

## **Governance for sustainable development**

The idea of sustainable development resonates widely with policy-makers and the public alike and is often found in documents or vision statements mapping the way forward for both developed and developing economies. It is one of the fundamental aims of the European Union, prominently set out in article 2 of the Treaty on European Union.

In 2006, the EU agreed a revised Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS) which not only updated the aims of the strategy that had been established five years earlier, but elaborated the governance mechanisms intended to advance these aims. Individual Member States also have bodies with various roles in fostering or monitoring sustainable development: in 2006, for example, the UK assigned a watchdog role to an independent commission. The United Nations, too, has an agency – the *Commission on Sustainable Development* – set up in 1992 and charged with promoting sustainable development and the 2002 Johannesburg summit – the *World Summit on Sustainable Development* – was a showcase for the world's ambitions. The resulting 'Plan of Implementation' (United Nations, 2002) offers a comprehensive list of aims and is replete with rousing rhetoric, though disturbingly short on credible obligations.

Yet despite the enthusiasm for the concept and the spread of initiatives and strategies, it is far from obvious either that the current trajectory of economic development is sustainable or that inroads are being made into global sustainability problems. Indeed, since the Brundtland report (WCED, 1987) first set out a comprehensive view of sustainable development, the concept has been narrowed towards environmental – especially climate change – and quality of life issues (seen as richer, developed country pre-occupations), although the original conception

was as much about economic development. An especially critical view is offered by Victor (2006: 93) who observes that ‘even as sustainable development has become conventional wisdom over the past two decades, something has gone horribly wrong’, and he notes the ‘capture’ by diverse special interest groups and a proliferation of ‘largely meaningless checklists and targets’.

That there are shortcomings in the governance of sustainable development is undeniable and it is evident that there is a pervasive reluctance to confront some of the more intractable challenges. These notes review definitions, examine the governance *of* sustainable development and try to tease out ideas on policy developments that might enhance governance *for* sustainable development.

## 1. Defining sustainable development

Most people have an intuitive understanding of what the term ‘sustainable development’ encompasses, and would tend to associate it with variations on the definition first adopted by the Brundtland report that sustainable development implies meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. There are three distinct facets of this definition that should be stressed. First, a balance has to be struck in depleting scarce resources so that today’s generation can enjoy an adequate quality of life without depriving successor generations. ‘Scarce resources’ in this context comprises a mix of those that are lost irretrievably once consumed (such as oil stocks), those that can be re-cycled (many materials) and those that can be regenerated with competent management. An argument can also be made that social policies that promote life-long learning and engage those more distant from the labour market are about maintaining the stock of human capital.

Second, the present generation has to avoid leaving a legacy that is detrimental to the well-being of future generations. Environmental degradation is the obvious example here with extreme forms associated with contamination of industrial sites that will take centuries to recover naturally. However, it is important also to recognise that there are social and economic dimensions to legacies. Extreme poverty or endemic disease

are just as debilitating as a poisoned environment and will often be seen as more immediate political challenges. In so many African countries, the loss of such a high proportion of the prime age population to AIDS is having a devastating effect not just on economic potential but on social relations. At a political level, actual or perceived inequalities or social injustices can give rise to reactions that culminate in terrorism.

Third, there are the obligations to provide infrastructure and social capital for the future, just as previous generations have provided capital from which today's benefits <sup>(1)</sup>. A specific element here is pensions and care for the elderly which, in ageing populations such as the EU and China, raises complex questions about the sustainability of inter-generational arrangements domestically, although there is also an international dimension. For many in the developed world, capitalised pension funds imply investment in emerging markets (indeed the rules in many countries oblige fund managers to seek the highest returns consistent with a level of risk). Such investment improves the availability of funding for developing economies that might struggle to finance investment, but also creates governance challenges to do with the sustainability of investment. Equally, immigration is canvassed as one of the ways in which ageing populations can sustain their work forces, raising complex inter-country challenges around social provision for migrants and the burden of investing in human capital – 'brain drain' for some; 'brain gain' for others.

## **2. Governance of sustainable development**

Sustainable development is often closely linked to analyses of globalisation, especially in relation to its social and environmental impacts. Since the late 1980s, the range of governance instruments and processes has expanded as the world struggles to develop a coherent approach. It is in the environmental area that most effort has been made,

---

<sup>1</sup> Anyone working in London, as the present author does, cannot fail to be struck by the fact that there is (only) now a major effort underway to renovate and upgrade sewers constructed in the Victorian era.

with multi-lateral – albeit incomplete – processes such as the Kyoto protocol, with its targets for lowering of emissions of greenhouse gases. The social dimension seems to have advanced significantly less. The word ‘development’ also deserves to be stressed. The Millennium Development Goals (MDG) emerged partly from the momentum of the 1992 Rio summit that, in turn, took forward the Brundtland Report and can, thus, be seen as a product of the global approach to sustainable development. The limited progress towards achieving these goals (see box 1) raises a number of governance issues, about whether the strategic framework and the institutional machinery are adequate. Moreover, the aim of improving the health and well-being of the world’s poorest people is patently not being achieved, especially in much of sub-Saharan Africa.

Many regard globalisation as a generally positive force, a good advocate being the prominent economist Jagdish Bhagwati (Bhagwati, 2005). However, in its report published in 2004, the ILO’s World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization (WCSDG) documents the inequitable distribution of the benefits of globalisation. The ILO is clear in its policy message that ‘wealth is being created, but too many countries and people are not sharing in its benefits. They also have little or no voice in shaping the process. Seen through the eyes of the vast majority of women and men, globalization has not met their simple and legitimate aspirations for decent jobs and a better future for their children.’ The inequities are of two sorts: benefits tend to accrue disproportionately to some groups and only marginally to others, but there are also those who lose absolutely from globalisation. The implication is that although there are frequently-stated aims of promoting sustainable development, these aims are not well matched by institutional development and policy innovation.

### **Box 1: The faltering progress towards the Millennium Development Goals**

The eight MDGs – which, given the political trajectory that led to them, can be interpreted as a vision of sustainable development attuned to developing countries – comprise six that can be described as social, one environmental and one to do with governance; they are to:

- Eradicate extreme hunger and poverty, halving the proportions of the population subject to hunger or incomes of \$1 a day or lower;
- Achieve universal primary education;
- Promote gender equality and empower women;
- Reduce child mortality by two thirds for under fives;
- Improve maternal health, reducing maternal mortality by two-thirds;
- Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases;
- Ensure environmental sustainability, by introducing environmental sustainability programmes, by halving the proportion of the population with unsafe drinking water, and by improving the life of at least 100 million slum dwellers;
- Develop a global partnership for development, covering a wide range of initiatives.

The latest UN assessment states that, half way towards the 2015 target date, sub-Saharan Africa is not on track to achieve any of the Millennium Development Goals, and notes that even the best governed African countries are failing to make enough progress in reducing extreme poverty. Of 18 indicators shown in a summary assessment (\*), the UN estimates that in 2007, only one (measles immunization) is considered likely to be met by 2015 in sub-Saharan Africa, but is more than offset by deterioration in other causes of infant mortality. Eight of the indicators are adjudged to be 'target is not expected to be met by 2015', while the remaining nine are described as 'no progress or a deterioration or reversal'. Other developing regions fare better, though areas such as South Asia also seem unlikely to attain the goals on schedule, with the implication that sustainability remains distant.

\* <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/mdg2007-progress.pdf>.

The EU's Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS), initially agreed at the 2001 Gothenburg European Council, was revised in 2006 and is one of a number of 'mega-strategies' put in place in recent years. These strategies are, inevitably, primarily inward-looking, with the SDS emphasising environmental aims, alongside social cohesion and competitiveness, as internal EU objectives. It identifies seven key challenges and corresponding overall objectives and targets (see box 2). Despite having three distinctive over-arching aims, the SDS appears, in these seven challenges, to be dominated by environmental objectives. But along with the EU's energy and competitiveness strategies, there is an increasing disposition to integrate external dimensions. Thus, the SDS addresses global dimensions of sustainability that had been prominent in the Brundtland report and that have arisen in other initiatives such as the Johannesburg summit held in 2002.

In trade policy, market access for developing countries to richer countries' spending power is recognised to be essential for economic progress, yet trade talks are stalled and there are few signs that the *European Consensus on Development* is allowed to over-ride entrenched interests. In particular, the adverse effects of European (but also US and Japanese) agricultural subsidies on production in lower-income countries is well-known. Although the EU has in place a variety of processes intended to promote sustainable development within the Union, there is little beyond statements of intent in relation to the international aims of the SDS. This prompts questions about how this dimension of the strategy could be developed.

### **Box 2: The challenges at the heart of the EU's Sustainable Development Strategy**

- **Climate Change and clean energy.** To limit climate change and its costs and negative effects on society and the environment
- **Sustainable Transport.** To ensure that transport systems meet society's economic, social and environmental needs, while minimising their undesirable impacts on the economy, society and the environment
- **Sustainable consumption and production.** To promote the production and consumption of goods and services that make lesser demands on scarce resources and diminish adverse effects on the environment
- **Conservation and management of natural resources.** To improve management and avoid overexploitation of natural resources, recognising the value of ecosystem services
- **Public Health.** To promote good public health on equal conditions and improve protection against health threats
- **Social inclusion, demography and migration.** To create a socially inclusive society by taking into account solidarity between and within generations, and to secure and increase the quality of life of citizens as a precondition for lasting individual well-being
- **Global poverty and sustainable development challenges.** To promote sustainable development worldwide, and ensure that the European Union's internal and external policies are consistent with global sustainable development and its international commitments.

### **3. Towards governance *for* sustainable development**

The unsatisfactory governance of sustainable development calls for fresh thinking aimed not just at improving the current approach to key sustainability challenges, but also at shifting the terms of policy debate so that a more active pursuit of sustainable development becomes feasible, instead of just dealing with current priorities. In essence, the challenge is how to manage globalisation so as to make it consistent with a vision of sustainable development. Sound governance tends to imply being suspicious of statements replete with good intentions, but with no

regard to costs, practicalities of achieving goals or timescales. There is even more reason for caution when problems of capture by special interests of diverse characteristics are apparent. A key governance challenge will be how to nurture and build on SD measures that emerge at local level without compromising them.

In its response to the 2004 ILO report, the European Commission notes a range of areas in which the EU approach chimes with what the WCSDG advocates and argues that the EU can, in many respects, serve as a model. The Commission communication draws particular attention to gender issues (CEC, 2004a: 6), observing that 'the WCSDG highlights that in some countries globalisation has exacerbated gender imbalances. Deep-rooted and long-standing gender inequalities often result in the social costs of globalisation falling disproportionately on women'. The Commission communication goes on to list several broad domains of the external impact, including migration. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is seen as one area where EU experience may be especially salient. Another conceptual tool from EU experience of the social dimension is the notion of social protection as a productive factor.

### 3.1 How could the EU take a lead?

Recognising that the EU's experience of internal policy co-ordination of policies that promote sustainable development is considerable, could it play a similar role in leading international co-ordination? One way may be to build on the learning and exchange of experience mechanisms in the 'open method of co-ordination' adopted in the EU. A first step could be to include sessions on the methodology of policy learning on the agenda of strategic dialogue between the EU and other global regions.

Energy and climate change raise further possibilities. The EU's conditional commitment to lowering greenhouse gas emissions is a novel approach that combines a unilateral move with a promise to go further if others follow. It states that the EU will, by 2020, reduce emissions by 20% compared with 1990 levels, but the European Council undertakes to reduce EU greenhouse gas emissions by 30% by 2020 (compared with 1990), "provided that other developed countries commit themselves to *comparable emission reductions* and economically more advanced developing

countries to *contributing adequately* according to their responsibilities and respective capabilities” (emphasis added). In practice, there is only one other developed country that really matters in this regard – the United States – and the outcome of the Heiligendamm G8 summit in June 2007 hardly inspired confidence. Yet three months on, in the run-up to the UN General Assembly, the much more constructive approach of the US revealed in the proposals on CFCs may signal that the considerable pressure for action coming from below in the US is shifting attitudes.

The EU as a whole is expected to exceed its overall Kyoto target of a 8% reduction in emissions by 2012 compared with 1990, with the latest projections pointing to a 9.3% reduction for EU-15. Bearing in mind the energy intensive character of industry, pre-transition, in the eight central and eastern European countries (CEECs) which acceded to the EU in 2004, the reduction likely to be attained by the EU-27 is even larger at around 11%. The change in the CEECs is, moreover, a compelling example of how much scope there is for change when prices and the regulatory framework are used to good effect.

Building on these initial successes, limited though they may be, there is scope for the EU to lead the rest of the world in four main ways. As a governance experiment, the EU’s challenge to others to match a 30% reduction has much to commend it when the obstacles to a more ambitious reduction in emissions are considered. These obstacles are principally to do with the perception that a significant lowering of carbon use necessarily implies a threat to competitiveness. The argument is that energy is a cost of production, so that if attempts to curb emissions raise the cost of energy, EU exporters will find themselves at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis China, India, the US and other competitors who do not make polluters pay as much. Yet there are only a few industries in which energy costs are, typically, a significant factor in competitiveness, so that the risks would not be huge.

What, then, could (or should) the EU do if the conditions, which are in any case fraught with ambiguity, are not met? For example, would China and India be regarded as ‘contributing adequately’ if they were simply to slow the growth of their emissions and, if so, by how much would they

need to be slowed (<sup>2</sup>)? Though manifestly in a different category as a major producer of oil and gas, what can reasonably be expected of Russia? Should the nature of emissions be brought into the equation, given that Brazil is a global leader in bio-fuels which have the potential to be 'carbon neutral' (<sup>3</sup>), even though technological challenges remain? If the US continues to resist a target close to 30%, can the EU be content with limiting itself to the much softer 20% target?

A second approach the EU could take is simply to aim for a more ambitious reduction without worrying about whether others follow suit. The figure of 50% reductions by 2050 canvassed at the Heiligendamm G8 summit was again predicated on US compliance, but the figure also signals what the EU believes it can achieve on its own. The main reason for hesitation would again be that forgoing hydrocarbons as the primary source of energy would result in self-inflicted wounds to EU competitiveness. Another objection that is frequently raised is that it does not actually have much impact if the EU – or more so an individual Member State – cuts emissions while China is opening a new coal-fired power-station every month. When allied to the competitiveness argument, this becomes a strategy for inaction. Yet it is misleading to believe that China has no interest in curbing emissions and there will be increasing domestic as well as international pressures on China to deal with pollution. Air pollution in the main urban centres of China is

---

<sup>2</sup> China is about to become the world's biggest emitter of carbon, overtaking the US in absolute terms, although clearly the US's per capita emissions still dwarf China's. But as much as a third of China's emission could be curbed if it adopted best practice technologies.

<sup>3</sup> The simple proposition is that a bio-fuel, such as sugar cane, takes carbon out of the atmosphere while being cultivated, and returns the same amount when consumed. However, forest clearance (typically by burning), a lower absorption capacity of cultivated crops compared with virgin forest, transport and refinement all add to carbon emissions compared with conventional hydrocarbons, undermining the neutrality principle. In addition, it is claimed that bio-fuels emit more nitrous oxide, a more damaging greenhouse gas.

already at levels that are proving to be socially unacceptable and the experience of the most advanced countries showed that air quality was an important trigger for curbs on emissions in earlier decades. A third approach that the EU could deploy would be to push for governance methods at global level that build on the experience of the open method of co-ordination. It is important to stress that there are mixed reviews on the success of this approach, but it is also salient that where it works well, the opportunities for policy learning are considerable.

Perhaps the most imaginative broad direction that different major economies could take – the EU and China are obvious examples – in seeking to reconcile an energy deficit and a concern to boost renewable resources would be to opt for what has been called a smart growth strategy. This would entail investment that exploits new environmentally friendly technologies to achieve SD aims, but with the understanding that there are also substantial market opportunities from such an approach. Smart growth has to be predicated on changing investment strategies, because decisions today will have lasting effects, which means that decisions taken today will shape future energy demands. For this, investors need a reliable compass to guide investment strategies, implying the need to take tough but enduring decisions. The smart growth philosophy extends, similarly, to ensuring that social policy equips individuals for the new jobs that smart growth both brings and relies on, calling notably for a rethinking of training and lifelong learning. Judicious use of regulatory and pricing mechanisms, together with public procurement, can be used to promote such a ‘smart growth’ strategy. More stringent building codes and energy efficiency standards, differentiated charges for vehicle licensing, use of ‘lead’ market strategies to enable environmentally efficient energy providers to overcome the very substantial scale barriers to entry, and fiscal incentives are all prospective tools of policy that can be deployed. In the social policy arena, education and health policies have to adapt better to future labour needs, while migration needs to be handled more imaginatively.

### 3.2 Burden-sharing – a messy issue

One of the more intractable issues about promoting sustainability, whether within the EU or at global level, is that it imposes costs, with the corollary that proposals are needed on burden-sharing. In relation to abatement of climate change, the problem is complicated by the fact that the projections for later in the 21<sup>st</sup> century of the volume of greenhouse gases show them to be the result of the stock of past emissions (predominantly from developed countries) and the flow over the coming years of current emissions, where developing countries are rapidly overtaking their richer peers. Various models for allocating costs can be envisaged (discussed in depth in a Lehman Brothers study by Llewellyn and Chaix, 2007), deploying criteria such as:

- **ability to pay**, implying that richer countries pay disproportionately;
- **level of current emissions**, essentially the polluter pays principle, with a target for curbing the level, typically expressed per head of population;
- **estimated volume of past emissions** which entails working out retrospectively which countries bear the responsibility – Llewellyn (2007) reports that some 70% of the stock of carbon up to 2004 is attributable to the US, EU, Japan and Russia, with China and India accounting for just 10%;
- **distribution of benefits** in which the social, political or economic benefits of curbs are taken into account. A low-lying European country, for example, might have a higher welfare gain than, say, an upland Asian country;
- **egalitarian principles** might be advanced to justify richer countries subsidising abatements in poorer countries, thereby going beyond the ability to pay principle.

Also relevant is how abatement policies are pursued. Emissions can be cut by direct action to cut the burning of fossil fuels (principally by investment in replacing energy-inefficient equipment and buildings), but also more indirectly by investing in technology developments. The US, for example, argues that it is in the forefront in the latter category, even

if it lags behind in current abatement. The other side of the same coin is technology transfer and the related intellectual property right costs/benefits.

Similar analyses could be conducted about dealing with the costs of other facets of sustainability such as world health, world poverty or what, to adapt a well-known EU term, might be called global economic and social cohesion. There is, for example, a direct counterpart of the technology transfer issue referred to above in relation to drugs aimed at mitigating the effects of HIV. Drug companies, not surprisingly, want to charge prices that help to amortise the high costs of past and current research, implying prices much higher than the costs of marginal production, while impoverished nations are severely constrained in how much they can afford to pay. Although Bill Gates and Warren Buffett have led the way in showing that philanthropy can play a part in bridging this gap, it remains an inadequate approach to the governance of such a major issue. Labour standards, gender equality and social protection also come into the equation, while the upsurge in migration also has to be seen as a facet of sustainability. The flood of would-be migrants from Africa, drawn by the EU, is a symptom of imbalance between labour supply and demand that, in turn, results from lack of economic development which will be exacerbated by demographic trends in the two continents.

There is an obvious tension between economic development imperatives and climate change, and many developing countries have articulated resistance to curbing emissions, placing economic development as a higher priority. Energy is a lubricant of economic development and fossil fuels remain the fuel of choice in terms of cost and efficiency. But there are options, and in seeking to exploit some of them, business stakeholders are likely to be especially important in two respects: first for the actions they take themselves; and second in shifting the terms of political debate. It follows that political efforts to engage business are vital.

What, then would make sense, notably from a business perspective? Essentially, what is needed is a means of making the price of greenhouse gases (GHG), especially the burning of fossil fuels, better reflect the social as opposed to the production cost of using them. Here a number of

factors come into play. First, business craves and values certainty, and is, consequently, more likely to make the necessary long-term investments if a clear and enduring policy framework is in place. Second, policy has to deliver a tolerably level playing-field, or else there will be strong pressures to diminish policy-related costs that penalise production in locations that have impose heavier taxes or restrictions on GHG, ultimately triggering a 'race-to-the-bottom'.

Choice of mechanisms is also central. The EU has in place an emissions trading system (ETS) that, although so far pretty undemanding, is expected to constrict carbon use progressively more as it evolves. Extension of the ETS principle to the global level may therefore be appealing. However, it would face a range of difficulties of design and implementation. It is, for instance, more difficult to implement in some sectors than others, an example of the former being transport, where the driver of the vehicle is the emitter, making it much harder to design efficient emission control incentives <sup>(4)</sup>. In some other sectors, such as industry, it is more straightforward to administer emission control (see WBCSD, 2007), although special pleading will always arise. Any ETS system is also subject to the quality of monitoring and enforcement, especially in states where routine compliance with legal requirements is dubious – without the rule of law, a quasi-law cannot work.

Taxes (or subsidies) are an alternative means of using price signals to shape behaviour. Here there are many issues to confront. Who pays, and is the incidence of taxes equitable? What should be taxed or subsidised? By using the tax system to raise the costs of polluting activities, the expectation would be that consumers would shift demand to less polluting activities. But taxes inevitably raise difficult political economy problems.

---

<sup>4</sup> A study by the Tyndall Centre for *Friends of the Earth* casts severe doubts on the capacity of ETS to curb airline emissions, and favours a tax based system (Anderson *et al.*, 2007).

## **Concluding comments and issues for debate**

Sustainable development encompasses goals and obligations that deserve strong political commitment and a robust governance framework, yet it has been let down by ambiguity in its core aims, inconsistent and incoherent policies, and being subject to capture by vested interests.

Although the issue of climate change is manifestly both pressing and global in character, it is important to keep the wider aspects of sustainable development firmly on the policy agenda. In particular, there is a need – especially in the external dialogue – to restore the prominence of the social dimension.

It may be something of an exaggeration to assert that environmental sustainability is largely a rich country pre-occupation, but principles for burden-sharing need to start by recognising that other parts of the world assign a higher priority to economic development than to environmental protection. It is therefore incumbent on richer nations to facilitate development trajectories that take account of sustainability imperatives.

It is important to stress that sustainable development and growth are not incompatible; rather, it is the quality of growth that should be targeted.

Both at global level and within the EU, there is a propensity to overload the policy agenda. A resulting risk is of ‘process fatigue’ with too many reporting obligations, an undue proliferation of targets (some potentially at odds with one another) and a consequent lack of genuine or adequate commitment to each of them.

An associated risk, especially in a multi-lateral setting, is of succumbing to the lowest common denominator, often so as to achieve the broadest possible consensus. While breadth of support matters, it may be better for like-minded countries to adopt more ambitious targets. In this context, the EU should be aware of its scope for exercising leadership, not just by initiating strategies, but being prepared to go it alone.

The existence of a strategic framework and the procedures associated with it can help to motivate governments, both by providing a model to follow and a basis for political commitment, especially where the policy orientations are, ultimately in a country’s interest. If so, there would be

no reason for governments to shirk their responsibilities. However, it is generally easier for governments to respond to focused commitments than to have to reconcile different ones.

Some of the policy methodologies that have been tried in EU co-ordination processes could be effective either on the wider international stage or among new cross-border partnerships. It is therefore worth exploring how elements of the open method of co-ordination could be used elsewhere to stimulate policy learning. It would be a useful exercise to develop proposals along these lines in the EU dialogues with global partners.

It is essential to engage business actors in advancing sustainable development and to consider the governance principles that will facilitate such engagement. In particular, business contributions will be enhanced by regulatory predictability and stability in the conditions affecting investment. Long-term investment strategies are needed to shift the global economy in the direction of 'smart growth'.

At the global level, energy policy lacks adequate strategic institutional, with producer cartels on one side and rich country consumers on the other (Weiss, 2007). The idea of a more balanced World Energy Agency that brings together producer and consumer interests deserves consideration.

Bearing in mind that economic reform requires consistency and perseverance, often with reforms having to be implemented in a sequence before they bear fruit, it would be regrettable if a lack of political attention at the highest level diminished commitments to reform. But perseverance with some of the difficult policy orientations that underpin long-run change can only be kept up if there is a demonstrable political pay-off. This may be the ultimate governance challenge for sustainable development.

## References

Anderson, K., Bows, A. and Footitt, A. (2007) *Aviation in a Low-Carbon EU*, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, Manchester.

Begg, I. (2007), 'Lisbon II, Two Years on: An Assessment of the Partnership for Growth and Jobs', *CEPS Special Report*, Centre for Policy Studies, Brussels, July 2007.

Begg, I. and Larsson, A. (2007), 'Time for better governance of EU "mega-strategies"?' Paper for the European Panel for Sustainable Development, Göteborg, 6 May 2007.

Bhagwati, J. (2005), *In defense of globalization*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

CEC (2004a), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 'The Social Dimension of Globalisation - the EU's policy contribution on extending the benefits to all', COM (2004) 383 final of 18 May 2004.

CEC (2004b), 'Facing the challenge: The Lisbon strategy for growth and employment', Report from the High Level Group chaired by Wim Kok, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, November 2004 ([http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/pdf/kok\\_report\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/pdf/kok_report_en.pdf)).

ILO (2004), 'A Fair Globalization: Creating Opportunities for All', Report of the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, International Labour Office, Geneva (<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/wcsdg/docs/report.pdf>).

Llewellyn, J. and Chaix, C. (2007) *The Business of Climate Change II*, Lehman Brothers, London.

Mandelson, P. (2007), *The European Union in the global age*, Policy Network, London.

Stiglitz, J.E. (2002), *Globalization and its Discontents*, W.W. Norton, New York.

United Nations (2002), Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, 26 August-4 September 2002, United Nations, New York ([http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD\\_POI\\_PD/English/WSSD\\_PlanImpl.pdf](http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/WSSD_PlanImpl.pdf)).

Victor, D.G. (2006), 'Recovering sustainable development', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.85, No.1, pp.91-103.

WBCSD (2007), *Policy Directions to 2050*, World Business Council for Sustainable Development, Geneva ([http://www.wbcd.org/DocRoot/bdA09BFxjVkjEeXJKjle/int\\_low\\_res.pdf](http://www.wbcd.org/DocRoot/bdA09BFxjVkjEeXJKjle/int_low_res.pdf)).

WCED (1987), 'Our Common Future', Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, United Nations, New York.

Weiss, S. (2007) 'Test case Europe', *Spotlight Europe*, No.2007/05 Bertelsmann Stiftung.