context, the Commission ‘considers it good legislative management to withdraw proposals that do not advance in the legislative process, in order to allow for a fresh start or for alternative ways to achieve the intended legislative purpose. A close scrutiny of all pending proposals before the legislator has resulted in the identification of further proposals which are either outdated or without support by the legislator.
and should therefore be withdrawn. These include proposals on (...)

By way of a reaction, the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC)
restates its opposition to the ‘deregulatory’ Refit programme (http://
www.etuc.org/press/refit-focus-deregulation-remains#.VQwaY9KG9co).

19 June: the Employment, Social policy, Health and Consumer affairs
(EPSCO) Council discussed the employment/social policy aspects of the
Country-Specific Recommendations addressed to countries as part of
the 2014 European Semester. According to the EPSCO Council
conclusions, discussions revealed broad agreement on common
challenges, such as pension adequacy and improving labour market
resilience.

20 June: the ECOFIN Council closes excessive deficit procedures for
Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria and
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26-27 June: European Council. After tough negotiations, the European
Council nominates the former Luxembourg Prime Minister and
European People’s Party (EPP) candidate, Jean-Claude Juncker, as its
proposed choice for European Commission President.

Adoption of the European Council’s strategic agenda. In it, the Council
undertakes to apply the principle of subsidiarity, i.e. ‘to concentrate its
action on areas where it makes a real difference’. According to this text, the
EU ‘should refrain from taking action when Member States can better
achieve the same objectives’. The programme ‘will also benefit from closer
involvement of national parliaments’ in order to enhance the Union’s
credibility, which depends on ‘its ability to ensure adequate follow-up on
July

1st July: Italy takes over the Presidency of the Council of the European Union from Lithuania.


15 July: Jean-Claude Juncker, candidate for President of the European Commission, presents to the European Parliament his ‘political priorities’ for the relaunching of the European economy. On this basis, the Parliament, in a secret vote, confirms him as European Commission President, with a majority of 422 votes; 250 MEPS voted against and 47 abstained.

16 July: extraordinary European Council meeting on the ‘next institutional cycle’. The Heads of State and Government are unable to reach agreement on appointments to top European posts, i.e. the future High Representative for foreign affairs and security policy, and the new President of the European Council. It was agreed to organise another extraordinary European Council meeting on 30 August. Moreover, the Council reiterates its support for a peaceful solution to the crisis in Ukraine, and tightens sanctions against Russia, EUCO 147/14 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/143992.pdf).

17 July: annulment appeal concerning the texts ratifying the fiscal compact. In Belgium, an extremely rare event occurred when legal challenges were brought, questioning whether the various legal instruments transposing the fiscal compact into Belgian law were compatible with the Belgian constitution. Various appeals were brought, by the Ligue des droits de l’homme (‘Human rights league’) and the Centrale nationale des employés (CNE - ‘National Employees’ Collective), the citizens’ collective Constituante.be, members of which include the federal secretary of the ABVV-ACOD (Algemeen Belgisch Vakverbond – Algemene Centrale der Openbare Diensten, Flemish wing of the Public Services union), supported by organisations such as the Federation of CPAS (Public social welfare centres) of the Union of Walloon towns and local authorities.
The actions refer to the ‘act of consent’ linked to the compact, but also to the cooperation agreement between the federal government and the regions, which organises how the compact will apply at all levels of power. The Constitutional Court, which is examining these three actions together, will rule on the point in one sole judgment, probably in the spring of 2015. Rôle 5917, 5920 and 5930, Moniteur belge, 17 July 2014 and http://www.etaamb.be/fr/avis_n2014204426.html.

August

7 August: the ECB President warns of geopolitical risks. Following the monthly conference of ECB governors, Mario Draghi recognises the risk that the crisis with Russia might weaken the European economy. These ‘heightened geopolitical risks ... may have the potential to affect economic conditions negatively’. The ‘geopolitical risks’ referred to by Mario Draghi, meaning the Russian crisis, but also the situations in Iraq, the Middle East, Syria and Libya, might lead to a rise in energy prices and ‘weaker than expected domestic demand’. The ECB will closely monitor the possible repercussions of the crisis with Russia, at a time when Mario Draghi has seen a ‘slowing down in the growth momentum’ in Europe, is140807 (https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2014/html/is140807.en.html).

22 August: meeting of the principal central bankers at Jackson Hole (United States) to discuss employment. The ECB President, Mario Draghi, claims that he is ready to further adjust monetary policy. These words are understood as an announcement of new ‘non-conventional’ policies. He does not excuse governments from carrying out structural reforms where necessary – here he refers to Spain. He also asks European countries to shoulder their responsibilities: Thus, it would be helpful for the overall stance of policy if fiscal policy could play a greater role alongside monetary policy, and I believe there is scope for this, while taking into account our specific initial conditions and legal constraints. These initial conditions include levels of government expenditure and taxation in the euro area that are, in relation to GDP, already among the highest in the world. And we are operating within a set of fiscal rules – the Stability and Growth Pact – which acts as an anchor for confidence and that it would be self-defeating to break. ‘No amount of fiscal or monetary accommodation, however’, he adds, ‘can compensate for the
necessary structural reforms in the euro area’. This means that ‘national structural reforms that tackle this problem can no longer be delayed. This reform agenda spans labour markets, product markets and actions to improve the business environment’, sp140822 (https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2014/html/sp140822.en.html).

30 August: high-level European posts. The European Council elects the Polish politician Donald Tusk as President of the European Council (and of the European Council in its Euro Summit format), and appoints the Italian Federica Mogherini to the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, EUCO 163/14 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/144538.pdf).

September

4 September: reduction in ECB key interest rates. The ECB Governing Council took many decisions which will apply as of 10 September. These consist of a further drop in key interest rates and a programme for buying back assets, principally non-bank debts. The ECB is planning a series of ‘Targeted Long-term Refinancing Operations’ (so-called TLTROs) to encourage banks to lend more to the real economy. The central bank also announced its intention to proceed to the implementation of an Asset-backed Securities Purchase Programme (ABSPP), is141002 (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2014/html/is141002.en.html).

Revision of the ECB’s macroeconomic forecasts for the Eurozone for 2014, 2015 and 2016. Forecast growth has been reduced to +0.9% (as opposed to +1%) for 2014, +1.6% (rather than +1.7%) for 2015, with an upwards correction for 2016: +1.9% (instead of +1.8%). Forecast inflation is reduced to +0.6% (rather than +0.7%) for 2014; it remains the same at +1.1% for 2015 and +1.4% for 2016. ‘ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area’ (https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecbstaffprojections201409en.pdf).

5 September: Jean-Claude Juncker, future European Commission President, sends the Council the list of Commissioners-designate. These designations follow a series of interviews between the President and all
the candidates put forward by the Member States. The list is accepted by Council on the same day, IP/14/965 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-965_en.htm).

10 September: presentation of the new European Commission. Jean-Claude Juncker explains the structure of the new Commission, and the distribution of responsibilities between each Commissioner proposed by Member States. A new feature of this Commission is the creation of 6 new Vice-President posts, with cross-cutting powers, as well as the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy, the Italian Federica Mogherini, who is also a Commission Vice-President. The post of First Vice-President goes to the Dutch politician Frans Timmermans, in charge of better regulation, inter-institutional relations, the rule of law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, MEMO/14/523 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-523_en.htm).


14 September: legislative elections in Sweden. Victory for the Social Democratic party, leading to the forming of a minority coalition government.

15 September: OECD economic forecasts. The OECD is now forecasting growth of no more than 0.8% for 2014, (whilst in May the forecast was still 1.2%), and 1.1% for 2015 (compared with a forecast of 1.7% in May). According to the OECD, forecast growth varies widely between the major Eurozone economies. The growth rate in Germany, for example, is expected to be 1.5% in 2014 and 2015, while in France the figures are 0.4% in 2014 and 1% in 2015. In Italy, Gross Domestic Product is expected to fall by 0.4% in 2014, before recovering by only 0.1% in 2015. In this context, and in light of the risk of a further weakening of demand in the event of deflation, the OECD is calling for a strengthening of the ‘stimulative monetary policy’ pursued in the Eurozone. The OECD welcomes the recent

17 September: failure of ECB financial package. Observers expected a take-up of at least 100 billion for this lending package, with a maturity of July 2018. The Frankfurt monetary institution announces that it has lent 82.6 billion euros to 255 European banks, as part of a targeted four-year loan, the first of a series of eight Targeted long-term Refinancing Operations (TLTROs), announced in early June, to encourage banks to increase lending to the private sector and to stir up the sluggish Eurozone economy.

18 September: referendum on Scottish independence (United Kingdom). The ‘No’ voters win, with 55.3% of the vote.

October

2 October: ECB operations. The Governing Council of the ECB, meeting in Naples, adopts the principal details of the asset-backed securities and covered bond purchase programmes. These programmes will last at least two years. This should enhance transmission of monetary policy, support provision of credit to the Eurozone and provide further monetary policy accommodation, pr141002_1 (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr141002_1.en.html).


17 October: the Westminster Parliament debates the ‘European Union (Referendum) Bill’. This bill on the organising, by 2017, of a referendum
on the United Kingdom’s membership of the European Union will not go beyond a second reading. The British Prime Minister, David Cameron, undertook, in early 2013, to organise such a referendum if he was reelected at the forthcoming parliamentary elections, in May 2015. The aim of this initiative is to counter the rise in power of the eurosceptic party UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party). (http://www.parliament.uk/business/news/2014/october/commons-private-members-bills-17-october-2014/).

**22 October:** voting-in of the European Commission. Following the hearings organised by the relevant committees in the European Parliament, the EP votes in the Juncker Commission. Despite doubts voiced at the parliamentary hearings, the more controversial Commissioners, such as the UK’s Jonathan Hill, in charge of financial stability, financial services and capital markets union, and the Spaniard Miguel Arias Cañete, initially made responsible for climate action and energy, keep their posts.

**22 October:** European Parliament resolution on implementation of the European Semester. The EP resolution ‘notes the speech by the President of the ECB at the annual central bank symposium in Jackson Hole on 22 August 2014; calls on policy makers to draw the right conclusions with regard to monetary, budgetary and structural reform policies with the aim of creating growth and jobs’. The resolution echoes the words of the ECB President, saying that ‘no amount of fiscal or monetary accommodation, however, can compensate for the necessary structural reforms in the euro area’, P8_TA(2014)0038.

**23-24 October:** Eurozone Summit. Following the Euro Summit, the participants agreed ‘that closer coordination of economic policies is essential to ensure the smooth functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union. In this respect, it called for work to continue, in close cooperation with the Commission, to develop concrete mechanisms for stronger economic policy coordination, convergence and solidarity.’ To this end, they ‘invited the President of the Commission, in close cooperation with the President of the Euro Summit, the President of the Eurogroup and the President of the European Central Bank, to prepare next steps on better economic governance in the euro area’, Doc.145454.

November

1st November: the new European Commission takes office, under the leadership of Luxembourg’s Jean-Claude Juncker.

5 November: Luxleaks, or organised tax fraud in Luxembourg. The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, working with around 40 newspapers, including Le Monde, The Guardian, the Süddeutsche Zeitung, Asahi Shinbun and Le Soir, publishes documents proving that more than 1,000 companies have been guilty of tax evasion, with the agreement of the Luxembourg tax administration.

6 November: publication of the secret ECB letters. The European Ombudsman, Emily O’Reilly, welcomes the ECB’s decision to publish, among other things the letter sent by the ECB President, Jean-Claude Trichet, to the Irish Finance Minister in November 2010 (http://www.eureporter.co/fr/frontpage/2014/11/06/ombudsman-welcomes-ecb-decision-to-release-irish-ecb-letter/).

9 November: Spain. Consultation on Catalonian independence. The Constitutional Court had ruled that the organisation of such a referendum was unconstitutional.

11 November: social benefits and European citizenship. The judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) highlights the links between entitlement to social benefits and European citizenship. This judgment comes at a tense time, with much anti-immigration talk in the United Kingdom, where the eurosceptic party – the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), whose original sole policy aim was to see the UK leave the EU – condemns ‘social tourism’. The Court decided that the ‘Union citizen’ directive, as well as the regulation on the coordination of social security systems, do not preclude national legislation which excludes nationals of other Member States from entitlement to certain ‘special non-contributory cash benefits’, although these benefits are granted to nationals in the same situation, in so far as
those nationals of other Member States do not have a right of residence in the host Member State, Case C-333/13.

16 November: the G20 wishes to complete negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) by the end of 2015. Following their meeting in the margins of the G20 summit, U.S. President Barack Obama, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy, as well as the leaders of the major European economic powers – British Prime Minister David Cameron, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President François Hollande, the Italian President of the Council Matteo Renzi and the Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy reaffirmed their commitment to the conclusion of a high standard Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). It is hoped that progress will be made in the negotiations in the course of 2015, on the basis of shared values, and with a view to creating jobs on both sides of the Atlantic and increasing competitiveness, STATEMENT/14/1820 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-1820_fr.htm).

17 November: Social Dialogue. According to the European Commission, ‘social dialogue’ at all levels is a prerequisite for the functioning of Europe’s social market economy and crucial to promote both competitiveness and fairness. STATEMENT-14-1884 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-1884_fr.htm).

22 November: protest against the European Central Bank (ECB). The European network of left-leaning organisations, Blockupy, demonstrates its opposition to austerity policies in a protest in front of the future ECB headquarters in Frankfurt.

25 November: the OECD is concerned about the increasing risk of deflation and calls upon the ECB to take action. In its view, ‘the euro area is grinding to a standstill and poses a major risk to world growth as unemployment remains high and inflation persistently far from target’.

26 November: EU launches Investment Offensive to boost jobs and growth. The ‘Juncker Plan’ launches a ‘European Fund for Strategic Investments’ (EFSI), designed to unlock 315 billion euros, thanks to an initial contribution, acting as a guarantee, of 21 billion euros of ‘public’ money from the European budget and the European Investment Bank. According
to the Commission, this fund should attract private capital, and, by means of a 15-fold multiplier effect, should attain its target of 315 billion euros, IP/14/2128 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-2128_en.htm).

28 November: inauguration of the 2015 European Semester. The European Commission publishes the documents starting off the 2015 European Semester. According to the Commission, the European Semester is an ‘integrated system’, which ‘ensures that there are clearer rules, better coordination of national policies throughout the year, regular follow-ups and the possibility of swifter sanctions for non-compliance. This helps Member States to deliver on their budgetary and reform commitments, while making the Economic and Monetary Union more robust’, IP/14/2235 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-2235_en.htm).

December

1st December: European Council. Former Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk takes over from the Belgian Herman Van Rompuy as President of the European Council. He is also appointed President of the Euro Summit.

9 December: the European Commission President receives the first ‘self-organised’ European citizens’ initiative. This initiative against the TTIP and the CETA has collected a million signatures, despite the Commission’s refusal to register the initial initiative.

12 December: general strike in Italy against reform of the labour market.

16 December: European Commission work programme. This programme ‘represents the new Commission’s political commitment to an approach more focused on priorities and on results’, MEMO/14/2704 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-2704_en.htm).

17 December: right of withdrawal from the EU/Austria. Austrian nationals present a ‘popular initiative calling for withdrawal from the EU’ to the competent authorities, in order to request a referendum on Austria’s withdrawal from the European Union (http://www.currentconcerns.ch/index.php?id=2921).

**18 December:** the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) against EU accession to the European Convention on Human Rights. The 28 EU Member States are members of the Council of Europe, which has 47 member countries in all, and are thus, individually, contracting parties to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which enables any individual to refer a case to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. EU accession as such to the Convention is provided for in the Lisbon Treaty, which came into force in 2009. An agreement to this effect had been concluded in April 2013 between the European Commission and the Council of Europe. The Commission had then addressed the Court of Justice, to ask for its opinion on whether the draft agreement was compatible with EU law. The Court is of the view that ‘the approach adopted in the agreement envisaged, which is to treat the EU as a State and to give it a role identical in every respect to that of any other Contracting Party, specifically disregards the intrinsic nature of the EU and, in particular, fails to take into consideration the fact that the Member States have, by reason of their membership of the EU, accepted that relations between them as regards the matters covered by the transfer of powers from the Member States to the EU are governed by EU law to the exclusion, if EU law so requires, of any other law’. It also notes that ‘there is no provision in the agreement envisaged to ensure such coordination’ between the ECHR and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, Opinion 2/13 (http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=160882&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=150480).

18 December: business consensus on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The leaders of several European countries participate in an event organised by the British employers’ organisation, the CBI (Confederation of British Industry). Seven Prime Ministers - David Cameron (UK), Matteo Renzi (IT), Mariano Rajoy (SP), Ewa Kopacz (PL), Laimdota Straujuma (LAT), Helle Thorning-Schmidt (DK), and Alexander Stubb (FIN) – highlight the business consensus in favour of negotiating a transatlantic partnership (http://news.cbi.org.uk/news/business-consensus-on-ttip/).

19 December: ‘Stop TTIP’ demonstration in Brussels. 4,000 people protest against the negotiations underway between the United States and the European Union, following a call to action from citizens’ alliance D19/20. EU trade union leaders back this opposition to the TTIP.

22 December: the ECB Vice-President presents the future programme for the purchase of government bonds on the secondary market as a simple open market operation. According to Vitor Constâncio: ‘Basically, quantitative easing, which everyone is talking about now, is nothing more than a traditional open market operation, i.e. a central bank’s option to buy or sell securities, even government bonds, in the secondary market, in order to control the monetary supply. This is perfectly legal, and we don’t exclude what is legal’, sp141222 (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/inter/date/2014/html/sp141222.en.html).

27 December: following the announcement of early elections, initially planned for March 2015, the Swedish minority red-green government reverses its decision. An agreement is reached by six of the eight Swedish political parties (without the extreme right and the extreme left), which will last until 2022. This will neutralise the tricky budget issue, which is the reason for the problems facing the government. As a result of this agreement, any government, even a minority government, is authorised to vote through its own budget. The aim is to prevent the extreme right party from undermining the government (often a minority government in Sweden) by backing the opposition. (http://www.government.se/sb/d/19506).

29 December: failure of the third round of Presidential elections in Greece. Early legislative elections will be held on 25 January 2015.
### List of abbreviations

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<tr>
<td>ABSPP</td>
<td>Asset-backed Securities Purchase Programme</td>
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<td>ABVV-ACOD</td>
<td>Algemeen Belgisch Vakverband – Algemene Centrale der Openbare Diensten</td>
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<td>AFL-CIO</td>
<td>American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations</td>
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<td>AGS</td>
<td>Annual Growth Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALMP</td>
<td>Active labour market policy</td>
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<td>AMR</td>
<td>Alert Mechanism Report</td>
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<td>ASISP</td>
<td>Analytical Support on the Socio-Economic Impact of Social Protection Reforms</td>
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<td>BEUC</td>
<td>Bureau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
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<td>CBI</td>
<td>Confederation of British Industry</td>
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<td>CC.OO</td>
<td>Comisiones Obreras</td>
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<td>CEPII</td>
<td>Centre d'Études Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales</td>
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<td>CEPR</td>
<td>Center for Economic Policy Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>CETA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>CEU</td>
<td>Council of the European Union</td>
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<td>CGTP</td>
<td>Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses</td>
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<td>CNE</td>
<td>Centrale nationale des employés / National Employees' Collective</td>
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<td>CPAS</td>
<td>Centre public d'aide sociale / Public social welfare centre</td>
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<td>Country-Specific Recommendation</td>
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<td>Committee on Culture and Education</td>
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<td>Directorate General</td>
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<td>DG CNECT</td>
<td>Directorate General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG COMM</td>
<td>Directorate General for Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG EAC</td>
<td>Directorate General for Education and Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG ECFIN</td>
<td>Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG EMPL</td>
<td>Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion</td>
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<tr>
<td>EASI</td>
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<td>European Central Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHR</td>
<td>European Court of Human Rights</td>
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<td>ECHRM</td>
<td>European Convention of Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECI</td>
<td>European Citizens' Initiative</td>
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<td>ECOFIN</td>
<td>Economic and Financial Affairs (Council)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDP</td>
<td>Excessive Deficit Procedure</td>
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### List of abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>EES</td>
<td>European Employment Strategy</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Economic and Financial Committee</td>
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<td>EFDD</td>
<td>Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy</td>
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<td>EFSF</td>
<td>European Financial Stability Facility</td>
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<td>EFSI</td>
<td>European Fund for Strategic Investments</td>
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<td>EIB</td>
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<td>Excessive Imbalance Procedure</td>
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<td>EMCO</td>
<td>Employment Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMU</td>
<td>Economic and Monetary Union</td>
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<td>ENF</td>
<td>Europe of Nations and Freedom</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<td>EPC</td>
<td>Economic Policy Committee</td>
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<td>EPM</td>
<td>Employment Performance Monitor</td>
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<td>EPP</td>
<td>European People's Party</td>
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<td>EPSCO</td>
<td>Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs (Council)</td>
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<td>EPSU</td>
<td>European Federation of Public Service Unions</td>
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<td>EQF</td>
<td>European Qualifications Framework</td>
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<td>European Social Dialogue</td>
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<td>ESIF</td>
<td>European Structural and Investment Funds</td>
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<td>ESM</td>
<td>European Stability Mechanism</td>
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<td>ESPN</td>
<td>European Social Policy Network</td>
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<td>ET</td>
<td>Education and Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>ETF</td>
<td>European Training Foundation</td>
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<td>European Trade Union Confederation</td>
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<td>European Trade Union Committee for Education</td>
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<td>ETUI</td>
<td>European Trade Union Institute</td>
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<td>ETY</td>
<td>Education, Training and Youth</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUCIS-LLL</td>
<td>European Civil Society Platform on Lifelong Learning</td>
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<td>EUNEC</td>
<td>European Network of Education Councils</td>
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<td>FAME</td>
<td>Forum Alternatif Mondial de l'Eau (AWWF, Alternative World Water Forum)</td>
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<td>FIDH</td>
<td>Fédération internationale des Droits de l'Homme' (International Federation for Human Rights)</td>
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<td>FIMA</td>
<td>Forum Italiano dei Movimenti per l'Acqua, Italian Forum of Water Movements</td>
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<td>FN</td>
<td>Front National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTT</td>
<td>Financial Transaction Tax</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GHDI</td>
<td>Gross Household Disposable Income</td>
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<td>GI</td>
<td>Geographical Indications</td>
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<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPM</td>
<td>Global Policy Model</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIT</td>
<td>Health Systems in Transition</td>
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<td>HSPA</td>
<td>Health Systems Performance Assessment</td>
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<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Financial Institution</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>ISDS</td>
<td>Investor-state Dispute Settlement</td>
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<td>ITUC</td>
<td>International Trade Union Confederation</td>
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<td>JAF</td>
<td>Joint Assessment Framework</td>
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<td>LERU</td>
<td>League of European Research Universities</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOLR</td>
<td>Lender of Last Resort</td>
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<td>LTC</td>
<td>Long-term Care</td>
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<td>MEP</td>
<td>Member of the European Parliament</td>
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<td>MIP</td>
<td>Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MS</td>
<td>Member State</td>
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<td>NAAEC</td>
<td>North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation</td>
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<td>NAALC</td>
<td>North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation</td>
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<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>NEET</td>
<td>Not in Education, Employment or Training</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NHS</td>
<td>National Health Service</td>
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<td>NPD</td>
<td>Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands / National Democratic Party of Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRP</td>
<td>National Reform Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSR</td>
<td>National Strategy Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCA</td>
<td>Optimum Currency Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIRA</td>
<td>Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OJ</td>
<td>Official Journal</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMC</td>
<td>Open Method of Coordination</td>
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<td>OMT</td>
<td>Outright Monetary Transactions</td>
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<tr>
<td>OP</td>
<td>Operational Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSE</td>
<td>European Social Observatory</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAH</td>
<td>Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca (Platform of Mortgage Victims)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>Partito Democratico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PI</td>
<td>Precários Inflexíveis (Inflexible Precarious Workers)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIAAC</td>
<td>Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies</td>
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<tr>
<td>PISA</td>
<td>Programme for International Student Assessment</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PROGRESS</td>
<td>Programme for Employment and Social Solidarity</td>
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<tr>
<td>QMV</td>
<td>Qualified Majority Voting</td>
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<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research &amp; Development</td>
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<td>RCO</td>
<td>Regulatory Cooperation Body</td>
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<td>REFIT</td>
<td>Regulatory Fitness and Performance</td>
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<td>REGIO</td>
<td>DG Regional and Urban Policy</td>
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<td>SANTE</td>
<td>DG Health and Food Safety</td>
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<td>SECGEN</td>
<td>Secretariat General</td>
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<td>SGP</td>
<td>Stability and Growth Pact</td>
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<td>SHI</td>
<td>Social Health Insurance Systems</td>
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<td>SIEPS</td>
<td>Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies</td>
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<td>SIP</td>
<td>Social Investment Package</td>
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<td>SME</td>
<td>Small and Medium-sized Enterprise</td>
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<td>Social Protection Performance Monitor</td>
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<td>SRM</td>
<td>Single Resolution Mechanism</td>
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<td>SSM</td>
<td>Single Supervisory Mechanism</td>
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<td>SWD</td>
<td>Staff Working Document</td>
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<td>TABD</td>
<td>Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue</td>
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<td>TAXUD</td>
<td>Taxation and Customs Union</td>
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<td>TBT</td>
<td>Technical Barriers to Trade</td>
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<td>TEC</td>
<td>Transatlantic Economic Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
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<td>TLTRO</td>
<td>Targeted Longer-term Refinancing Operations</td>
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<td>TPP</td>
<td>Trans-Pacific Partnership</td>
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<td>TSGC</td>
<td>Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance</td>
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<td>Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership</td>
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<td>TWG</td>
<td>Thematic Working Groups</td>
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<td>UGT</td>
<td>Unión General de Trabajadores</td>
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<td>UKIP</td>
<td>United Kingdom Independence Party</td>
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<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
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<td>USTR</td>
<td>United States Trade Representative</td>
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<td>VAT</td>
<td>Value added Tax</td>
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<td>VET</td>
<td>Vocational Education and Training</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
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<td>WPPHSL</td>
<td>Working Party on Public Health at Senior Level</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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### List of country codes

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<td>Slovakia</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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</table>
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He has published extensively on these issues, and frequently serves as a
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