Chapter 2
Slovenia: From corporatism to localised conflict

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1. Introduction

Slovenia has two important features which make it different from most of the other countries of central and eastern Europe that joined the EU as part of the eastward enlargement in and after 2004. Firstly, its neocorporatist industrial relations system (Bohle and Greskovits 2012; Stanojević 2012) which appears much more akin to the continental western European model than to other countries in central and eastern Europe. Secondly, its reliance on domestic sources of capital accumulation, which is in sharp contrast with the Visegrád countries that relied heavily on foreign direct investment (FDI).

Both of these distinctive features changed after the integration of Slovenia into the EU. The unionisation rate among employees fell from 50-60 per cent in the early 2000s to 20-25 per cent around 2020 (Broder 2016; Toš 2021a, 2021b); while near-universal collective bargaining coverage in 2004 fell to around 70 per cent in 2016.[1] The same period saw the sale of many companies to foreign owners, pointing to a possible link between the increased role of foreign capital in the Slovene economy and the position of trade unions. Some observers (Meardi 2012: 151-152) have suggested that the strength of Slovene trade unions is primarily based in domestically-owned companies where managers are well acquainted with the benefits of their role in facilitating 'flexible production'. Alternatively, could foreign multinational companies (MNCs) be expected to follow the industrial relations practices common in western Europe and potentially become leverage for increasing union power, as has been suggested for central and east European countries in general (Myant 2014: 378; Myant 2020: 23)?

The chapter is organised as follows. The next section provides a description of the transition from self-managed socialism to capitalism with special emphasis on developments in industrial relations and in the ownership structure of companies. The following sections feature four case studies of MNCs operating in two important sectors of the economy: automotives and metal and electrical equipment and food retailing.[2] The fifth section summarises the main findings and concludes.

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1. https://ilostat.ilo.org/topics/collective-bargaining/
2. The case studies are based on desk research and interviews with workers' representatives at sector (one in each case) and company levels (two in Tradiret; two in Disco, including one with two activists; one in Appliprod; and two in Autosup). An interview with a management representative in Tradiret was also used. Some of the interviews were conducted as part of the SEGNED project, funded by the Slovene Research Agency (J5-9335). Pseudonyms are used in the case studies for the names of the Slovene companies involved.

2. Foreign ownership and industrial relations

Slovenia has often been characterised as a neo-corporatist exception among central and east European countries (Bohle and Greskovits 2012) or as a coordinated market economy (Feldmann 2007; Stanojević et al. 2016). A crucial feature in this apparent exceptionalism in the early period of the transition was the level of employee mobilisation (Crowley and Stanojević 2011); this was formative of the Slovene pattern of industrial relations and of crucial importance in the bid to preserve national ownership of industry by establishing a domestic capitalist class. This was helped by the legacy of Yugoslav self-managed socialism that allowed Slovene workers to articulate their interests in opposition to the relatively autonomous management of their companies (Stanojević 2018). This in turn enabled trade unions to express workers' oppositional voice when growing discontent resulted in a massive strike wave during the early 1990s (Stanojević 2018). This established trade unions as an important actor, able to influence the course of a privatisation which favoured insiders (workers and managers) and marginalised foreign bidders (Crowley and Stanojević 2011: 280; Simoneti et al. 2004). Thus, an important link between industrial relations and corporate governance was established.

Moreover, this newly acquired power enabled trade unions to enter political exchanges with capital and the government by means of a series of social pacts (Stanojević and Krašovec 2011). In exchange for incomes policies, unions were able to influence social and employment policies through a tripartite body leading to a statutory minimum wage, a relatively favourable labour code that sets out an important role for collective bargaining and an acceptable reform of the pension system. At micro level, the labour-capital compromise materialised in the form of 'coalitions of survival' (Stanojević 2004) in which workers and their representatives bargained high levels of work intensity for employment and wage stability. Insofar as management was successful and able to ensure employment stability and the regular payment of wages, trade unions adopted a relatively cooperative approach (Stanojević 2001: 240).

However, in the absence of external sources of finance, investment was dependent on internal funds, leading to a sharp trade-off between investment and wages (Domadenik et al. 2000). Hence, investment finance could only be forthcoming on the back of a redistribution from wages to capital, facilitated in practice by the incomes policy. The compensation of workers as a share of GDP fell sharply precisely during the time of the most intensive period of social pacts, from around 60 per cent in 1993 to some 51 per cent in 1999, albeit thereafter stabilising.

This industrial relations model underwent upheaval from the mid-2000s as the room for political exchange narrowed considerably after the country entered the Eurozone in 2007 (Stanojević 2018: 721). Some important laws were amended and both the government and employers gradually changed their approaches. The system of social pacts was paralysed after 2004 as the government pushed the unions into opposition by trying to pass neoliberal reforms unilaterally (including flat-rate taxation that was deflected and a reform of the social system that was adopted) and was only briefly resuscitated during the 2007-2009 period.

Before 2005, mandatory membership of the main employer organisation, Gospodarska zbornica Slovenije (GZS; Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Slovenia) and a general collective agreement for the private sector provided for virtually total coverage of the workforce by collective agreements. This was undermined by a 2006 law which reformatted GZS as a voluntary organisation, prompting a radicalisation of its positions, while collective bargaining was decentralised from national to sector level as the general collective agreement for the private sector was cancelled in 2005 (Stanojević and Klarič 2013). This started a gradual erosion of collective bargaining coverage (Figure 2.1), tempered somewhat by the extension mechanism provided in the 2006 law on collective bargaining.

Employers sought to defend competitiveness by an intensification of work and by resorting increasingly to agency labour (Stanojević 2018: 717) while changes to the welfare system (Leskošek 2011) pushed the unemployed into precarious jobs, further weakening the bargaining position of the lowest paid workers and making union recruitment more difficult. Union membership fell sharply between 2004 and 2008 (Figure 2.1). This coincided with easy access for companies to credit as Slovene banks could borrow on foreign financial markets. Loans to non-financial corporations increased from 21 per cent of GDP in 2002 to 56 per cent in 2009. The link between neocorporatist industrial relations and corporate finance was thereby severed as the domestic capitalist class no longer needed to extend concessions to the working class in return for incomes policies.

Figure 2.1 **Collective agreements coverage, union membership and density in Slovenia, 1991 to 2020**



Sources: Broder (2016); Toš (2021a, 2021b); Visser (2019); and Statistični urad Republike Slovenije (SURS, Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia) https://pxweb.stat.si/SiStat/sl.

Figure 2.2 **Bank loans to non-financial corporations and FDI stock, percent of GDP, Slovenia, 1995-2019**



Source: Bank of Slovenia (2020).

The financial crisis of 2008, coupled with procyclical measures by the central bank as well as reactions on the part of the commercial bank sector, brought heavily indebted companies to the brink of collapse (Prašnikar et al. 2015: 32-34) and external actors (European Commission, international financial markets) gained influence over policy making in Slovenia. Collective bargaining coverage fell further during the crisis due to the cancellation of some sector agreements. During the early years of the crisis, trade unions were able to hold ground, for instance by preventing the introduction of mini-jobs for the unemployed (2011) and even to improve on some labour standards, such as the sharp increase in the minimum wage in 2009. However, besides the labour market and pension reforms that were agreed by the social partners, several measures such as the mini tax reform, austerity measures (2012), the fiscal rule (2013) and the restriction of referendum rights (2013) were passed despite trade union opposition. Collective bargaining coverage declined between 2008 and 2013 owing to the cancellation of the general collective agreement for the private sector and of some sector agreements.

Regarding corporate finance and ownership, the most important measures were the establishment of a 'bad bank' in 2013, able to convert non-performing loans to companies into equity shares which were to be progressively sold off; a privatisation plan from 2013 for 15 state-owned enterprises; and the sale of most of the state's shares in banks after their recapitalisation. Taken together, these measures led to an increase in the stock of FDI from 2013, as shown in Figure 2.2.

As shown in Table 1.1 in Chapter 1, the share of foreign-owned enterprises in total value added remained lower in Slovenia than in other central and east European countries, at some 28 per cent in 2019, with the stock of FDI as a proportion of GDP standing at around 34 per cent. Foreign ownership is predominantly concentrated in manufacturing, the financial sector and trade, with most investors coming from Germany, Austria, USA, Italy and Switzerland (Bank of Slovenia 2020: 22-23, 26).

However, the standard indicators of industrial relations do not demonstrate the negative impact of foreign ownership on trade union strength. Firstly, trade union membership decline was strongest during the 2003-2008 period, when FDI as a share of GDP was stagnating, but was much more stable during the 1997-2003 and 2013-20 periods, when FDI was increasing more rapidly. This can be seen by comparing Figures 2.1 and 2.2. Secondly, as Figure 2.1 shows, while collective bargaining coverage fell rather abruptly after the mid-2000s, owing to the factors already highlighted, it stabilised and even marginally improved after 2013 as some of the cancelled sector collective agreements were renegotiated.

Interviewed in 2018, sector representatives of Zveza svobodnih sindikatov Slovenije (ZSSS; Association of Free Trade Unions of Slovenia), the largest trade union confederation in Slovenia, reported that the differences in approach to trade unions and collective bargaining between domestic and foreign-owned companies were rather small (Bembič 2019). Most reported that coverage by company collective agreements was about the same in foreign and domestic companies, with two out of the nine representatives interviewed claiming higher coverage in foreign MNCs and two lower. Neither did the difficulty of collective bargaining differ much between domestic and foreign-owned firms. However, three out of the nine representatives claimed that establishing union organisation and recruitment might be more problematic in foreign MNCs, as those from the German-speaking area often preferred to deal with works councils[3] instead of unions, while others emphasised difficulties in greenfield companies although these are rather rare in Slovenia.

These aggregate impressions could conceal important changes in the quality of relations and trade union strategies within MNCs. This could be compatible with the selective transfer of practices from home countries (cf. Jürgens and Krzywdzinski 2009; Krzywdzinski 2011) or, as argued by other researchers, a decision to undermine the social dialogue in the new EU Member States (Meardi et al. 2011; Meardi 2012).

The outcome in Slovenia, more so than in other central and east European countries, is more likely to be influenced by relatively strong trade unions capable of using a range of power resources – mainly structural, associational and institutional ones (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2013: 30-31). As regards trade union strategy (Boxall and Heynes 1997), when management is able to guarantee a high degree of job security, Slovene trade unions traditionally follow a rather cooperative approach while their strategy towards the membership mostly consists of servicing and only rarely encompasses a resort to organising (see below).

3. Works councils can be established in any company in Slovenia with more than 20 workers. The larger ones have the right to choose representatives of workers to sit on the company board and, in general, they have relatively strong information and consultation rights. For some decisions their formal agreement is required, but they do not engage in collective bargaining. Works councillors are protected against dismissal and are afforded time-off for carrying out their duties.

Looking at the list of trade union instruments as set out by Bernaciak and Kahancová (2017: 13), unions with considerable structural, associational (including organisational) and institutional power resources could be expected to rely more on traditional instruments, such as servicing and collective bargaining, supported by mobilisation when necessary. In contrast, weaker trade unions might resort to 'borrowed resources' (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2013), such as moral or discursive and coalitional power resources, correspondingly putting more weight on alternative instruments such as protests, public mobilisation and political discourse (Kahancová 2015) in the domestic arena. Unions facing hostile management might shift from a cooperative to a more adversarial approach and try to internationalise conflict either because they are weak and need to boost their resources by eliciting the support of trade unions in the MNC's home country (Myant 2020) or simply because the instruments at their disposal and the response framework at national level might no longer prove appropriate (Marginson 2016). Finally, trade unions might turn to active organising in order to replenish their power resource which, nevertheless, requires a break with past practice as well as some resources to start with (Myant 2020: 31).

3. The retail sector

Labour Force Survey data[4] show that about 80 000 people work in the retail sector of whom some 64 per cent are either in standard (i.e. full-time and permanent) employment or are full-time permanent agency workers. The remainder are engaged on non-standard contracts. The average wage was 79 per cent of the national average in 2019.[5] Foreign-owned MNCs in retail accounted for 48 per cent of value added in the sector in 2019, with productivity and average wages slightly above the average levels in domestic-owned companies, as shown in Tables 1.3 and 1.4. In food retail, foreign MNCs are even more prominent: the five largest companies control more than 90 per cent of the market (UMAR 2015: 11) and only one of them is in domestic ownership.

Several trade unions are present in food retail, but only Sindikat delavcev trgovine Slovenije (SDTS; Trade Union of Workers in the Trade Sector of Slovenia), a member of ZSSS, is officially represented at sector level. All the major food retailers, including the MNCs, are affiliated to the largest employer association in the sector, Trgovinska zbornica Slovenije (TZS; Chamber of Commerce of Slovenia), but most are also members of other associations, predominantly GZS and Združenje delodajalcev Slovenije (ZDS; Employer Association of Slovenia). Trade union density is around 15 per cent in retail as a whole and about 15-17 per cent in food retail, albeit with wide differences between chains. Density in the largest, foreign owned Tradiret, is around 30-40 per cent but in the second largest retailer it is just 10 per cent.

The domestic trade sector is covered by a collective agreement, extended across all employers. This includes clauses on wages and various further benefits, establishes detailed provisions on working time, including rest periods and holidays, and sets

4. SURS, https://pxweb.stat.si/SiStat/sl, available upon request.
5. SURS, https://pxweb.stat.si/SiStatData/pxweb/sl/Data/-/0701011S.px

conditions for the operation of trade unions within companies. In the majority of areas, the sector agreement improves upon the labour standards laid down by law, but it also exploits the derogations allowed by the Slovene labour code in specific areas.[6] The agreement formally sets the lowest wages at levels below the statutory minimum; pay cannot fall below the statutory minimum, however, and the provision in the agreement is purely a computational category used to calculate wage supplements. A notable achievement of the 2018 sector collective agreement was that it banned work on national holidays.

In food retail, only Tradiret has a company collective agreement while other companies, especially the MNCs, prefer to negotiate only at sector level.

The sector union representative (Interview 2.8 and 2.9) reports no major differences between domestic companies and MNCs in the area of collective bargaining (other than the latter preferring to negotiate at sector level) or in attitudes towards unionisation. Furthermore, there have been no major changes after takeovers by foreign MNCs. The most pronounced differences relate to mode of entry as it is more difficult to unionise greenfield companies than retain presence on brownfield sites. The business model is also important and the discount chains in particular tend to resist unionisation.

In general, the sector trade union's strategy in relation to employers is cooperative and the representative claims that social dialogue operates at a very high level. Besides collective bargaining other instruments deployed by the trade unions include litigation, collaboration with political parties and media campaigns such as the successful 2020 campaign against Sunday working in the retail sector where SDTS cooperated with the parliamentary party Levica (The Left). Industrial disputes in the sector are extremely rare. Despite cooperation with trade unions from other countries, mainly ex-Yugoslavia, Germany, Austria and Italy, and an affiliation to UNI Commerce, SDTS has never tried to use these links to put pressure on the management of an MNC. International contacts are used to gain access to information and the dissemination of best practice.

Membership recruitment and establishing union organisations in unorganised companies, such as greenfield MNCs, mostly relies on a servicing model: the trade union first identifies breaches of a sector collective agreement or of the law, usually after workers' complaints, and then approaches management on behalf of workers to solve the issue in a cooperative manner. Workers usually join the union after the successful intervention. For instance, SDTS spotted that payroll accounting in the French MNC Leclerc was incorrect and, after the problem was solved in dialogue with management, some 20 per cent of the workforce joined the union.

The strategy of a cooperative approach towards employers and a membership servicing model is, however, reversed when a company refuses to cooperate with the trade union or even resists unionisation. In such cases the trade union may call in the labour inspectorate which can cause major problems for companies by making it more difficult

6. Derogations from the law are only allowed in sector agreements in specific areas. This option was introduced in the 2001 labour code and extended by the 2013 reform.

to obtain work permits for foreign workers, especially in the prevailing situation of labour shortages. The single most effective instrument, however, is media campaigning as companies in retail are very sensitive to negative publicity. If faced by MNC resistance to unionisation, SDTS is willing to incorporate certain elements of the organising model and build coalitions with external activists.

3.1 Tradiret – the traditional retailer

Tradiret was established in the period of self-managed socialism and was privatised in 1993 when two state managed funds became the largest owners. It expanded quickly by merger and acquisition to become the largest food retail company in Slovenia, but also a heavily-indebted one. Positioning itself as a channel retailer (Rudolph and Meise 2012: 137), it features various formats from small convenience stores to supermarkets and large hypermarkets. After the two state funds sold their shares, the company ended up in the hands of a private domestic owner that failed in 2008, with the shares seized by domestic banks. In 2013, these were sold to another highly indebted conglomerate from central and eastern Europe. Employing some 10 000 workers and controlling about 30 per cent of the market, the company remains the largest retailer in the Slovenian food retail industry.

Tradiret's business strategy as a channel retailer relies on quality of service requiring involved and skilled employees who are, however, in short supply especially in the delicatessen, butchery, fishmongery and bread departments that involve intense contact with customers. The company's high level of indebtedness narrows management's room for manoeuvre, leading to low wages despite the skill requirements, a major source of discontent in the company. The skill retention problem has led Tradiret to offer standard contracts of employment from day one (previously contracts were for fixed terms) and to the employment of agency workers from ex-Yugoslav republics via a Slovak temp agency for deskilled shelf-stacking jobs. After a certain period, foreign agency workers are offered direct employment with Tradiret.

Tradiret is a case of brownfield investment in which there is a long history of employee representation. The new owner brought no substantial change, accepting the demand for binding commitments put by the unions before the takeover in respect of consultation on employment related issues, workers' participation in management, social dialogue and the collective agreement, as well as on retention of the company brand and the long-term development of the company. Trade unions have good access to management and, when needed, the president of the largest union in the company can arrange a meeting with the president of the management board at a few days' notice. As the union president recounts:

> I have to say that [the new owner] always had a warm attitude towards the trade union and labour. On 'D day' he became owner of Tradiret at 12 o'clock and by four the two of us had already sat down for a coffee. (Interview 2.2)

This level of cooperation also continues in terms of union recruitment. Management allows the union president to visit stores and warehouses and to present the benefits of membership to employees. The HR department even notifies the union of each new employee and the president sends an invitation listing all the services and benefits associated with union membership. Company headquarters plays no role in employee relations beyond issuing guidelines on labour costs. In fact, the trade union sees itself as a barrier against the importation of bad practices and lower labour standards from abroad.

There are actually two unions in the company that together organise 30-40 per cent of employees. Although in the past relations between the two were often quite tense, by 2020 they were cooperating closely and coordinating their positions on all important issues. There is also a works council and employee representatives on the supervisory board. The strategy of the largest trade union towards management is cooperative, accepting the argument that the company is unable to pay higher wages due to its financial situation and being willing to exchange wage moderation for an enhanced role in the regulation of non-wage issues. Both the unions are signatories to the open-ended company collective agreement which mostly improves on the pay and conditions set down in the sector agreement while also removing some of its derogations. Wages were renegotiated following minimum wage rises in 2020 and 2021.

The trade unions within the company mainly rely on institutional power (legally sanctioned structures of worker representation, established collective bargaining) and associational power (relatively high union density), temporarily enhanced by structural power (i.e. from the presence of the shortage of skilled labour).

The company is affiliated to two large employer organisations, TZS and ZDS, and management acknowledges the need for a sector collective agreement to establish a level playing field. The collective agreement in the company is seen as useful for allowing the consensus-based regulation of important areas, strengthening the legitimacy of the adopted rules.

The works council and both trade unions are involved in the regulation of all work-related developments which have an impact on workers' wellbeing, including training and health and safety issues where improvements have been achieved in providing workers with ergonomic equipment, making changes to company-provided footwear and addressing unsafe work processes. Workers' representatives are involved in the regulation and management of all company-backed social benefits, such as the company's holiday facilities, humanitarian fund and supplementary pension insurance. In relation to workers, union strategy is predominantly service oriented, mostly dealing with members' individual grievances and providing various services, such as holiday facilities, consumer loans, social assistance, etc.

In all, Tradiret is a case of the relatively successful survival of the established model of Slovene industrial relations at company level, even after takeover by a foreign company. Trade unions still enjoy relatively high density and are able to negotiate a collective agreement that significantly improves working conditions and wages. However, cases of disillusioned workers leaving the unions and the gradual erosion of membership suggest that the traditional model might not be sustainable in the long-term.

3.2 Disco – the discount retailer

Disco is part of a large MNC organised in two divisions employing hundreds of thousands of workers worldwide. Entering Slovenia in the mid-2000s it employed some 1800 workers in 2019 across 60 stores and one logistics centre. In contrast to Tradiret, Disco is a greenfield investment expanding its retail network gradually by reinvesting profits and via long-term loans. The company has increased its market share – at the expense of traditional retailers – from 4.4 per cent in 2010 (Rabuza 2017) to approximately 10 per cent in 2017 when it was the fifth largest food retailer in Slovenia (Bratanič 2018). Disco's hard discount business model (Rudolph and Meise 2012) was developed in Germany and applied in Slovenia with minimal adjustment.

Unlike channel retailers, the motto of a hard discounter is cost leadership, i.e. offering a limited assortment of private branded goods with high turnover at the lowest possible price for good product quality (Rudolph and Meise 2012; Andersen and Poulfelt 2006). The level of instore customer service is low: there are no service counters, no decoration and even shelf-stacking has been greatly simplified (Rudolph and Meise 2012). Thus, anything beyond basic generic skills becomes largely superfluous. A deskilled, malleable workforce with little autonomy is subject to strict hierarchical control with detailed rules of conduct according to the most 'efficient' practices alongside a high degree of workplace flexibility, workers swiftly switching between deskilled tasks. This permits the company to operate at minimum levels of staffing but it also results in heavy workloads.

High work intensity makes for high productivity, allowing the company to pay (hourly) wages which are above the sector average while still achieving a much lower ratio between the total wage bill and sales than traditional retailers (Andersen and Poulfelt 2006; Rudolph and Meise 2012). At the start, only part-time contracts were offered to shop assistants, partly because the required level of work intensity cannot be sustained for eight hours and probably partly also to keep staffing levels in line with fluctuations in activity, as explained by Jany-Catrice and Lehndorff for European retail trade in general (2002: 509). However, the high workload coupled with detailed rules of conduct increases the likelihood of mistakes, allowing the company to intimidate workers with disciplinary measures – a practice sometimes called 'terror tactics' (Hamann 2006: 57). Some 10 per cent of Disco's shopfloor workers were subject to a formal warning or dismissal in 2020.

Disco is affiliated to the two largest employer associations, TZS and GZS, both signatories to the sector collective agreement, but, given the hard discount model, the trade union in the company is treated as an unwanted interference in management's unilateralism, obstructing the deployment of the most 'efficient' working practices. There is no company collective agreement.

Being a greenfield investment, there was no trade union legacy in Disco and, until 2018, all attempts by SDTS to establish a union organisation failed. However, after more than 10 years of operations in Slovenia, one was established by a store manager although it only achieved a membership of around 20. Company management never recognised the union and, despite numerous attempts, the union president never managed to establish dialogue with higher management (Interview 2.5). In a conversation with the union president, one district manager even referred to the union as 'something she does in her leisure time which does not concern the company' (Interview 2.6). In late 2019, management put pressure on the president by scanning her work in search of mistakes and fired her in early March 2020.

Although management is not legally permitted explicitly to forbid workers from joining a union, it does everything in its power to discourage them. In an attempt to bypass the union, a 'social worker' from the human resource department has been appointed in order to deal with employees' complaints and concerns; management regularly removes union application forms from the staff kitchen; when union activists wait for workers outside stores in order to contact them after work, management complains to SDTS about alleged employee harassment; and management has never replied to any of the written suggestions and complaints from the union, passing the email directly to a hired law firm that always denies any wrongdoing but demands from the union the names of the individuals making complaints.

Thus, in the case of Disco a transfer of practices from the home country did occur – German hard discount chains are notorious for their hostility towards trade unions (Hamann 2006; Geppert et al. 2015) – bringing industrial relations standards which were much lower than those established in Slovenia.

Faced with an MNC which was resisting unionisation, SDTS abandoned its traditionally cooperative strategy in favour of a more adversarial stance towards the company while, in relation to workers, it combined its servicing approach with several elements of organising and coalition building. Organising deskilled shop assistants with low union density and lacking institutional support besides those provided by legislation and the sector collective agreement, the trade union could not count on structural, associational or institutional power resources. It had to make the best of organisational power by involving members and trying to borrow resources from the community.

Facing growing pressure from management, in late 2019 the president of the union in the company entered a coalition with a small socialist organisation, Center za družbeno raziskovanje (Cedra; Centre for Social Research) which was able to deliver a research and campaigning capacity with people trained in union organising (Interview 2.15). A two-pronged approach was adopted.

First, a public campaign to defend the president was prepared and carried out during Covid-19 lockdowns. The campaign aimed at exposing the hard discount business model using an online petition which was signed by several thousand people; and it also sent public letters of solidarity from the sector union and various organisations to the company demanding the president's reinstatement. The union obtained additional visibility by participating in the campaign against Sunday working in retail launched by SDTS in spring 2020.

Second, an organising approach was adopted. Two workshops with union members financed by SDTS were arranged where members were introduced to mapping techniques[7] and urged to approach their colleagues in the stores to unionise them. A committee comprising the most active members from various stores was established and held meetings every few weeks. Activists made periodic calls to selected members in every store in order to check on the recruitment process. A communications channel – a chat application similar to those used by workers and management in the stores – was established and all union members were added. Here a lively debate on virtually every aspect of trade union organisation and politics takes place, affording members access to information and giving them a voice in union related matters.

The public campaign did not achieve its ultimate goal as the union president remained dismissed, but it gave an additional boost to the organising campaign by enabling employees to identify with the grievances voiced by the union and by showing them that change is possible, as for example in the successful campaign against Sunday working. By May 2020, union membership had increased from 1 per cent to 3 per cent of employees which was considered quite a success in view of the Covid-19 lockdown and the prior sacking of the president that had been intended to intimidate workers.

Researching working conditions through interviews and surveys of workers, with the results presented to members, strengthened internal cohesion. Some potential members that anonymously attended teleconferences presenting the research results later joined the union. The research results also enabled the union to formulate demands to management. While the company rejected most of the claims, management did issue written guidelines on the issue of working time registration according to which preparation for work was to count as working time. This was in line with the union's demand and was presented to potential and actual members as proof of the union's effectiveness. The union also successfully attacked the company's practice of sending workers home before the end of a shift when sales are low in order to achieve daily productivity targets without counting the scheduled hours as if they had actually been worked. This constitutes a breach of Slovene labour law.

In the first half of 2021 the union established a coalition with the environmental movement, taking an active part in a campaign against a water regulation law proposed by the government that was subsequently rejected by a large margin in a referendum. During the campaign the union gained visibility as it was criticised by media close to the right-wing government (with one article being re-tweeted by then Prime Minister Janez Janša himself) as well as by a lawyer hired by Disco (a notable liberal opponent of the government). Both castigated the union for transcending the narrow focus on wages and working conditions. In response, the environmental movement rallied behind the

7. Mapping techniques consist of listing workers in the workplace targeted for unionisation and rating them in advance of recruitment in terms of their propensity to become members with special emphasis on those that enjoy the respect of their colleagues (Blyton and Turnbull 2004: 131).

union, with many activists joining efforts to recruit union members by approaching employees as they left work at the end of the evening shift. These 'evening actions' brought some new members and many new contacts among workers that were later approached personally and persuaded to join.

The union actively uses social media in order to communicate with potential members, personally approaching those who like the union's posts. The impact of a social media presence was revealed in the second half of 2021 when management offered workers annexes to their contracts of employment for a temporary increase in hours; the union criticised this in its channels on the grounds of the lower hourly rate, prompting workers to refuse the company's offer. This occasioned the first direct contact between company headquarters and the new union president, as two employees from the HR department turned up in her store for a discussion about employment issues.

The case of Disco is not only about a transfer to the host country of a model hostile to trade unionism, which it undoubtedly is, but also a case of a shift from a cooperative to an adversarial trade union strategy, combined with organising, when traditional approaches prove unviable. It also demonstrates extensive use of borrowed resources in the face of a lack of structural, associational and institutional power resources. The outcomes of these strategies remain an open question, as collective bargaining and formal union recognition have yet to be won while working conditions do seem poorer than in traditional retailers, especially in regard to work intensity, health and safety issues and the harsh discipline. However, membership had increased to 7-8 per cent of employees by March 2022 despite high levels of labour turnover. With members' enthusiasm fuelled by gains readily acknowledged as small, the union strategy does seem to be bringing results.

4. The automotive and metal and electrical equipment sector

This sector employed an estimated 35 000 employees in 2019 (GIZ ACS and GZS 2020), 80 per cent of whom are either on standard contracts of employment or are full-time permanent agency workers.[8] Average wages were around 93 per cent of the average national wage.[9] As shown in Tables 1.1 and 1.2, the share of MNCs in value added has risen, from 41.8 per cent in 2008 to 72.8 per cent in 2018, while their share of employment has increased, from 38.5 per cent to 71.5 per cent. Productivity and wages were only slightly higher in MNCs in 2019.

The largest trade union organising the sector is Sindikat kovinske in elektroindustrije Slovenije (SKEI; Trade Union of Metal and Electrical Workers of Slovenia), which claims official representativity in each of the three subsectors of metal, metal materials and foundries, and the electronics and electrical equipment industry. Employers are organised mainly by GZS and ZDS. Union density across the sector is stable, probably between 25 and 30 per cent, but somewhat lower in motor vehicle production.

8. SURS, https://pxweb.stat.si/SiStat/sl, available upon request.
9. SURS, https://pxweb.stat.si/SiStatData/pxweb/sl/Data/-/0701011S.px

The sector is covered by three collective agreements, one in each of the sub-sectors listed above, and with the extension mechanism applied in all. The agreements cover pay and a range of conditions, including in this case some regulation of non-standard employment. They appear more favourable to workers than the agreement for the trade sector, but they also provide employers with greater flexibility, notably with respect to working time. According to SKEI's main negotiator, more than half of unionised companies have reached company collective agreements.

There are no important differences between domestic and foreign-owned companies in terms of their relations with company trade unions, according to the president of SKEI (Interview 2.13 and 2.14). The most important factor influencing unionisation is mode of entry as greenfield sites appear much more difficult to unionise compared to retaining union organisation in brownfield investments, which is the more frequent mode of entry. Foreign MNCs do appear more willing to enter collective bargaining at company level, especially those coming from the German-speaking area, although this may be due to them being simply larger than domestic companies. However, she categorically rejects the suggestion that Slovene managers are in any way defenders of social dialogue or that domestic ownership is in any respect more favourable to trade unions. Both domestic and foreign-owned companies alike are keen to devolve an increasing number of provisions to company collective bargaining. Finally, inducing competition for investment and playing off workers in one location against those in another does not constitute an important factor. MNCs might threaten the relocation of production, but the representative is convinced that succumbing to such threats of ceasing operations only slows down economic development and wage growth:

> I think that we are, in a way, gradually growing up in this area. Of course, the fear is always present and at the end of the day it turns out that [wages] are a factor [in MNCs' decisions]. But maybe it is sometimes better if they leave sooner rather than later. Because in this way they make room for others that may be better. (Interview 2.14)

The leadership of the sector union believes that there is a commonality of interest with employers, including foreign MNCs, and it has therefore adopted a strictly cooperative strategy. Typically, the process of the establishment of a trade union within a company starts with a call by a disgruntled employee. A meeting with workers follows and, if there is consensus about organising a union, a representative of the sector union contacts the company, arranges an interview and explains that a trade union is going to be established, trying to persuade management that it is in the best interest of both sides that everything runs as smoothly as possible. Management rarely resists unionisation. Hence, collective bargaining and social dialogue are the instruments of choice when dealing with employers. Notwithstanding the cooperative approach, the union is able to mobilise its membership when needed: trade unions in the sector recorded the highest level of strike activity in the Slovenian private economy during the 2009-2018 period, with SKEI being one of the few trade unions able to carry out a successful sector-wide strike after 2009 (Žunec 2019: 25 and 29-30).

When dealing with European MNCs, SKEI often uses contacts with trade unions in the home country, but mostly to enable the union to obtain information on financial conditions and on trends across the MNC during collective bargaining rather than as a means of pressurising headquarters. Media pressure in the host country and direct contacts with headquarters may also be used, but are not particularly important.

The union bases its strategy in relation to workers on the servicing model, especially in supporting individual members in their relations with management and in ensuring compliance with laws and collective agreements. Litigation and legal assistance are important instruments. Other services include loans at reduced interest rates and various consumer-oriented benefits, plus union-organised sports events such as fishing and football tournaments. Despite being able to mobilise the membership for industrial action when needed, SKEI does not appear to adopt an active organising approach.

4.1 Appliprod – home appliances producer

Appliprod is a producer of home appliances but two of the company's subsidiaries – producers of tools and industrial equipment – form part of the Slovene automotive and mobility cluster. As an employer the company is of immense importance to the local community and is a major exporter from Slovenia. It has long been considered a role model and as a trendsetter in industrial relations, such as in 2009 when a spontaneous strike broke out with a final settlement that induced a very similar increase in the national minimum wage a few months later. Appliprod employs around 10 000 workers across Europe, including some 6000 in Slovenia.

After experiencing deep troubles for some years, the company, which used to be one of the largest MNCs headquartered in Slovenia, was sold in 2018 to a Chinese owned MNC with tens of thousands of employees around the world. On the part of the buyer the motivation for the takeover was probably access to the European market, expansion of the product range and access to technology. The company was also strong in innovative design; R&D remains concentrated in Slovenia and was even expanded in 2020 when Appliprod became the MNC's R&D centre for cooking appliances and washing machines. Nevertheless, the new owners brought an increased reliance on non-standard, mainly fixed term, contracts and announced redundancies of around 1000 workers in early 2020. There was also a notable increase in the intensity of production after the takeover with a sharp increase in physical productivity.

Being a brownfield investment in a company with highly-developed industrial relations, the new management accepted the trade union and collective bargaining from the outset but had less understanding of the works council:

> We found it difficult to explain to them about the works council. [...] They said: Yes, you have some kind of socialism and self-management. But we replied: No, we have worker participation. (Interview 2.10)

Management has never objected to the works council's existence, although foreign managers rarely attend the meetings where sharp exchanges sometimes take place between worker representatives and management. The president of the trade union has no problem accessing the director of the company, although relations with management are now more business-like and less consensus-based than under domestic ownership.

The structures of employee representation have undergone substantial changes following the takeover. With integration into the MNC's European operations, the existing European Works Council (EWC) was disbanded and a new one covering the wider group has yet to be established. The legal status of Appliprod was also changed from a joint stock to a limited liability company, which meant abolishing the supervisory board that used to include employee representatives, depriving workers of an important channel of representation.[10] The worker director retained his position after the takeover, but his influence was weaker without the support mechanism of employee representatives on the supervisory board. Furthermore, he retired in 2021 and management does not seem at all keen on engaging a replacement. All these changes have substantially reduced the flow of information to the trade union.

Under the new owners there has been a notable shift in approach from consensus-based relations to ones marked by managerial unilateralism. The redundancies announced in March 2020 were opposed and eventually deflected (see below), while threats of relocation are ever-present but do not seem to play a major part. The new management tried to increase the share of variable pay, unilaterally imposing a performance-related pay scheme despite the union's opposition. However, the scheme backfired as even those workers that financially benefited from it refused to have anything to do with it, claiming that it was unfair.

After these failures of unilateralism, it seems that management has begun to accept the role of the union as a negotiating partner which confers a certain legitimacy on the measures they agree. Despite greater difficulty in reaching a collective agreement, the inherited labour standards remain largely intact while the wages of the lowest-paid and workers with skill profiles which are in short supply are regularly negotiated to reflect increases in the minimum wage and to reduce turnover.

The overall strategy of the trade union in Appliprod towards management remains largely cooperative as company survival and success is still seen as an important shared objective. Despite the change in relations with management, the union views the takeover positively, as a factor stabilising the company's financial position. The union often presents its demands as consistent with the company's objectives, for instance by emphasising the loyalty of long-serving employees when arguing against fixed term contracts.

10. The legislation provides a certain number of seats for workers' representatives at board level in shareholding companies (both two-tier structure and those with a single board structure), but not in those with limited liability. In both shareholding and limited liability companies with more than 500 employees, the works council can propose a worker representative on the management board (worker director) who is then appointed by the supervisory board (in companies with a two-tier structure); or one of the executive directors who is then appointed by the board (in companies with a single board structure).

When faced with managerial unilateralism, the union could have tried to turn to a more adversarial approach, but mobilising workers proved difficult with the increased share of workers on non-standard contracts and after the announcement of redundancies in 2020. Instead, the union used its institutional power resources through the worker director and the union-controlled works council, which has a statutory role in collective redundancy procedures, and was able to stall the process. Finally, with its diminished capability to mobilise workers the trade union increasingly turned to borrowed resources, building a coalition with the local community for protest action, including the local press, to put pressure on management and expose the company to bad publicity. As the union president admits:

> I have been the president of the trade union since 2009. But now, since [the new owner] and all this started to happen, I am getting much more involved with the local community than before. (Interview 2.10)

The combination of procedural devices, media campaigns and protest was eventually successful in preventing the layoffs as it bought enough time until demand for the company's products had picked up, forcing management to abandon the plans for collective redundancies.

International contacts do exist, mostly within IndustriALL Europe, and could potentially turn useful but are kept as a weapon of last resort. In relations with the membership the union retains a predominantly servicing strategy. A large part of membership recruitment used to take place at worker assemblies although these were discontinued during the Covid-19 pandemic.

To summarise, the takeover has tested the power of the trade union in Appliprod. Faced with a sharp turn from a long tradition of consensus-based relations to management unilateralism the union found itself ill-prepared, but nevertheless managed to use institutional resources with a degree of flexibility, combining them with borrowed resources afforded by the local community. Resilience has paid off and the union has been able to preserve most labour standards while, after some failures, the new management has come to realise the value of having a collective representation of workers with which to negotiate. The weakest link seems to be the union's approach to members as, in the absence of established routes for membership recruitment, even the advantage of a large workplace in what used to be a stronghold of trade unionism has proven to be no barrier to a gradual decline in the density rate.

4.2 Autosup – the automotive supplier

This company has been owned by various state managed funds, including the 'bad bank', and was one of the companies listed for privatisation in 2013. Producing electrical equipment for automotives and other industrial sectors, the company had long-term contracts with several producers of industrial vehicles and was developing its own automotive programme. Its exports reach some 97 per cent of production. It was bought in 2014 by a German-based supplier of auto components employing almost

100 000 workers. With some 1500 people at home and another 1000 abroad before the takeover, Autosup has always been of great significance to the regional economy.

Even before the takeover the company had a strong R&D department in which it had invested heavily and where some 8 per cent of all its workforce in Slovenia was employed. Five years after the takeover, employment at sites in the country had expanded by one-third, reaching approximately 2000 workers, while the R&D department had expanded even faster, to around 300 workers, constituting some 15 per cent of total employment. The Slovene site became one of fifteen major R&D centres in the MNC. For the acquiring company, the takeover therefore meant access to cheap but highly skilled professional labour as well as production facilities.

After the takeover some production was transferred from Austria, taking advantage of lower wages in Slovenia but arousing resentment and fears from the local management that the new owner would turn it into a low-cost production operation. In fact, there was increasing worker discontent over wages, the starting level of which lagged behind a relatively fast growth in the statutory minimum wage, placing an increasingly large share of workers on the minimum. In addition, as the company sought to attract engineers in a tightening labour market with high starting salaries, seniority differentials were eroded, arousing resentment among senior engineers. The trade union thus demanded a new wage payment system.

Before the takeover, Slovene managers worked hand-in-hand on the new payment system with the trade union which was in any case deeply involved in the everyday operations of the company and the regulation of working processes (Interview 2.11). Similar to Tradiret, the foreign buyer agreed before the takeover to the binding commitments demanded by the union regarding social issues and the development of the company in the five years following the takeover, while the new management was also reported as being very open towards the trade union.

However, the new wage payment system proved to be an immediate stumbling block: the negotiated system would have set the lowest starting wage at the level of the minimum wage while the pay structure would be compressed in order to keep the resulting increase in the total wage bill to 8-12 per cent. Senior management regarded this as unacceptably high and decided to pull out of the negotiations and adopt a hostile approach towards worker representatives in place of the previous cooperative one.

Accusing the trade union of destructive behaviour by striving to increase costs beyond any level that was reasonable, the flow of information to the union dried up overnight. This followed a change in the shareholding structure to a limited liability company that took place soon after the takeover and which meant the abolition of the supervisory board, stripping workers of an important source of information and influence. The established practice of a union seminar for new hires taking place after the mandatory health and safety training, which presented the single most important channel for the union's recruitment, was discontinued. Finally, management tried tactically to divide workers' representatives by refusing to hold joint sessions between the trade union and the works council, retaining cooperation with the latter and trying to isolate the former.

Management also tried to take control of the works council although elections to this body, carried out by postal ballot due to the pandemic, failed to reach the requisite quorum. Workers' representatives were also frequently reminded about the possibility of the relocation of production but, being aware of the MNC's investment plans and labour shortages in Slovenia, they largely ignored these threats.

The growing conflict was eventually resolved after industrial action. After management pulled out of negotiations and started to put pressure on workers' representatives, the latter first responded with a media campaign and by directly contacting company headquarters with a letter signed by a large number of workers. This enraged local management. Once the trade union realised that management was not willing to consent to the new wage pay system, it called a warning strike, demanding an across-the-board increase of 15 per cent, a substantial increase in holiday bonus and the return of annual leave entitlement that management had denied during the conflict.

The warning strike was hugely successful. Management agreed to virtually all of the union's demands (with the exception of wages that were increased by 5 per cent in 2021 and by another 5 per cent plus inflation in 2022) and changed its approach once again. The flow of information from management to the union resumed and the latter revived work on the new wage payment system in cooperation with the HR department. A local manager with competence in the area of social dialogue was appointed to the management board while the head of the HR department was replaced with one more attuned to cooperation and who seems to perceive the union as a partner in her efforts to reduce labour turnover. Finally, new regulations on working time and on annual leave, as demanded by the union, were agreed. In sum, relations improved substantially.

Despite the conflict, the trade union has adopted a thoroughly cooperative strategy in its approach to management as it is oriented towards the company's development and its market success, prioritising its long-standing role as a provider of valuable input from a worker standpoint and in facilitating work processes. Even the contentious issue of the wage payment system had been formulated as a means to reduce turnover among highly skilled professional staff. Also, the union did not hesitate to sign an agreement on shorter working hours with a corresponding reduction in wages in order to support the company during the pandemic.

Such a cooperative approach by the trade union has, however, been adopted from a position of strength. The main power resources at the union's disposal are structural power, due to the large share of highly skilled workers coupled with a tight labour market for engineers, and considerable associational power and organisational power, as the strike has amply demonstrated. Underpinned by these resources, the union relies on traditional instruments of collective bargaining and social dialogue, but it readily resorts to mobilisation when needed:

> The difference is noticeable. Obviously, the new team failed to detect that the union has such power and influence and this warning strike gave them a cold shower. (Interview 2.12)

The trade union used its international contacts to gather information on the foreign buyer when the company became shortlisted as a potential new owner but, after the takeover, borrowed resources – that is, international contacts via the EWC – have not played a particularly prominent role. The EWC is important in the view of representatives mostly because it allows the local trade union direct contact with headquarters, bypassing local management.

However, the union's approach to the membership could be a source of longer-term problems. The strategy relies largely on a servicing model with the most important services being the organisation of various events, sports and legal assistance. According to representatives, members also appreciate the ability to influence the internal bylaws of the company that regulate work-related issues. With few new members and an ageing membership, union density in Autosup has declined. Reliance on employer-granted access to the means of recruitment, here as in many Slovene companies, might turn out to be a significant liability in the case of protracted conflicts in the event of which the union would have to invent a more self-reliant approach to recruitment.

5. Discussion and conclusions

The cases presented above show that the arrival of MNCs has had a substantial impact on industrial relations in Slovenia. The picture is one of foreign ownership bringing major upheavals in the established pattern of Slovene industrial relations alongside attempts at the realignment of power relations in favour of capital and management. These can, to a certain extent, be countered by changes in trade union strategies.

The most visible changes relate to the institutional area. Even though in most of the case studies the existence of trade unions and the presence of collective bargaining within companies were accepted by the foreign owners, the established institutional arrangements were upset in three out of four of them: supervisory boards which had reserved seats for worker representatives were abolished; the EWC of one Slovene MNC was disbanded; there were attempts to substitute the trade union with the works council; and breaches of formal law and/or collective agreements also occurred. Beside changes to narrowly understood institutions, efforts to reshape the balance of power have taken various forms from outright union busting by ignoring its existence, preventing recruitment and dismissing the union leader (Disco); enlarging the share of non-standard employment and making threats of major redundancies (Appliprod); and disrupting established channels of recruitment, curtailing information and attempting to co-opt and take over the works council (Autosup). Interestingly, however, in neither of the two manufacturing plants have threats of relocation played a major role in all this.

Furthermore, it is important to note that the transfer of industrial relations practices from western Europe is not necessarily favourable to the power of trade unions in Slovenia, as illustrated by our two cases of German MNCs. In the case of Disco the transfer brought substantially lower labour standards than those prevailing in the Slovene retail sector, while the attempt to substitute the trade union with the works council in the case of Autosup was obviously a bid to outmanoeuvre the union.

How are unions responding to these attempts and are they successful in overcoming the challenges? As our case studies show, when faced with management's bids to reshape internal relations, traditionally cooperative trade unions have added a more adversarial string to their bow, mobilising various resources and deploying a wide array of instruments. Based on our case studies, we are able to propose a few hypotheses on the factors that influence trade union success in foreign MNCs.

Institutional power resources, defined either as 'social compromises that were agreed upon in the past' (Dörre et al. 2009: 37) or the 'legacy' of union existence and collective bargaining in brownfield investments, appear the single most important element in trade union presence and collective bargaining practice. As suggested by most sector trade union representatives, foreign MNCs tend to accept these two basic institutions of industrial relations in Slovenia. But, as shown in Appliprod, while legacy may help, it is no guarantor of improvements.

The most effective instrument enabling unions to achieve tangible results through collective bargaining seems to be mobilisation which, however, may require abundant organisational and/or structural power resources. This is most clearly visible in the case of Autosup. Here, the union was able to resolve the conflict, increase wages and holiday pay and force management to cooperate with the union by mobilising members, despite its attempt to scale down the structures of employee representation (institutional power) and to sideline the union.

Apart from the mere existence of unions and collective agreements, institutional power resources matter because unions can rely on them to defend the gains achieved and improve working conditions. Tradiret provides a clear case of institutional power which was not challenged by management and which enabled the union to improve working conditions. The trade union in Appliprod made ample use of institutional arrangements to delay collective redundancies for several months until demand had picked up, after which the plans for redundancies were scrapped. Furthermore, the company's management eventually realised the drawbacks of managerial unilateralism. Another example is Disco, where the identification of breaches of labour legislation and the sector collective agreement (institutional power) helped the union force the company into compliance which was, in turn, used as proof of union effectiveness. Another important aspect of the institutional environment is the minimum wage which increased by almost 15 per cent between 2020 and 2022, encouraging unions to bargain for wage increases in Tradiret, Appliprod and Autosup.

Where basic power resources (structural, associational, organisational and institutional) are found lacking or inadequate, a combination of what does exist and borrowed resources may help. The cases of Appliprod and, to an even larger extent, Disco are good examples of such alternative approaches as both unions entered coalitions, with the latter transcending traditional concerns with wages and working conditions. That paid off handsomely in terms of visibility and support from other movements. In line with our expectations, the use of borrowed resources also implies changes in the instruments deployed – media campaigns and the use of a political discourse appear much more prominent in Appliprod and Disco than in Tradiret and Autosup where more traditional instruments were able to bring results.

Somewhat surprisingly, although most of the trade unions in our case studies have many international contacts, they do not seem to expect much from them and rather rely on local resources that appear to continue to be sufficiently effective.

The employment of organising instruments seems to be of crucial importance for the long-term viability of Slovene trade unions. Servicing alone seems insufficient for retaining an adequate membership base while reliance on employer-granted access to prospective membership makes unions vulnerable to employer sanctions. The failures of trade unions in Autosup, Appliprod and Tradiret to increase membership seem to point to troubles in membership recruitment even when unions are able to deliver relatively large gains from collective bargaining as well as provide a wide array of services. On the other hand, the trade union in Disco has been able to make significant progress by investing heavily in organising tactics in a hostile environment and by achieving superficially rather modest gains in terms of employer concessions.

Finally, structural power in the form of tight labour markets and scarce skills obviously matters as indicated by the shift to permanent contracts in Tradiret; by the sheer mobilising capacity of a trade union organising a site with a large share of disgruntled professional labour alongside a strong R&D department in Autosup; and by trade unions' ability to negotiate improvements in the wages of those whose skill profiles are in short supply in Appliprod. It remains open, however, whether these gains can be sustained during the hard times of economic downturn.

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All links were checked on 03.10.2022.

Annex

List of interviews and communications

ID	Position / organisation	Sector / level	Date of interview
Interview 2.1	Worker representative, Tradiret	Retail / company	March 2016
Interview 2.2	Worker representative, Tradiret	Retail / company	February 2020
Interview 2.3	Management representative	Retail / company	June 2020
Interview 2.4	Worker representative, Disco	Retail / company	December 2018
Interview 2.5	Worker representative, Disco	Retail / company	November 2019
Interview 2.6	Worker representative, Disco	Retail / company	2020-2022 (personal communication)
Interview 2.7	Worker representative, Disco	Retail / company	2021-2022 (personal communication)
Interview 2.8	Trade union representative	Retail / national	January 2018
Interview 2.9	Trade union representative	Retail / national	December 2021
Interview 2.10	Worker representative, Appliprod	Automotive and metal / company	October 2021
Interview 2.11	Worker representatives, Autosup	Automotive and metal / company	September 2021
Interview 2.12	Worker representative, Autosup	Automotive and metal / company	January 2022
Interview 2.13	Trade union representative	Automotive and metal / national	January 2018
Interview 2.14	Trade union representative	Automotive and metal / national	July 2021
Interview 2.15	Cedra activists	National	August 2021

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